Culture

In the past two days I have written nearly two complete posts which will have to remain for consideration at another time. Something didn't feel quite right, so I hovered over the "PUBLISH POST" button and refrained from clicking. Then I realized why I had non-clicked; there was something out there that I had not discovered yet that layered upon one of the subjects that I have explored before. My thoughts on this subject go back to a concept that began to jell for me in Afghanistan.

This concept began swirling around in the back of my consciousness at first as a vague feeling that something wasn't working. It coalesced into a pool of misgivings, congealed into half-formed ideas and finally jelled over the next couple of months into the wiggly self-standing mass that I've expressed before directly and indirectly. It is a criticism, in part, of My Army; one made out of respect and a sincere desire to witness and be a part of success in the protection of these United States through our efforts in the Long War.

As I stumbled through the internet, uncomfortable with not one but two postings which sat still steaming in my "POSTS" archive with the red-lettered Draft next to them, I was led by my Irish nose to this gem in Baltic Security and Defense Review by LTC (Dr) Robert Cassidy entitled "Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars." While this scholarly paper addresses the military command culture of the Army, it is this culture that permeates down to the soldier level and which I found to be unsupportive of our objectives in Afghanistan (and by extension Iraq, which I am unqualified to address specifically.)

I have expressed these same thoughts in less scholarly fashion on more than one occasion. There are two instances in particular in my experience where there are direct, to my mind, soldier-level examples that I mentioned in my Afghan ramblings. The first took place during Operation Nauroz Jhala, and the second after my migration to Nuristan.

In the first example, my sad peschak (hundred cats) and I were operating in the Afghanya (or Afghania) Valley, a sub-valley of the Tag Ab Valley, with a company of ANA, their Army ETT's, a light platoon of Pathfinders from the 82nd Airborne, two Psyops Operators, and a squad of elite 82nd Airborne soldiers from Task Force Fury. We were in the "Clearing" phase of the operation, sweeping the valley from one end to the other. For the first few days, we had divided the American mentors up to support three separate but parallel lines of advance up the mile-wide Afghanya Valley, with the TF Fury element operating in trail behind the center group, giving them flexibility to bound left or right to support any serious contact. On the fourth day, we entered the Ghain Valley, a thumb-like appendage of the Afghanya. LTC Jhala had expressed his belief that this area was where the Taliban leadership would escape our hammer. There was no anvil, as his recommendations for the placement of a blocking force at its terminus had been ignored.

As we moved into the Ghain, the TF Fury soldiers came into direct support of my sad peschak. Mind you, we had been given very little time with these cats to prepare them for this operation, concentrating our efforts on the most dangerous aspect; house clearing. The ANP moved exactly as I have described them; like a herd of cats. Their tactical movement bore scant resemblance to the tactical movement of the more highly trained ANA and no resemblance whatsoever to the movements of the elite kids from the 82nd. The airborne troops held my peschak-ha in absolute disdain. They couldn't get enough of amusing themselves derisively at the ANP's expense. While the ANP couldn't understand a word that was said, they understood every word that was said.

Disrespect requires no translation.

It took a lot of work to help my ANP through the Psyops that were laid on them by these "highly-trained, elite" soldiers of the Airborne Pride of the Army. I wanted to butt-stroke the muscle-headed airborne bastards. (For those of you who just got a funky visual, the butt-stroke is a close combat technique, part of the "bayonet drill," it involves clobbering someone in the head with the butt end of your rifle. It is the Infantry equivalent to two-by-fouring a jackass.) This was a cultural display on the part of our young soldiers that was not entirely their fault. They were completely untrained in how to work with indigenous forces and bred to look down their noses at others they deemed inferior.

In the American Army, there is a hierarchy, as most are well aware. This hierarchy is based on the "Hooah Factor" or the degree of eliteness of one soldier as compared to another. In the Infantry, the Airborne is higher than the Leg, for instance. In any initial sizing-up, an American soldier is weighed by his or her rank, apparent physical prowess, qualifications, what unit they belong to, and what badges they wear; and their ability to project a stream of urine for any distance is immediately assessed. It is the unspoken pissing contest. It is bred into our beings as younglings while still sopping wet behind the ears and is actively encouraged and trained. It becomes second nature. In fact, it is in our natures even before we reach the reception stations. Soldiers want to be elite.

This elitism is expressed in many different relationships. Marines are the same way, as they are instinctively bred to match streams of urine with any Army soldier, especially Combat Arms soldiers. Marines naturally assume that they are superior to any non-Combat Arms and most Combat Arms soldiers. Soldiers naturally assume that they are more intelligent than any Marine, but this is largely in reaction to the inbred haughtiness of Marines and takes advantage of the Marine ASVAB minimum score. In all fairness, the Marines set the standard for training all Marines as fighters and support tasks as a follow-on skill as opposed to the Army's history of a cursory basic training for support soldiers, a culture we've paid the price for heavily in the current conflict.

Oddly enough, the Marines seem to be getting the "working with indidge" thing a lot better than the Army is, too. I did not witness the same tendency to look down their noses at Afghans among Marines that I noticed among soldiers. I think this odd because the Marines assume that they are elite, as opposed to the Army, where most of the Army finds itself resentful of the few "elite."

This quote is out of context, and yet it applies perfectly:

Because cultural preferences tend to value certain roles and to devalue other roles, military culture can impede innovation in ways of warfare that lie outside that military’s preferred core roles. ~ LTC Robert Cassidy

One innovation would be to grant respect to the host nation's forces and instead of disrespecting them, work patiently with them to raise their performance. To an Afghan, there is no greater wrong than to be disrespected as a man. The only thing the young 82nd soldiers could have done to make it worse would have been to make a pass at their wives or mothers. Given their performance with the Afghans, I think that if the opportunity had arisen, that's precisely what they would have done. My ANP were left with the impression that on the whole, Americans suck, and that my little crew was an anomaly. Keep in mind that when you lose the hearts and minds of those who are supposed to be fighting on your side, then you are really screwed.

