Shout Out To Tampa-St Pete

I know there's a couple of readers down there, I can see you on the SiteMeter!

... Aunt Muriel? Cousin Larry? Anyone?

Please look at this and see if you can do a little to show some support. Perhaps a little cheering or something?

We each do what we each can do. It all adds up.

Thanks,

Blue
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Here Is Bacevich's Counterpoint; John McCain

A day after posting that there was no point/counterpoint between Nagl and Bacevich, SWJ puts up the content of Senator John McCain's remarks to the American Enterprise Institute.

Bacevich offered no counterpoint to Nagl. Nagl moves past the question of "why?" and gets to the "how," which Bacevich never does. McCain's remarks serve as an excellent rebuttal to Bacevich's stance. Nagl's piece stands without challenge in substance.

Anyone? COL Gentile?
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Two Very Smart Men; Missing The Point-Counterpoint

Dr. John Nagl is always ready for a point/counterpoint type of exchange with an opposing point of view. In his latest joust, Dr. Nagl takes on Professor Andrew Bacevich in U.S. News and World Report. Dr. Nagl offers a course of action that is predicated upon the belief that Afghanistan - and Central Asia - is vitally important to the security of the United States. Prof. Bacevich dismisses even addressing this issue in what appears to be a de facto assertion of the irrelevance of Central Asia to national security, and counsels that departing Afghanistan is the only way for President Obama to truly cast his legacy. This misses the Point/Counterpoint that was advertised.

More after the jump...

Dr. Nagl, the new President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS,) a Washington-based think tank which was co-founded by Michelle Flournoy, a very smart woman in her own right and recently sworn in asAmerican goals in Afghanistan have suffered from the most fundamental of all strategic errors: insufficient resources to accomplish maximalist goals. Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, presents the opinion that success in the Afghan Campaign of the GWOT is achievable. He also presents a pretty horrendous picture of what that success will cost in terms of troops deployed, at least initially. This is tempered by a call for transition to a sustainable Afghan force, backed by advisers and force multipliers such as air power, in order to maintain security gains. In the midst of this, Dr. Nagl notes that this needs to be more than a purely military solution.

While an expanded international commitment of security and development forces can assist in the achievement of these goals in the short term, ultimately Afghans must ensure stability and security in their own country. Building a state, even if it is a flawed one, that is able to provide a modicum of security and governance to its people is the American exit strategy from Afghanistan...

...Success in counterinsurgency requires the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic assistance to a country afflicted by insurgents; Gen. David McKiernan, the American commander responsible for the International Security Assistance Forces, briefed just such a strategy to a group of scholars visiting Afghanistan in November. Unfortunately, he has not been given the resources required to accomplish his mission.

These are things that have been said before here on this page, and are proof that I do not have an original thought in my head. The point here, and stated clearly in Prof. Bacevich's response, is that there is no purely military solution to any insurgency. It requires a holistic approach that we have not been pursuing.

I tend to agree strongly with most of Dr. Nagl's points, and the one that gives me pause is the troop requirement, which I believe to be excessive. On this point I may well be wrong, but my central point remains that if we were in fact performing full-spectrum counterinsurgency we would not be suffering so in Afghanistan. A quick review of the many ideas being bandied about, and the widely divergent opinions of such smart men as Nagl and Bacevich, display our absolute national confusion as to how to resolve this situation favorably. Our own Armed Forces, particularly the Army, struggle with the embrace of such strategies and tactics to the point that the institution itself has become practically schizophrenic.

Any Soldier who has deployed will tell you that there are two Armies; the one that is deployed and fighting and the one that resides in non-combat areas. This is not a statement of standards of living, but an observation of the training and preparation for war done at home station as opposed to the actual Soldiering that is done in the Theater of War. Some active duty units do a better job than others, but Guard units are still training for WW-III or at least some more conventional war. Even at pre-deployment training there are things that are taught as gospel that bear little to no resemblance to what is actually done in-theater, especially in Afghanistan.

A case in point was that of SSG Smokey Jackalacker. SSG Jackalacker was the subject of the subject of some humor on this site, but those humorous points had a purpose; to demonstrate the failure that we have had in preparing our Soldiers for this war. SSG Jackalacker and all of his compatriots underwent their pre-deployment train-up at Fort Bragg. You would think that, on a post which hosts elite units that have spent many months in the suck of Afghanistan, the pre-deployment training would be the very best theater-focused immersion training that the Army could possibly provide.

SSG Jackalacker and his men were "immersed" in a "FOB" complete with role players who frequently demonstrated outside the gates of the "FOB." Not once in a year in Afghanistan did I see, on any of the many FOBs I visited or worked out of, a single demonstration. Not once. Yet hours and hours of training and mental bandwidth were spent preparing for the most unlikely of potentialities while critical aspects of training were completely absent.