The second example centered on my experiences with the arrival of our new SECFOR team in Nuristan, led by SSG Smokey Jackalacker and our experiences with a squad of MP's who determined that they could project a stream of urine for a greater distance than could CPT Mack or myself, largely due to the fact that we were National Guardsmen (another immediate loss of elite-points in any dealing with Regular Army types.) These two experiences were intertwined, as SSG Jackalacker found a willing listener and enabler in his fantasies of "sweeping the objective" and "double-tapping everyone on the objective" in the MP's. In hours of discussions with SSG Jackalacker, I could not disabuse him of the concept that he needed to be scary to the Afghan civilians. He tried his best to look like an alien invader (actually, he was enamored of the "Transformer" cartoon series, and you can see it in this picture.)

SSG Smokey Jackalacker as Optimist Prime..."In the beginning, there was the cube..."

Looking closely, you will note that SSG Jackalacker is wearing every bit of kit that was issued to him and more. If it looks like he's carrying about two basic loads of ammunition, it's because he is. He's actually got layers of magazine pouches (because we got into so many firefights where we had run out of ammunition.) We never wore knee pads, and we only wore the shoulder armor (DAPs, or Deltoid Armor Panels) when in the turret of the humvee. He never took them off, because they added to "the look." Note also that he is wearing a neoprene face mask, which he thought made him look even scarier to the Afghan civilians. It did. It also made him look like something other than a human being, exactly what you don't want when your job is winning their hearts and minds. He thought we were trying to win their hearts and mimes and thought that the articulated robot toy look would appeal to a mime. The cool part was that he if you pressed the button in the middle of his back, he turned into a truck.

"I've been in the Army for thirteen years, Sarn't, and all that time I've trained to kill, to fire and maneuver. Now you're telling me that's not my job?"

"Be friendly to everyone you meet, but have a plan to kill them," I told him, "Take off that mask and use a shemagh."

"But my face is cold," he faux-whined to me, desperate for an excuse to continue his charade.

"Take the &*$%#@ thing off or I will confiscate it. Use a shemagh. It will keep your face nearly as warm, it will do a better job of keeping the dust out of your mouth, and Afghans wear them on their face all the time. You will look like a human being to them instead of a bad Sci-Fi character. This is important."

He wore the neoprene mask whenever I wasn't around.

The MP's were performing soldier training and SSG Prince, the MP squad leader, was also responsible for the local security plan while we were staying in the village of Alingar (scene of "Smokey Jackalacker And The Hyena Of Doom" and "Nighttime In Shades Of Green.") We were staying in the Wuliswahl's (Sub-Governor's) compound there, and the MP's had guards at the gate to the walled compound to wand visitors for our greatest tactical threat at that point, a suicide vest. The visitors to the compound were often village elders who had come to see the Wuliswahl. The MP's assigned females into the rotation to wave wands over the bodies of these elders, who already found it hard to swallow that they had to be searched in the first place. Now, in addition to the ignominy of being searched coming into their own District Center, they were being searched by females? Thankfully, we had stopped short of cavity searches, which to the Afghan patriarchs would have been the next natural step in humiliation of them on their home turf.

When those village elders went home to their villages and had chai with their neighbors, do you think that they were talking about the Americans working diligently to improve the professionalism and ability of the ANP to provide security in their districts? No. They sat and complained about being humiliated for having the unmitigated temerity to go and visit their Wuliswahl in their own District Center. Now that, my friends, is counterinsurgency at its most devastatingly effective. For the Taliban, that is.

When I forced SSG Prince to reassign the females from this task, he objected vigorously, saying, "F&%# 'em. They're soldiers doing their jobs and those elders are going to have to get used to it."

"No, they aren't going to have to get used to it, Staff Sergeant. You are going to get used to them. This is their District Center and it's bad enough that we have to search them in the first place. They didn't ask for us to come here, and the Sub-Governor has graciously allowed us to use his compound. We are going to respect their values and not insult them. Make that happen."

Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them ~ FM 3-0 Operations

For Afghanistan, counterinsurgency in difficult terrain against tribal mountain fighters requires special operations forces and specialized general purpose forces with agility and knowledge of the people and terrain. Thus, irregular war there seems to require the opposite type of military culture, force structure, and doctrine that the American military went to war with in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of this long and irregular war. Finally, there seems to be a contradiction that inheres in irregular wars that see big power conventional forces fighting irregular adversaries: it is a paradox of hubris and humility. ~ LTC Robert Cassidy

As for the pleasure in hubris, its cause is this: men think that by ill-treating others they make their own superiority the greater. ~ Aristotle

I had to put up with some childish games out of the MP's after that; nothing that you could bring thunder on them for, just silly BS. As soon as I went on pass, they went back to doing whatever they wanted. The culture of elitism is hard to overcome. SSG Prince is still convinced, I am sure, that he was right. I am also sure that he remembers the situation completely differently than I do. Sometimes we look at history through the lenses that suit our prejudices.

LTC Cassidy describes in his paper how the Army chose to avoid responsibility for the failure of the counterinsurgency and resulting defeat in Viet Nam. He describes how a book commissioned by the War College took a left turn at Albuquerque and never quite made it to Pismo Beach:

In the late 1970s, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College arranged for Colonel Harry G. Summers to be assigned there. The Commandant assigned him to write a book on Vietnam and to apply and to incorporate the findings of a previously documented report, a BDM Corporation study which had found that the U.S. Army never learned how to prosecute counterinsurgency and that it learned from Vietnam, only, the notion to avoid such interventions. Instead of applying the BDM report, however, Summers employed for his theoretical framework Karl von Clausewitz's On War. Consequently, the argument which Summers put forth in his book, On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, proffered conclusions that were absolutely converse to the conclusions of the BDM study. Summers concluded that the Army failed in Vietnam because it had not sufficiently focused on conventional warfare. In other words, the U.S. Army's problems in Vietnam stemmed from its deviation from the big-war approach and its temporary and very incomplete experiment with counterinsurgency. Not surprisingly, Summers' book was readily embraced by the Army culture while the BDM report drifted into obscurity. ~ LTC Robert Cassidy

LTC Cassidy is discussing culture writ large, and I am discussing that same culture as it trickles down to the soldier level. It takes time to change the culture of the Army.

The American military has been compelled by the challenges of two ongoing irregular wars to become an institution that can learn, innovate, and adapt in contact. However, the disadvantages that the American military accrued to itself by embarking in 2001 on an unanticipated long irregular war characterized by multiple counterinsurgencies, still encumbered by a deeply embedded regular war military culture, are essentially temporal: military cultural change requires five to ten years; it generally requires a minimum of eight to 12 years to prevail in counterinsurgency; and the U.S. domestic political cycle exhibits a fickleness every four or eights years. Time is everything when a democracy wages protracted irregular warfare. To paraphrase a quote attributed to an anonymous Taliban guerrilla in Afghanistan, the U.S and the West may have the all the nice wrist watches, but, the insurgents have all the time. ~ LTC Robert Cassidy

LTC Cassidy points out and demonstrates that the Army has a preference as to what kind of its nation's wars that it wants to fight. SSG Jackalacker is an example of how that preference trickles down to the soldier level and becomes a personal preference. One of the founders of Iraq Veterans Against the War, Brandon Friedman, wrote a book entitled The War I Always Wanted: The Illusion of Glory and the Reality of War in which his lamentation echoes and gives, I'm sure, a greater prose to SSG Jackalacker's cartoonish whine. Apparently neither of them has gotten over their disappointment with the war their nation needed them for as opposed the war they always wanted. Mr. Friedman blamed the administration, and his disillusionment with the war that he wound up being tasked with brought him to actively campaign politically. He seems to express some sort of enlightenment that came from his shattered quest for glory, but the truly enlightened never went to war with visions of glory, for there is no glory in war itself; there is only a magnification of the character of each participant. All of the trappings, whether they be massed tank battles, isolated firefights with insurgents, or the sudden destruction of an IED are just the stage upon which that character is exposed and magnified.

“I will be damned if I will permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions, to be destroyed just to win this lousy war” ~ Anonymously attributed to an American general from the Viet Nam era

LTC Cassidy seems to feel that we have turned the corner in finally adapting to counterinsurgency. It is possible, given that we have a Commander in CENTCOM who has successfully implemented counterinsurgency on a national scale in Iraq, that it will be pushed down now, but as LTC Cassidy points out, that change takes years. I submit that it requires forceful effort to push it down to the soldier level. The young idealists who join the Army and Marines have visions in their heads of what it's like, bred by movies and video games and books of the glories of yore. Their visions of what it means to be a soldier are carried within them and like those of Smokey Jackalacker will die hard. If we continue to breed in them the ugly elitism and lack of respect for those who we must win for first in order to secure our own peace, our job is that much the harder.

One thing that surprised me in action was the disconnect between the conventional forces and the Special Forces. Counterinsurgency has typically been the realm of the Special Forces, but this is too large for just the SF. The job that my team did, that Bouhammer did before us and Vampire 06 has done after us, is traditionally a Special Forces mission. Just to clarify for anyone who might care, I am not a Special Forces soldier. In fact, there's nothing for me to feel especially elite about; but I know what I know. What I know is that the thing that makes the Special Forces so special is their attitude, the same one that gave them their nickname; Quiet Professionals. The SF have found a way to be elite without having to act elite. Just as we have had to borrow lessons from them on how to train indigenous forces, we need to learn from them how to have the humility to work with others and to respect other cultures. We need to learn how to be elite without having to be better than anyone else.

We can start, I suppose, with dropping our preference as to what type of war we personally want. It does boil down to that, because an institution's preferences always stem with the preferences of the members of that institution. We are here to fight our nation's wars, not just the ones that we would like to fight or the ones that suit our childhood images of war and glory.

There is more to discuss in the paper by LTC Cassidy, but that's a start. Overall, it's a subject that bears further review and discussion by Army leadership. LTC Cassidy presents a very well thought-out and researched effort; and I think he makes a lot of sense. It struck a nerve with me, as there is so much of this that I've perceived before, but he demonstrates why he has a doctorate and I don't with his lengthy set of references and excellent assembly of the information he has gathered. It's not a long read, and I recommend it.
Read full post with comments

Happy New Year

Happy New Year! I can tell you this; there are big changes coming to, as Registan refers to it, BABEAA. Those cats are still in the bag, but will unfold as does 2009. In the meantime, you (yes, you) can help shape that future by voting in the poll to be found to the left at the top of the sidebar.

Not that this is a democracy. I just wonder what you think, and it may, just may, have an impact.

To those downrange; may 2009 find you at home with your loved ones.
Read full post with comments

Afghan Conundrum

In the last few posts I have reviewed a posting by "Afghanistan Shrugged" and the latest report on the ANP by the International Crisis Group. One notes how a higher commander can derail an honest effort by a subordinate in a dangerous situation, bringing failure to an operation on the verge of success, and the other details the current state of one of the two main pillars of Afghan security; the ANP (and with it the Ministry of Interior.) The second also touches on the Afghan Judiciary; the shadowy realm where criminal prosecution and corruption blend into a tie-dye of injustice that threatens the very viability of the Afghan government.