SSG Jackalacker had heard the word, "counterinsurgency," but really was utterly and completely clueless as to what it meant. Heavy on the "utterly" and the "clueless." SSG Jackalacker's mind was stuck on thirteen years of training for narrow-spectrum Infantry operations and all of the inapplicable training that he had been subjected to in a three month train-up at Ft Bragg. After a quick review of what his training, I had to sing to SSG Jackalacker the same song so many have heard upon arrival in the theater; "Forget everything they taught you except your weapons, your combat lifesaver, and your communications. We will show you how it is done for real."

Many of the active duty units that do a good job, due to repeated rotations, of training theater-specifically in counter-guerrilla tasks. Note that counter-guerrilla tasks are not the full spectrum of counterinsurgency tasks. While the survival and small unit combat skills are necessary, junior leaders, particularly NCO's, are woefully untrained in COIN. Commanders are not judged by how secure the populations are relative to the arrival and departure of their units. Success as a commander is measured by how many missions were executed, how much humanitarian aid was delivered, and their casualties relative to any apparent damage done to the enemy, among other things. Nowhere in the appraisal process is an attempt made to measure the opinion of the local populace, the center of influence in any counterinsurgency campaign.

Dr. Nagl points to a lack of resources made available to the highest military authority in Afghanistan to do what he knows to be the right thing. GEN Petraeus, who pushed down counterinsurgency behavior to the small unit level in Iraq, knows these things, too. The Armed Forces can only do so much in the counterinsurgency. Iraq has had more of the non-military resources devoted to it, and has a lot more of the basic material (such as the basis of an economy) than Afghanistan has. Iraq has an institutional memory of how to govern itself and provide basic services to its constituents. Dr. Nagl points out that Afghanistan lacks this.

Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires.

Dr. Nagl then presents a solution; but it is a solution predicated upon our Armed Forces conducting proper counterinsurgency and our civilian government making just as big a commitment to supporting the non-military organs of the Afghan government. This writer does not see these as foregone conclusions.

Additional troops will be successful only if they are employed correctly. Relearning the classic "clear, hold, and build" counterinsurgency model took several years in Iraq, but to date there are insufficient international or Afghan forces to hold areas that American troops have cleared of insurgents. As a result, the troops have had to clear the same areas repeatedly—paying a price for each operation in both American lives and in Afghan public support, which suffers from Taliban reprisals whenever we "clear and leave."

The alternative requires not just more troops but a different strategy. After an area is cleared of insurgents, it must be held by Afghan troops supported by American advisers and combat multipliers, including artillery and air support. Inside this bubble of security, the Afghan government can re-establish control and build a better and more prosperous community with the help of a surge of American civilian advisers.

Andrew Bacevich, also a very smart while very pessimistic man, weighs in from his angle and, perhaps unwittingly, points to the very deficiency in our current strategy that makes Afghanistan appear, to those who will not clearly see the solution, as an imponderably sodden mass of confusion.

Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight.

Bacevich then launches into a flawed and overly simplistic three-phase analysis of the war. His analysis is hamstrung by a traditional military analytical approach, and a total dismissal of any effects at all from the application of rudimentary counterinsurgency doctrine down to the unit level.

What Bacevich's analysis appeared to do, surprisingly, is bring to light the very inability of traditional military thought to accurately decipher the events that have occurred as the conflict changed from conventional warfare into irregular warfare. His analysis of the early phases of the war hint at a foreboding that simply defeating the armed defenses of Iraq and the Taliban regime would not be sufficient to bring relief from the threat, but as the analysis goes on Bacevich is only able to discern the failures without seeming to understand why they occurred. His attributions of the military and civilian failures on the local level are to the overarching political decision-making rather than on the inability of the United States to effectively shift gears with the changing needs of the situation. Bacevich appears to be stumped.

Yet efforts to achieve a military solution yielded not decision but escalating levels of violence. Confident chatter of ending tyranny and liberalizing the Islamic world ceased. The strategic focus narrowed further: In common parlance, "the war" no longer meant the larger struggle against terrorism; it meant Iraq. There, U.S. commanders had willy-nilly adopted a strategy of attrition, which produced frustration on the battlefield and backlash on the home front.

In frustration Bacevich dismisses any American change of doctrinal behavior by utterly ignoring it and instead launches upon a political analysis of the presidential campaign and the war's effect upon it. While this appears to be diversionary, it is not.

Petraeus launched what was in effect a salvage operation. The emphasis shifted from chasing insurgents to protecting the Iraqi people. Under what was styled as the Sunni Awakening, the United States offered money and arms to militants who promised to cease attacking coalition forces. Thanks to this "surge," the level of violence in Iraq diminished appreciably. Although Petraeus by no means solved the Iraqi conundrum, he pulled that country back from the precipice of disintegration.

This limited success did not suffice to redeem the presidential hopes of Sen. John McCain, who made his support for the surge the centerpiece of his campaign. Barack Obama, a consistent critic of the war, beat McCain handily.

Bacevich then lends more credence to what has become a common meme; that the conflict in Afghanistan suddenly and nearly inexplicably degenerated in 2008 and that the safe zones in Pakistan were somehow a new problem.

In 2008, the Taliban returned to the offensive. Allied casualties increased. Fighting spilled across the border into Pakistan, which became the Long War's de facto third front.

Any veteran of Afghanistan who spent much time "outside the wire" in the past several years could tell you that the Taliban had been getting bolder and bolder with each passing year. Until 2008, 2007 had been by far the most violent year in Afghanistan, and there was plenty of cross-border activity that year including air strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in the FATA. While Musharraf's government was much more amenable to such cross-border activity, they are by no means new. Bacevich's depiction of the apparently sudden resurgence of the Taliban demonstrates that his awareness of Afghanistan, like that of the American public's, is lost in a fog prior to this year. Until this year Afghanistan was "the forgotten war," and everyone who slogged around in the dust of the Hindu Kush knew it. Even the Army forgot that it existed. In our preparations for deployment as embedded advisers, it became a running joke that our briefings would start off on the wrong foot.

"When you arrive in Iraq..."

"Uh, Sir?"

"Yes?"

"We're going to Afghanistan."

"Oh."

While Bacevich is not alone in his misunderstanding of Afghanistan, the entire tone of his piece is a political viewpoint. This is not a point/counterpoint, as the two men are discussing two completely different topics. Nagl's advice for how to bring about success is an appeal to both military leadership and political leadership to take a well-rounded counterinsurgent approach, while Bacevich's ultimate appeal is not to military decision-makers but to one man; President Obama.

The time to address these questions is now. Obama's freedom of action will never be greater than it is today. Should he dodge these issues and plunge more deeply into Afghanistan, the Long War will very soon become Obama's War. And he will richly deserve the obloquy to be heaped on his head as a consequence.

The real difference between these two men begin with their respective appraisals of the national security implications of Central Asia and Afghanistan's role in it. If you feel that Afghanistan is in any way significant as a key to national security in the future, listen to Dr. Nagl very carefully. If you are convinced that retreat from that theater will not bring adverse consequences for our security, then cite Professor Bacevich liberally.



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Yep, It Quacks Just Like A Duck

With the kind permission of Neptunus Lex, I bring two comments out of his vault, both made today. I'll let you be the judge.

I say it quacks just like a duck.

RYP // Feb 24, 2009 at 2:27 pm

Sadly, yet another series of untruths from Old Blue in addition to the ones he has already corrected. I have never met Ted Turner or Wes Clark and I have no business relationship with them.

You can see the site I own at http://www.iraqslogger.com. Not that exciting or even close to being a Human Terrain program killer. I gave Steve and his crew free subscriptions after I first met him and offered to hook him up with a number of research sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I like Steve and wish him well.

There are quite a few errors, inventions and misstatements in his latest iteration. Its clear that he steadfastly keeps the focus off the actual problems in the HTT program by desperately tries keep pulling rabbits out his hat.

And yes, I would think that most people on this forum would agree that the truth is always worth a ferocious defense but invented offense is probably worth ignoring.

Emphasis mine.

Old Blue // Feb 24, 2009 at 6:01 pm

Please allow me to deposit the BS flag as gently as possible.

So after he left CNN, Mr. Jordan called up his former boss and longtime mentor, Ted Turner.

“I didn’t ask for money, but for his advice and guidance,” Mr. Jordan said. Mr. Turner sits on Praedict’s advisory board, as do former Presidential hopeful Gen. Wesley Clark, Iraqi Red Crescent president Dr. Said Hakki, Gen. James Marks and Lord Richard Bethell Westbury.

“The company has been largely funded out of my pocket, with some help from a couple of angel investors,” Mr. Jordan said. Mr. Jordan declined to specify who the angels were, beyond saying that they were not members of the advisory board.

Praedict’s U.S. staff consists of co-founder Robert Pelton, author of a book on the inner workings of military contractors; journalist Nir Rosen, who chronicled the Sunni and Shiite resistance starting in 2003; Zeyad, an Iraqi CUNY student who uses only his first name; Amer Mohsen, who critiques the Iraqi press; and Ms. Shen.

http://www.observer.com/node/36590

Just sayin’…

I do not understand how one can not have a business relationship with someone on the advisory board of a company in which you are a co-founder. Can anyone help me to sharpen my business acumen? I'm obviously missing something here. Can this possibly make any sense at all?
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Picasso Pelton: Old Blue’s Paint By Numbers

We are going to play a paint-by-numbers game. I’m going to lay out the lines with the facts that I know, and I’ll supply the paints. You just paint by the numbers, and we’ll see what picture presents itself by the time we are done. This article includes a basic description of the Human Terrain System and why it is important to the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, and series of related events that may threaten the program at a critical stage in its development. This will show that Robert Pelton's business partner approached HTS with a proposal to sell intelligence to the program, and failing that, Pelton sought an embed, marketed his own services directly to ISAF without the knowledge of those who had gotten him cleared to enter the country, and then wrote a scathing article about the program.