These are not just my perceptions, but a thread that runs through the actions and decisions of hundreds, if not thousands, of soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan, especially leaders. These soldiers have an underlying sense of frustration that sometimes seethes to the surface. The feeling of struggling against the stream is at times intense. The author of "Afghanistan Shrugged" clearly brings this feeling forward in his post describing the events of a night when he was denied illumination and four Taliban rocketeers escaped to rocket another day.

We're not talking about a JDAM on a village here, folks, we're talking about mortar illumination rounds. The ANA Vampire 06 advises don't have NODS, and it was apparently one of those nights in Afghanistan that was darker than Osama's Soul.

I also reviewed Ghaith Abdul Ahad's article in The Guardian containing interviews with Taliban leaders in Wardak and Khost. A large part of the value of the article lay in these Talibs explaining their insurgency plan. They explained how they use the general inefficiency of and distrust in the ANP to their advantage, as well as the lack of faith with which the people regard the judicial system of the IRoA government. The Talibs explained the simple truth that the field in which they sought to compete with the government... and therefore destabilize it through de-legitimizing it... was in the provision of essential services to the people. One of the major services that they offer is a sure justice system.

These posts tie together to paint a picture of reality in Afghanistan, one that is felt if not completely articulated in the minds of most who serve outside the wire; a couple of sides of the Rubik's Cube that is the current state of affairs in Afghanistan. They also tie in to a story of intrigue that is still unfolding.

At at a FOB in Wardak, a small group of puzzlers whose job it was to move individual blocks around in the Rubik's Cube found themselves ensnared in the Afghan Conundrum. A spy had been identified; a small group of them, actually. They were undoubtedly providing information that was directly used by Qomendan Hemmet in his tactical and probably strategic operations against Afghan and Coalition forces in Wardak. American and Afghan lives were at risk, and the root cause of that risk was identified and in custody. Now the clock started ticking. Afghan law sets a time limit for action to be taken. Local nationals cannot be held indefinitely.

There are two paths to justice in Afghanistan with these types, and one of them is to turn the suspects over to the local judiciary.

Now, with the information provided by several sources, including the International Crisis Group, we have seen that the Afghan Judiciary is most likely to have these guys out and on the run in short order. No justice there; and the individual lives to harm another day. What's a young Company Commander to do? He may seek option number two; the American military-driven option. This interpreter-turned-spy deserved to spend some days at a nice detention center with American guards and daily interrogation, wouldn't you think?

BTW, if you're thinking of going all Abu Ghraib on me, I'll advise you to not even go there. The detainees at the American facility are very bad people who are treated very humanely and are in much nicer accommodations than any Afghan facility would provide. No, the interrogations do not include torture.

This young American officer then appeals to his commander for option number two and is met with... silence. His boss is leaving him out to dry. His distrust (along with the rest of Wardak's population) for the Afghan system complete, he takes action. Now he is facing Article 32 hearings (part of the Military Justice System's path to potential incarceration for crimes) at Khost for his actions.

I do not mean to excuse the men who participated in the interrogations that day in Wardak, but when an American reads an article about this officer and his First Sergeant and the trouble that they find themselves in, they do not see all that is behind it. While this is an extreme example, it is one that many of us who have operated outside the wire could easily imagine. My interpreter in Afghanistan was a stellar young man. Nearly every interpreter I ever met there was. I have also written about how Sam the Combat Terp and his family were threatened on more than one occasion, to the point that he moved his family twice within a few months. The pressure on these young men is intense. I don't know whether the interpreter in question was a plant or if he was pressured via threats or coercion to his life or his family's safety, but finding that your terp is a spy is every soldier's nightmare.

Only having a spy for a terp who is never discovered is a worse scenario.

I bring this situation into this thread of posts to illustrate that the situation in Afghanistan is indeed a Rubik's Cube, and we have a serious need to make a huge difference in reforming not only the ANP but the Afghan Judiciary. We also need to stress that highly trained leaders on the ground need to be trusted when they call for support from the little places in Afghanistan. Here we have two scenarios where the counterinsurgency was foiled by Battalion Commanders who made calls that negated their subordinates' positive actions (one had four rocket-firing insurgents trapped in the open and couldn't see them in the dark, the other had a known spy in custody who he feared... and rightly so... that this spy would go free if left to Afghan civilian justice) because they failed to back those subordinates. There is something intrinsically wrong with both of these scenarios. That young Company Commander and his First Sergeant would not be facing the ends of their careers and possibly incarceration if they had been treated with the respect that they were due. Four insurgent rocketeers would be either dead or in custody and unable to fire more rockets if the officers who asked for mortar illumination rounds had been given the respect that their judgment was due on that night near the Pakistani border.

Their commanders replied with, "I don't trust you to make a sound decision. I know that I will always know better than you what is best for your AO (Area of Operations.)"

I'll wager that if you asked the officers who are at the slimy end of that stick, "We are going to put you out in a very difficult and dangerous position downrange. We do not trust you and when you most sincerely need it we will not support you. Do you accept this mission?" the answer would be, "No. I hereby submit my resignation."

That Company Commander and his First Sergeant found themselves confronted by the nightmare scenario which was immediately followed by being left holding a bucket of steaming excrement. Judging their decisions from that point forward is not my job, but the job of the Article 32 Board. What I do know is that they should never have been left holding that bucket.