• Overview of the Human Terrain System
• Delicate Times for HTS
• Eason Jordan markets intelligence to HTS
• Pelton seeks an embed
• Pelton travels alone, markets to ISAF
• The embed
• The article
• Threats to the blogger
• Questions raised
• The picture

Overview of the Human Terrain System

The Human Terrain System is a $132 million program that provides social science information to the United States Armed Forces to assist them in understanding the populations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They map out the social networks in areas of operation, provide context about the concerns of the local population, and assist the military staffs with understanding the human elements of the local environment providing valuable information to commanders on the ground. This assists the commanders in working with and around the populations. It helps the Army to stay population-centric in the solutions that it arrives at when selecting courses of action. This means more effective counterinsurgency strategies. The efficient operation of this program is in the best interest of the Army, and therefore the nation. It is an item of public interest.

Anthropology not being an Army branch, the social scientists have in most cases been civilian contractors. This has provided for the social scientists to be very well compensated, making it a bit more worthwhile to subject themselves to the rigors of combat zones.

The program is not without its critics, both within the Armed Forces and without. The American Association for Anthropology has a very vocal minority that cries out that the program is an unethical use of anthropological science. They claim that anthropologists are using the data to target individuals for death. Commanders who have actually used the output disagree. COL Schweitzer, Commander of the 82nd Airborne's 4th Brigade Combat Team had this to say:

Schweitzer was unequivocal in his support for the HTT. He was conscious of how that might sound to his peers—“whacked,” was how he put it. But he assured me his enthusiasm was grounded in facts. Since February, his brigade had reduced kinetic operations by 60 percent in favor of “non-lethal forms and sets of maneuver,” which had reduced both American and Afghan casualties. More than one third of the districts in his area of operations pledged their support to the Afghan government for the first time. ~ Steven Featherstone, “Human quicksand for the U.S. Army, a crash course in cultural studies,” Harpers Magazine, September, 2008

Delicate times for HTS

HTS is in part comprised of Human Terrain Teams (HTT’s,) of which there are 20 in Iraq and 6 in Afghanistan. The Army has orders for 13 more teams in Afghanistan. Due to the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in Iraq, civilian contractors will be subject to Iraqi law and under new regulations will not be covered for basic health care by military doctors at military installations. This has forced the HTS to convert the HTT personnel who are currently contractors to government employees. Many of the social scientists are finding themselves looking at pay cuts that in some cases work out to about 70% .

“It’s the only thing that we could do for the long term health of the program,” says a senior program official at the HTS. “I know it’s hard for individuals because it’s not as lucrative, but in the coming weeks we are going to see many programs affected by this making similar choices.”

The $132 million program, a significant enabler of COIN in-theater, is making its way through some rocky parts in its road, perhaps facing the greatest challenges since its inception. There is another challenge.

Eason Jordan markets intelligence to HTS

In the summer of 2008, Eason Jordan, former Chief News Executive at CNN and a partner in two intelligence ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, approached COL(R) Steven Fondacaro of the Human Terrain System (HTS) with a business proposal. He wanted to sell HTS-related intelligence provided through Praedict in Iraq and AfPax Insider in Afghanistan/Pakistan to HTS. Not having any way to verify information provided through such an outside contract, Fondacaro politely declined.

Pelton seeks an embed

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Montgomery McFate co-author of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was approached by a journalist, Robert Young Pelton, at a social function. Pelton sought to do an embed with an HTT in Afghanistan. Through Dr. McFate, Pelton was then introduced to Steve Fondacaro. Fondacaro, who describes himself as, “the operational side of HTS,” and Dr. McFate as “the social scientist side of HTS,” agreed to embed Pelton with one of their teams.

“We had no idea at the time that Pelton was associated with Eason Jordan,” Fondacaro told me. Eason Jordan’s partners in IraqSlogger, Praedict, and AfPax Insider are Ted Turner, GEN(R) Wesley Clark and Robert Young Pelton.

Fondacaro and McFate approved Pelton to the Army PAO (Public Affairs Office,) which then completed the necessary steps to certify Pelton for the embed. Pelton was put through the process, including signing agreements to abide by the Army’s terms, including agreeing to comply with Army directives while embedded with American units, including a prohibition on gambling, pornography, extramarital sex and alcohol. These are the prohibitions of “General Order Number 1” which apply to all American forces in the theaters of combat. Finally, the embed was cleared.