Yes, Afghanistan is a Rubik's Cube. Many people have solved Rubik's Cubes at some point in their lives; sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly. The proof is in the pudding, as they say, and we are spinning the individual blocks around in a seemingly disjointed and random pattern instead of in a coordinated series of movements that see the whole cube. I, like CPT Hill, 1SG Scott, and Vampire 06, was working at moving one or two of the little blocks that make up the larger cube, and every once in a while the Big Hand reaches in gives the cube a couple of quick twists that undo considerable effort or short-circuit a favorable turn in battlefield fortunes. We in the Army have a polysyllabic yet simple word for this effect, but I'll give you a more generally acceptable and family-friendly word that starts with the same letter; counterproductive.

As the warnings of many experts and pundits ring, our window of opportunity in Afghanistan is growing smaller and smaller. It's time to reconsider... read unscrew... ourselves in how we are approaching this war. A symptom of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

Real insanity is the inability or unwillingness to perceive, understand, and abide in the truth. The truth is that what we are doing isn't working. Putting more effort into what isn't working isn't going to work much better. It's like trying to force a nut onto a bolt counterclockwise. Putting more umph into it isn't going to make the bolt thread the other way, but possibly just get the nut stuck in a supremely untightened position.

We are trying to go lefty-tighty. It just doesn't work that way. It doesn't even sound right.

Of course, there are other sides to the cube. "Free Range International" has an incredibly insightful post on some of the rest of the cube in his most recent post. This guy needs to be listened to.

Read that, "People who make big decisions should be paying attention to what this guy is saying."

It's time to figure out the Rubik's Cube, and it's time to do it quickly rather than slowly. Our window is closing, and there are those out there who are trying to close it faster.

I realize that all of the things that I linked to are a lot to read, but if you read all of them, or if you have read all of them, it will really help to paint a picture of what it's like in Afghanistan on a conceptual level on down to some of the dirt-level effects. This isn't the rantings of some FOBBIT about interpersonal relationships on a deployment, so it's a bit dry. There aren't any bullets flying around in these pieces, so it's not a mile-a-minute thriller; but if you want to get a feeling for some of the challenges and how it comes down to men on the ground making difficult decisions and having their very best efforts on behalf of this country sometimes come to naught, it will help with that. It's the stuff that is in the back of their heads when they are deciding where to go that they might get shot at or blown up. It's the stuff that underlies the next words they choose when they mentor their Afghan charges or brief the battlespace owner. It's the stuff that rattles around inside one's skull when trying to figure out just how much to trust an Afghan village elder who could seriously screw them over if he had such an inclination, which he will tell them himself is the farthest thing from his mind. It's the stuff that makes a young Specialist shake his head in disbelief and wonder if it's all worth it. Like a Rubik's Cube, it's all tied firmly together and when you move one piece the rest of it moves, too.

Here's the best part; it's Rubik's Cube by committee, really... but that's a bigger subject.
Read full post with comments

International Crisis Group Report On The ANP

This is the second report from the International Crisis Group that I have read, and comparing it to last year's, there are but a few changes in the overall picture. Some of those changes are due to recommendations that have been implemented (although those changes were not necessarily implemented due to the ICG report.) Numerous articles have been written in the mainstream media concerning the report, each with its own synopsis. Each synopsis seizes upon the conclusion drawn from the report, which is that the ANP are too busy fighting the Taliban to enforce the law and that the major military driver, the United States, views the ANP only as additional combat forces.

The substantive areas of the report are spot-on. The report points out that the ANP are rife with corruption and that public confidence in the professionalism of the ANP is extremely low. These assertions are, from my personal observations, correct. The report also leaves its lane a bit to delve into the Afghan Judiciary, which certainly needs some delving into and is appropriately addressed for its dysfunctional relationship with the ANP. The report points out that there is a battle for corruption that occurs when a suspect is detained, with each of the two branches (Executive and Judiciary) vying for their piece of the bribery pie.

The Judiciary is another subject all its own, but we certainly do not have anything resembling a grip on it and we truly need help from other (successful) Islamic countries with functioning judiciaries. This may provide opportunities for engagement; again, a totally new subject.

The observations of fact about the ANP are correct, and I found myself cheering the report on these issues. However, the shortcoming of the report lies in the commission's complete and total lack of understanding (and rightfully so) of COIN. Why does this make a difference? Because the ANP are a linchpin in the COIN fight. Unfortunately, some senior officers do not see this, but a simple perusal of Galula will show that local authority and governance is necessary in the absence of military forces.

The ANA can only take care of so much battlespace. The insurgent tends to leak away from areas with robust military presences, unless that area is necessary to their survival, such as the border areas and the infiltration routes from Pakistan. In areas where there is no such necessity, the insurgent enemy will tend to vacate areas that are stepped on by the Army, the way that water vacates a puddle when a foot lands in it. As with the puddle, when the foot is removed, the water seeps back in; and so do the insurgents.

The Army cannot be everywhere at once, and so the local guarantors of security are the ANP. By this doctrine, the only doctrine that is relevant, the ANP have a key counterinsurgent role. This role does not absolve the ANP for their responsibility in general criminal law enforcement, but rather falls under it. Galula points out that insurgents need to be criminalized. Criminalization of the insurgent brings several beneficial effects, but in order to criminalize the insurgent, there must be a rule of law to begin with.

In the clear, hold and build strategy of counterinsurgency as practiced in Iraq, for instance, the Police can and should participate in all phases. Participation in the Clearing Phase is actually necessary, as the national law in Afghanistan forbids searching of private residences unless it is done by ANP. ANP must be present, at a minimum. This is something of a nod to our Posse Commitatus, in my opinion, designed to prevent abuses by the Army. While the presence of the Army is not necessarily mandated in the Hold and Building Phases (but may be required due to the local situation,) the ANP begin to take the primary role in providing local security. This includes normal law enforcement activity.

When civilians think of the ANP, they tend to think of civilized countries where the only job of the Police is to enforce civil law. This is not the case in Afghanistan, or in any country where there is an active insurgency. The ANP resemble the law enforcement arms in western countries very little in their tasks and armament. While lightly armed compared to the Army, the ANP are excessively armed by any other measure. ANP carry automatic weapons, belt-fed machine guns, and RPG's, which function more as hip-pocket artillery than as the anti-tank weapons that they are designed to be.

The ANP are more like frontier deputy marshals in our own "wild west" days. They are often running into heavily armed criminals, whether they be insurgents or smugglers. When they make contact or are contacted, they are most often in small groups and usually outgunned. They are also often static, such as at checkpoints. This leads to the much higher death rate as compared to their Army counterparts. Make no mistake, though; they are killed by criminals. Even the Taliban are basically criminals.

Let's put this into US terms. In the United States, if someone were to run about killing policemen, what would we call them? Criminals. If someone were to (as some drug gangs have done) establish themselves as a local governing body and impose their own rule of law, what would we call them? Criminals. If someone were to refuse to obey the lawfully elected government, declare it to be illegal, and attack governmental offices, officers, and institutions, what would we call it here? Criminal. It is no different there. These are criminal acts. What do we do with "insurgents" here? We label them as criminals and we lock them up for a very long time. It doesn't matter to us whether their beef with the government is financial or political in nature here in the United States; here they are all just criminals and are treated as such. Timothy McVeigh thought he was an insurgent. He wasn't. He was just a murderer; a criminal. He was treated as such by the people of the State of Oklahoma. He wasn't captured by the Army, he was captured by law enforcement.

Insurgency is an internal problem, and therefore a criminal problem. The Taliban could each lay down their arms and take part in the process. They could vote. They could run for office. They could participate. What's the difference between any of the Taliban and Tim McVeigh?

There are more of them.

Afghanistan is trying to move on in the post-Taliban era. No longer an authoritarian theocracy, this country has ratified a Constitution and has held successful elections. Now, burdened with the detritus of 30 years of warfare and the lack of any real institutional memory of how to govern, this nation struggles to survive. The ANP are, again, key to the development of a healthy country. Are they treated as such?

Uh, I'll take "No" for a thousand, Alex.

The ANP are the bastard children of the Islamic Republic. Our own Army didn't want the ANP training mission, again preferring the ANA mission; at least it had the word "Army" in it. The organization I belonged to fell under the ARSIC-East. I heard it said at an ETT team leader conference that even though General Cone said that the ANP were the main effort, he didn't agree and the ARSIC-East's main effort would remain with the ANA. If I had disobeyed my commander at that level it would have been my butt, but I suppose that at that level there were gentlemen's agreements or something. The point is that the ANP are and have been lower on the priority list for training and mentoring, though we have seen what all of that can do for the ANA.

Six years ago the ANA were scarcely better than criminals in the eyes of the people. They often did things that the ANP are known for now; shaking down the populace for money, corruption on an incredibly grand scale, nepotism, clannish cronyism, thievery and misdirection of government assets... the ANA were champs of all of that behavior. Now the ANA are widely trusted and looked up to by the population. Their stock in the eyes of the people has risen immeasurably. My ANP were threatened by local village elders during an operation, "We like the ANA. We respect the ANA. When the ANA leave, you are through."

Telling.

I also saw the ANP Colonel that I was mentoring taking care of law enforcement calls while engaged in a major combat operation. Arrests were made, referrals to prosecutors made. I then witnessed the same erratic behavior from the Provincial law enforcement system that the ICG report details. On the first day of the operation, one of my cohort's team captured the Taliban S-2 (Intelligence Officer) for the Tag Ab Valley. Major find, eh? Yep, what a coup; right up to the point where he got to the provincial prosecutor.

The Provincial Governor (brand spanking new one, too) had him released. By the next day, he was leading 60 Taliban all over the Tag Ab Valley trying to kill us. I cannot express my admiration for the Afghan Judiciary and the current Provincial governance structure. During the same period, I was personally asked to intervene by an Afghan mother. Her son had been declared innocent by the court in Kabul, but she couldn't get the Provincial Government to release him, although she had copies of the decision in her hands.

They wanted a bribe to release him, and she couldn't afford the bribe.

This is why the Taliban, the criminals, are making headway; because it doesn't take much to out-govern such a government. All of these problems are fixable, though. If you had seen the ANA six years ago, you would have thrown in the towel. However, it's going to take a renewed effort, some re-delegation of responsibilities on the part of some of our non-combatant or sub-combatant allies (those countries with national caveats on use of force or employment of armed forces) into roles that don't require combat except in self-defense but can seriously impact governance, and potentially some help that is not currently being sought or used, such as to rework the Afghan Judiciary into something resembling a fair and honest system.

The ICG report hits the nail on the head with its depiction of the institutional flaws of the ANP, but misses the mark with its stress on removing the ANP from the counterinsurgent role. This is an honest mistake, though, made from the viewpoint of an organization that doesn't understand that criminalizing insurgents is part of the only strategy that will secure success in Afghanistan, and the fact that where the Army isn't, the ANP are static and are the government's first line of contact with the people and their rightful guarantors of security, just like they are here in the States. The report's recommendations for reforms and accountability are excellent. Overall, it's a good document and well worth a read.

Parking tickets are a long way off for these folks. Think 1870's in our own West.
Read full post with comments

News From The ARSIC-South

First things first;

Camp Falcon, the American camp on the British FOB at Lashkar Gah, has been formally renamed Camp Dimond, after CPL Scott Dimond, the ANP mentor who died in the ambush immortalized by Nick Meo in his self-serving article about... let me see... oh, yeah; himself. Well, the warrior whose life was taken in defense of freedom that night has been recognized with the naming of a camp in his honor.