Pelton travels alone, markets to ISAF

“We planned to take Mr. Pelton on a planned official visit to Afghanistan with us,” Dr. McFate told me, “but then he called us and told us he had found his own way to Afghanistan. We didn’t think much of it.” Pelton arrived in Afghanistan days before the embed was to begin. He spent this time in Kabul, marketing his intelligence services to International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF, commanded by GEN McKiernan.

On September 17th, 2008, Pelton called a member of a team at Bagram Air Field (BAF,) according to insiders. In notes on the conversation, it is noted that Pelton, “bragged about his intel/HT (Human Terrain) consulting contract with ISAF,” says a source who declines to be named, citing security concerns. The source goes on to say that the contract Pelton bragged about included, "cultural advisors, area specialists, polling, and other services." Pelton, the source explains, “claimed he wanted to see how HTS was operating and that writing an article about us was the best way to get that information.”

The embed

When Pelton joined the team days later at Bagram, arrangements had been made for him to participate in a scheduled mission “outside the wire.” Pelton missed the movement and was left behind while the mission was performed. The team went to great lengths to arrange an ad hoc mission so that Pelton would get a chance to go on a mission. This was when the trouble began.

“I had to tell my interpreter not to interpret his questions to the locals,” a team member reports. “Every time I spoke with an Afghan civilian, he would inject himself into the conversation.” He goes on to say, “He kept asking where the Taliban were. We never ask that. It interferes with what we really need to know. During one engagement that was going well, he blurted out, ‘Ask him where the Taliban are!’ The elder we were speaking with clammed up after that and wouldn’t speak to anyone.”

Pelton was asked repeatedly to cease such activities by 1LT Jones, the military team leader for the mission. At the end of the mission, 1LT Jones complained to his leadership about the trouble that Pelton had given him out in the field. 1LT Jones would later pay the price for his professionalism.

The article

Pelton wrote the article published in Men’s Journal trashing the team with which he was embedded and the HTS in general. He cast 1LT Jones as an idiot. In the final stab at the young First Lieutenant, Pelton claimed that Jones had shared some of the contraband whiskey that Pelton had smuggled into FOB Morales-Frazier. 1LT Jones is now undergoing an investigation into the allegation made by Pelton in his article. The Army had no choice but to investigate such a claim.

The article itself painted a bizarre picture of places, and of operations the types of which this writer is intimately familiar with. Pelton’s article just did not carry the ring of truth. Blogger Tim Lynch stated in his blog, Free Range International that Pelton appeared to be trying to capture the surreal character of Michael Herr’s Dispatches. His description of places and the behaviors of the Soldiers and Marines conducting operations in these places bore little resemblance to what my direct experience would lead me to find believable.

Pelton’s description of the HTT at Bagram was even less kind. Pelton nitpicks the team to pieces in a few sentences.

“What I find most disturbing,” Dr. McFate says, “is that he can take a man who has devoted twenty years of his life to studying Afghanistan and call him a Laotian DNA expert. I don’t understand why he would describe LTC Rotzoll as if he didn’t know what he was doing. LTC Rotzoll is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan, and he is very professional. The team that Mr. Pelton described in that article bore no resemblance to the team that I know.”

This writer took Pelton to task for his article, and in response received a barrage of emails from Pelton containing threats to sue for libel.

Threats to the blogger

If you do even the slightest bit of research on my background you will understand why your unfounded insults will not go uncorrected. I can also tell you that without an earnest attempt on your behalf to correct your malicious actions, the appropriate corrective and punitive relief available to me will be fully enforced. If you choose to be unresponsive, I will take that as proof that you choose to ignore polite requests to mitigate the damage. I strongly encourage you to consult your lawyer and have him define the term "libel" and its potential impact. I will print out a pdf of your website and other comments at exactly 9pm tomorrow evening Pacific time. (from an email dated February 19th, 2009 to me from Robert Young Pelton)

Mr. Pelton bragged on his own site about the tactics of intimidation.

...of all the things on the planet that need to be written about and the last person on earth you would want to call out... Most bloggers can't actually pay up but the cost of defending themselves (whether they are right or wrong) is enough to convince them that their economic model is going to get a whole lot costlier if they can't back up their statements. … often its the only way people realize the gravity and cost of the mistake they have made.

The mistake he’s talking about is pointing out something potentially unflattering about Mr. Robert Young Pelton. He was pointing out that his deep pockets make him right, and he’s not afraid to use them.

Questions raised

These very aggressive emails sent to a relatively unknown blogger caught my interest. It wasn’t fear of a lawsuit as much as curiosity as to why such a vicious response would be directed over a criticism of an obviously flawed and at least partially fabricated story in a second rate men’s magazine. As curiosity took hold, bits of what Mr. Pelton’s disjointed and rambling emails said made more sense.

Pelton even tried to lead me to believe that Fondacaro and McFate had approached him, as if they were begging him to do the embed:

Despite this one embed to satisfy Steve and Mitzi's request…

I talked to Fondacaro and McFate and discovered not only that Pelton had approached them, but also that his partner Eason Jordan had preceded him, a fact that came to light unbidden.

The discovery that he had bragged about marketing his services to ISAF made this passage from a separate email sent the same day as the one quoted above seem to make more sense:

You may not tell people that I work directly for the highest military command in Afghansitan and that my embed was set up at the highest level...but more importantly you need to respect that I busted my ass to see how this program work and it was a fucking disaster at every level. Jones, Rotzell, Fondacaro and McFate believe in this program passionately but are faced with almost insurmountable problems. This article clearly sends a message to the public, congress and the military that people like LT Jones (at 30K a year) do the heavy lifting while lazy anthros cost our government half a million dollars each and do fuck all.

A quick read of the article itself shows no evidence of attempting to show that 1LT Jones was even trying to do his own job. 1LT Jones’ behavior and professionalism was cast into such doubt by the fallacious article that his very career as an Army officer is subject to being ended. The end result of the type of investigation he is being subjected to as a result of Pelton’s writing is a Court Martial. While the assertions of holding 1LT Jones up as a shining example are obviously false, the email does seem to confirm that Pelton feels incredibly empowered and in control of the situation. It also begs more questions.

Assuming that every other person, or even most of them involved in this story may be truthful, Mr. Pelton’s story is slanted in general and at times flatly untrue. Is it possible that everyone else is lying and Pelton alone is telling the truth? If one is to doubt Mr. Pelton’s veracity in the article, which is a conclusion that is reasonably reached, then what is the purpose of, “This article clearly sends a message to the public, congress and the military…?” What message? Why sell this message so strongly in the public forum? What is the goal? Why defend it so viciously against question from even a blogger who is unknown to the general public? What is worth such a ferocious defense?

Would it make his own intelligence services more marketable if HTS and its management were discredited? Was this article written to assist in furthering his business objectives?

Dr. McFate says, “I don’t feel proprietary about this. I believe in the concept and I want the Army to be successful. If Mr. Pelton feels that he can do this properly, then he can try. It’s a lot harder than it looks.”

Asked about the disturbance caused to the HTS at a very delicate time it its young history, Dr. McFate says, “It’s upsetting if this is an attempt to damage the program. This is not in the public interest.”

The picture

I’m calling this one a duck. You can rest assured, based on his previous behavior, that Mr. Pelton will bluster and bully and call it an eagle. He will demand retractions and apologies and insist that I print an apology and call it an eagle. It looks like a duck, it walks like a duck, and it quacks just like a duck.

Once you’ve filled in the numbered areas with the paints provided, tell me what picture you come up with. I bet it’s a duck.


You can vote at the top left of this page.
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Dear Mr. President

Dear Mr. President,

I'm writing you today as a Soldier in the Army over which you preside as Commander in Chief. I'm writing because should the time ever come that my wishes need to be heard, I shall not be able to utter them. Please allow me to speak them to you now, and please hear me. Please remember these words should I not be able to speak them.

It is not my wish to be overly dramatic. I have seen others who have failed to ask for such favors before, who have waited until too late to make their wishes known, who have been made a mockery to their own values. I do not wish to be one of those, and so I speak while I still carry breath. I speak it now because I fear that I have reason to be concerned that such things would happen if I were to return home without my life from my next deployment.

Each of us who has gone into harm's way has had an opportunity to reflect in our own way on our mortality and what the possibility of the ultimate sacrifice means to us. I have had this moment, and before I left for my tour, I considered very carefully what I would like for those who know and care for me to know should I not return home with my life intact. Among other things, I wrote them a letter, to this point unopened, detailing my wishes for their conduct surrounding my death. I made it clear that should the ultimate sacrifice be taken from me, and rest assured that I risk this willingly but do not suffer it willingly, I do not wish to be made use of for anyone's purposes or for the influence of my fellow citizens.

When I went into harm's way before, I had no fear that my return to the United States would be made with less than perfect dignity. The recent consideration of revising the policy concerning the return of our fallen to Dover has caused me to feel that I need to express my wishes now. Consider this, if you will, an addendum to my Last Will and Testament.

I do not wish for the press to have access to the repatriation of my remains, Sir. I do not wish for the image of my returning casket to made available to anyone. I wish to maintain the privacy and dignity that my return to my native soil has been promised to this point in my service. I will not be able to defend myself from predation for the use of others, Sir. Please protect me when and if I cannot protect myself; when I cannot open my own mouth in protest, when I will not have breath in my body to form the words, "Please, leave me in peace. I just want to go home."