You can read about it and see pictures here. This will keep CPL Dimonds name in the memories of hundreds of soldiers who will work at and pass through that camp and learn where the name came from. His name will be mentioned in histories, books, and perhaps blogs that have yet to be written. His name is forever linked now with our history now being made in Afghanistan. While he paid a great price, honor will be given many times over to his name. It's the best we can do for him now.

This happens more often than you think;

Here we see that three would-be IED bombers were summarily executed by a combination of their own device and latent stupidity. This happens more often than you think. In July of 2007, as we were preparing for Operation Nauroz Jhala (New Year's Hail,) not one but two separate incidents happened in Kapisa Province. In the first, two men emplacing an IED were similarly executed by their own creation as they were trying to put a re-worked artillery shell under a culvert with visions of insurgent glory dancing in their heads.

In the other incident, a bomb-maker blew himself into paradise, which oddly enough looked like hundreds of tiny chunks, while constructing a device in his rented house. These happened within a couple of days of each other near Mahmoud Raqi, the seat of Kapisa Province.

You never heard of these two incidents before, as I'm sure that you won't hear of most of them. Why now? Because that article brought it to mind and also reminded me that we all need a little Christmas joy now and again. The joy lies not in the deaths of human beings; but if there had to be deaths, there is poetry in those deaths being of the ones who had evil in their minds instead of another CPL Dimond. You see, those two IED's that predetonated were likely targeted at my team. So my team and I get another Christmas with our families. This also brings greater empathy for CPL Dimond's sacrifice, and that of his family.

Rest in Peace, CPL Dimond; and may your family find some peace this Christmas season.
Read full post with comments

And The Winner Is... Substance

I differed with Andrew Exum of Abu Mukuwama in my review of Nir Rosen's article in Rolling Stone detailing his "embed" with the Taliban, which turned out to be, I thought, totally lacking in substance. It was more a tale of how his life was in danger as he was shuttled about by "Taliban" underlings. He in no way delved into the subjects that Ghaith Abdul Ahad, an Iraqi journalist who is published in The Guardian this week, plumbed thoroughly. Ghaith Abdul Ahad blows Rosen clean out of the water and shows Rolling Stone up for the pop outlet that it is, rather than a serious source of information.

Ghaith Abdul Ahad has produced an excellent look at some insurgents who have their act together. They know what they are doing. Read the article for a quick course in Insurgency 101. Qomendan Hemmet is the real deal. Qomendan is a spelling of a word in Dari that sounds to me like "Commandan" and means, "Commander" or "Commandant" depending on the usage. It is a title, not a name. Often Afghans in government service will refer to a commander as "Qomendan Sahib" as a way of being respectful of a commander. The Talib Qomendan explains the simplicity of the message that he is carrying and illustrates the difficulties facing the coalition in his area, which is in Wardak Province. Wardak borders Kabul Province to the west and southwest, and has been an area that has become more and more a focus of violence since 2007.

It doesn't matter what the location, though. Hemmet explains to Ghaith Abdul Ahad in relative detail how his insurgency is working and what his aims are. Is he cocky? Sure. You could say that he is cocksure of himself; or of his enemy's inability to block him in the achievement of his goals, which are simple and clear.

"The Americans have installed hundreds of Afghan policemen, they patrol the street all the time, but they can't control it." ~ Qomendan Hemmet

This is the message of the Taliban; it is simple, it is clear, and it is easier to give as an impression than it is to thoroughly disprove as a fact. That, my friends, is IO that is consistent with operations, goals, and capabilities. They mean what they say, they say what they mean, and they do what they say.

There is more consistency with a directly focused insurgency.

Mullah Muhamadi, one of Hemmet's men, arrived later wearing a long leather jacket and a turban bigger than all the others. "This is not just a guerrilla war, and it's not an organised war with fronts," he said. "It's both." He went on to explain the importance the Taliban attached to creating a strong administration in the areas it held: "When we control a province we need to provide service to the people. ~ Ghaith Abdul Ahad, The Guardian

This is echoed by another Talib in Ghazni. Sounds like these guys have read Galula, and whether or not they know it, they are students of Mao. Establish a shadow government and prove their legitimacy by providing service to the people. Outgovern the government. A discussion of whether and how they are achieving this goal is another subject, but there are definitely gaps in the government's legitimacy large enough for shadow organizations, like courts, to provide such services to the people.

"The main two problems we deal with in the Taliban courts are bandits and land disputes," Abdul Halim went on. "When we solve these problems we win the hearts of the people." ~ Maulawi Abdul Halim, quoted by Gaith Abdul Ahad, The Guardian

There was nothing nearly so illuminating in Rosen's piece. We are jaded with "hearts and minds," but the Taliban are living it. Those of us who have seen the shortcomings of the government of the IRoA at ground level know what the weak points are; the failures to govern effectively that have left the door open to the hated Taliban. Between these failures and the failures on the part of NATO and ISAF to effectively mentor the fledgling government to overcome these shortfalls and our failure to live up to our promises as far as reconstruction is concerned leave Afghans willing to consider alternate governance. But the Taliban?

Even the Taliban realize that they have a PR problem, and they address it.

"We went from the jihad to the government and now we are in the jihad again. We have learned from the mistakes we committed. Lots of our leaders have experience in the jihad and in the government. The leaders are the same leaders but the fighters are new and they don't want to be like those who ruled and committed mistakes." ~ Abdul Halim, quoted by Ghaith Abdul Ahad, The Guardian

These guys are not idiots. They know an opportunity to present their case when they see it. Sure, Ghaith Abdul Ahad and The Guardian provided them an outlet. I'm not slamming them for that at all. On the contrary, all of the stuff that I and others have been saying about insurgents, insurgency, counterinsurgency and the state of things in Afghanistan are being confirmed here from the other side. Yes, the Taliban got to paint their picture, but this article is valuable in shedding some light on the fact that these guys are no slackers, nor are they mysterious unbeatable Taliban. They are still Taliban.