Once the image of my returning remains has been captured, you cannot control its use. It does not matter that no one can see my remains, Sir. It is my body, and the vessel that carries it will belong to me, too. It will be the last possession I have, and one of very few that I will take to my grave with me. Please don't allow others, who do not know me, who do not love me, who do not care for what I wish, to make use of me in such a way when I may not respond. Please do not even risk that I may be in one of those caskets used for a purpose of which I would not approve. Please do not chance letting the risk I took as a willing Soldier for what I believe be used as a tool for someone with whom in life I respectfully disagree. This, Sir, to me, would be the ultimate insult and disrespect to my service.

Please, Sir, do not let them count coup on my defenseless remains.

These are my wishes, Sir. I wish, should my life be required of me so that my children may live in a country that remains free from terror, for the same dignity that has been afforded those who have gone before me in this effort.

If the day comes when I am on that plane, unable to speak for myself, please remember what I have asked of you. Please defend me then, Sir.

Until then, Sir, I remain,

Very respectfully,

An American Soldier
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Mea Culpa

I stated in a comment exchange with Mr. Pelton on The Stupidest Man on Earth that I would print a post entitled, "Mea Culpa" if he could show me any pictures proving any assertions that I contended with in the prior post. I also said that I would apologize.

Last night Pelton sent me a number of photographs to prove his assertions to be facts. I promised beforehand not to share, publish, distribute, fold, spindle or mutilate them. There, included in the pictures were two pictures of a standard issue Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter which upon closer inspection had some sort of illustration on the rear part of the engine nacelle. I could only see the right side of the bird. A picture taken from about four feet away clarified the illustration; a faded Grim Reaper about two feet long by a foot tall with scythe, robes flowing back from, you guessed it, a skeletal face.

Well, there you have it.

Mr. Pelton, I'm sorry. There was, technically, at least one skull on that bird. I had stated categorically that no General Officer in the United States Army would fly around in a helicopter with a skull on it, and I have been proved wrong. Please accept my apology.

I have kept my word. I have not, nor will I, distribute or publish those pictures. I am a man of my word. There were other pictures which Pelton presumed would assuage my other concerns with his veracity. Those, however, fall short. One picture designed to demonstrate that you can in fact see the gunner from the top of the vehicle was taken as Pelton was standing atop a stationary vehicle prepared for a CONOP. No one rides vertically on the outside of the armor during movement. I take it that his inference was that he was in this position during the movement in which he described all of the gunner's gestures.

I'm still not buying that part. Nice try, though.

Another was, by his description, taken out the back window of an MRAP of another MRAP, apparently to demonstrate that he could make out what the other gunner was doing. Either that picture was taken from outside the vehicle or that is the most transparent green-tinted ballistic glass that has ever made a long dusty convoy movement without getting dust on it.

Again, the check is in the mail.

There were pictures of 1LT Jones around others who were clearly drinking (they were French or Pelton, and they were drinking beer) but there is not one picture of the Lieutenant drinking. There is certainly not a photo of him enjoying a "smuggled nightcap" on the HESCOs in the starlight. I stand by my statement that this is a fabrication until he can prove otherwise. Of course, if he can do that, he would be assisting in the destruction of a young officer's career, already in jeopardy due to his article. I asked him about that.

There is no "young officer fighting for his career" if you mean Jones. He deserve a medal or at least half the salary of the nearest social scientist. Jones can come an work for me in Kabul if he is out of job.

It's amazing how the story changes. 1LT Jones deserves a medal. Is that the picture that the article paints? No, clearly not; but when questioned about if he even cares about this man's career, this flippant response and an off-the-cuff offer of a job at his new venture in Kabul (an intelligence venture that apparently provides very similar producets as HTS.) AFPax Insider hasn't officially been rolled out yet, but there are rumblings over at IraqSlogger.com about it. With the recent damage done to HTS and all the negative publicity, the rollout may be sooner than we think. Getting officers to lose their commissions is a really original recruiting tool, I've got to admit.

It is my opinion that Mr. Pelton considers me an idiot. He also considers me to be weak and easily frightened.

I have been subjected to a barrage of emails from Pelton over the course of the past two days alternating between compliments and belligerent threats. His bipolar fits of lets-be-reasonable-about-this-you're-a-nice-guy-I'm-going-to-smash-you-over-the-head have been mind boggling in their rambling complexity.

The intensity, bordering on desperation, of these emails has caught me off guard. "Why," I ask myself, "would this public figure, a published author and television personality, be so bothered by what this lowly blogger has to say?"

I'm just a little guy. Look at my webcounter. I'm not the Washington Post. Why work so hard to silence me? That is what he is trying to do; silence me.