These Taliban are also telling us how to beat them. It's all there; and it sounds a lot like what veterans of the campaign have been saying. No deep imponderables... except how to master ourselves.

Nir Rosen's bit in Rolling Stone had all the depth of a small soap dish. In fact, his inability to correctly identify the NATO member country whose armored vehicles roared past his position on Highway 1 was only one indication of the overall weakness of his portrayal of the situation and the insurgents. It was a story of personal intrigue, not an article of substance about the insurgents or insurgency. Ghaith Abdul Ahad did an actual work of journalism, and the difference between two articles that are so similar in intent is a world in breadth.

Two similarly themed articles; one in a newspaper, one in a flashy pop magazine, and the winner is the one with substance.

Rolling Stone really stepped on it. They should have hired Ghaith Abdul Ahad.
Read full post with comments

The More Things Change...

The More Things Change...

Witness this post on Afghanistan Shrugged, the best (IMO) soldier milblog in Afghanistan right now. Longwarrior would be right up there, too, but he's been unable or uninspired to post. Longwarrior's latest bespeaks the disillusionment that sets in upon exposure to the Afghan reality; the stuff they don't teach you at Ft Riley.

In any case, Vampire06 is doing a fabulous job of conveying the feeling of doing your best with some pretty workable Afghans all while having your hands tied behind your back by both your chain and the parallel ISAF chain. His frustration is evident, and I empathize completely. Working with the Afghans gave a real sense of satisfaction, while the American chain offered so much frustration and contradiction.

It's not like the Afghans don't offer their own frustrations. Corruption, favoritism, nepotism, clannish parochialism; they abound. But you expect that you will have these challenges from the Afghans. You don't expect that you are going to be given advice by Camp Phoenix with such ridiculousness as "don't drink the chai, don't eat the food." You don't expect your higher headquarters to tell you how to insult your charges and set yourself up for failure.

Or deny you illumination from your own 60mm mortars so that you can see the bad guys that you are almost on top of. Vampire06 has one of those "Oh, what the hell?" moments and describes his evening in detail.

Vampire06 is not the first one to experience this type of thing. He apparently, sadly, won't be the last. We have a tremendous ability to gather information. How cool is it that the TOC 100 miles away could see this situation unfolding on the ground? It's really really cool; except when the ability to gather information outstrips our ability to trust our subordinates and simply provide them the information that would help them instead of shackling them while they have bad guys in their sights.

Same old stuff. Keep in mind that Vampire06 isn't the lone ranger. He's not the only one out there that this type of thing is happening to. He's just the one writing about it. It happens much more often than that.

Keep it up, Vampire06. You're doing a great job. Sounds like you've arrived with your Afghans, which is the coolest thing. That trust and ability to influence is the best thing. No matter what else, you are doing what you are there to do. Try to let the rest of it slide and keep trying. Hope your comms always work. Funny how fragile those radios can be. Sometimes they sound just like someone is crumpling cellophane (like from a cigarette pack) up in front of the mike. Hope that never happens to yours.

No Flag For Sparky

Chromed Curses has brought it to the fore that there is a fireman who has been told to remove the American flag from his helmet. Goes against department policy to show pride in your country, it seems.

Fire Chief Mark Roche's email address is: mroche@newtonma.gov . Just sayin'...

New FM 7-0 Discussion at Blackfive

BG Abe Abrams has put up a guest post over at Blackfive and an opportunity to discuss the new FM 7-0 Training For Full Spectrum Operations. This is the companion piece to the recently released directive ordering that the Army will become proficient at IW, and is a significant change in the Army's doctrine.

Readers are encouraged to post comments which BG Abrams has been responding to. This is an unusual opportunity to "discuss" the new manual with one of the proponents. Blackfive even has a link provided to download the new manual. You can also find downloadable FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and FM 3-0 Operations at the same site.

Stick a fork in...

Loopy Libertarian also points out this bit of unbelievable outrageousness. Sallie Mae, it seems, is the absolute epitome of corporate philanthropy. Unless you are a recently deceased Marine, that is.

2LT McVey's Congressman is Rep Edward Markey, by the way. Just sayin'.

Now for the good news...

Go see the new FabLab computer lab in Jalalabad. Wonderful wonderful stuff. Someone needs corporate sponsors or something.

One last thing...

I got an email from a reader who is coordinating Afghan exchange students for the coming year. Due to an unannounced project, I will probably not be in the position to take a young Afghan into my home, but out there, somewhere in the blogosphere, someone who reads this must have thought to themselves, "I'd like to do something to help Afghanistan succeed, but I can't go and fight."

Well, here's your chance. When I was a junior high school student, my mother got us into Laubach Literacy, whose motto is "each one, teach one." This is kind of like that. I know that I didn't win the campaign in Afghanistan all by my lonesome. It's still going on, and I could only do a little. Someone who is reading this can make just a little bit of difference by bringing an intelligent young English-speaking Afghan into their home and making their own bond with Afghanistan without having to subject themselves to the predations of the Taliban.

"What an opportunity! How do I sign up?" you ask.

Send me an email at afghanoldblue[at]gmail.com and I will facilitate contact with the coordinator. It's actions that we take, not words or happy thoughts, that make a difference in this world. Consider taking an action. Personally, I know that it's little actions on a distributed level that make success in Afghanistan possible. You can be a significant contributor by sharing your hospitality with one student. That's pretty cool.
Read full post with comments