If you do even the slightest bit of research on my background you will understand why your unfounded insults will not go uncorrected. I can also tell you that without an earnest attempt on your behalf to correct your malicious actions, the appropriate corrective and punitive relief available to me will be fully enforced.

I recognize bullying when I see it. I remarked on The Stupidest Man on Earth that Mr. Pelton had been threatening me. He responded to that with, "I don't threaten." I remember that from the playground, etc... the unspoken part was, "I promise." Message received, Mr. Pelton. A swirl rose up within me; a bit of a tingling up the back of my neck. I hadn't felt this feeling for a pretty long time... since...

Since the first time I read the Constitution of the United States of America. You never really appreciate the Constitution as much as when you really need it. I like the Amendments a lot, too. I'm pretty fond of the Second Amendment, but today I'm finding that the First Amendment is pretty cool. It assures me that I have the freedom of speech.

Is this a great country or what?

If you choose to be unresponsive, I will take that as proof that you choose to ignore polite requests to mitigate the damage.

I didn't feel as if I was approached politely.

Me:

What is it that you expect from this? Your approach earlier was like a man beckoning a dog while he clutched a baseball bat in his hand.

Pelton:

I think you have me pegged correctly.

Glad I'm wearing my drool bib and hockey helmet then. I'm not a smart man, but I do know what rights are. Thankfully there are smart men who know, too. The Supreme Court has clarified things quite a bit, as I've had explained to me by some smart people. I have nothing to fear.

The Constitution feels like body armor. Mmmmmm... toasty.

I strongly encourage you to consult your lawyer and have him define the term "libel" and its potential impact. I will print out a pdf of your website and other comments at exactly 9pm tomorrow evening Pacific time.

If I don't hear from you by this time tomorrow or see significant evidence of retraction. I will publish and circulate your transcript with the photographs proving that the information in the Men's Journal article is accurate and correct. I then reserve the right to enforce legal action against you.

I'm thinking, "not so much," Bob. I don't have a thing to worry about. My opinion is protected speech, and you as a journalist should know that. I have and am giving my opinion on an issue of public concern. Yep, you were right. Discovering the definition of "libel" is was certainly a comfort and a joy. You see, the changes to my blog did retract statements that you had proved to be factual technically. Being a man of my word, and ego not being my main issue, I am happy to correct that which is factually proven.

However, there is a big difference between the logo in the picture on the helicopter and "hot-rodded Black Hawks adorned with skulls." Technically there was a skull face, and adorned means "worn or decorated with," but when you paint a word picture, you know what you're doing. I and everyone else who read that expected big, obvious skulls... you know, big white skulls prominently displayed like on the nose of the chopper, not some half-eroded two-foot Grim Reaper with a skull face no bigger than a few inches on the back half of the engine nacelle. Sheesh.

Many have asked why Pelton hasn't published his pictures. I will tell you why, because I have seen some of them. They don't support his crazy, hazy, opium-smoke-filled image of the days he spent with the HTT's. Pelton described FOB Kutschbach as if it were some ramshackle hunker-down-or-they'll-hit-you type of place, with spent shell casings and "discarded shipping containers." The picture he sent me of a PSD member with a >gasp< stylized skull with hair >gasp< on his backpack showed one of the (normal) Blackhawks on the white gravel LZ at a very tidy (for a war zone) FOB Kutschbach. They've done some nice things with the place. That area was all dirt the last time I was there.

The changes made to my posting do not change the meanings of "fabrication," "stylization" or "stretches of imagination." I clarified that these are, in my opinion, questionable assertions. Some, I'm sure, are untruths. That is my opinion informed by my experience, an experience much of the readership of that dreadful, fragmented adventurist pipe dream do not have. I am just a blogger; a little guy who Pelton has described himself today as having no respect for as he exulted in his success in intimidating me over at "The Black Flag Cafe."

Even a couple of Pelton's own hangers-on expressed disappointment in how easily I backed down. Be of good cheer, guys; I'm still here. I'm aware of where I stand, and if Mr. Pelton cares to go through the minor effort of finding me and suing me for no result, then all's the better.

I am an American, and I am not afraid.

This exercise has taught me a great deal. I've learned some things that are comforting. I've been drawn closer to one of the cherished rights which I myself have risked all for. I've once again become acquainted with what bullying looks like, especially wrapped in the mantle of righteousness (or self-righteousness, as the case may be.)

I've also become familiar with some very disturbing things. There will be more on that. For today, I promised that I would apologize, and that the title of the post would be, "Mea Culpa." I have fulfilled that promise. I'm a man of my word. This is much more than I can say for a man who admittedly broke his word by smuggling alcohol downrange in Afghanistan.

In the meantime, today will not be the day that a Canadian millionaire suppresses an American citizen/Soldier in the exercise of his First Amendments rights.

Peace Out.
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