Lieven Leaves Me Shaking My Head

My thanks to Vampire 6 for cluing me in to this.

What that link points to is an article in the Financial Times by Anatol Lieven, a professor at King's College in London, advocating evacuating Afghanistan posthaste. There are numerous failures in this article, but I am struck by two thoughts.

The first is that there is good news for the America in that the behaviors and capabilities of the past do not necessarily doom one to similar behaviors in the future. We aren't actually trapped by our history into repeating the mistakes of Viet Nam. This is proven by the fact that the British have now shed the mental and organizational agility that led them to success in COIN in Malaysia and have now become unable to grasp the concept. If this is possible for the British, it is then possible for us to change our spots and become an agile and adaptive organization that can grasp COIN and actually do it.

The second is that this man has never read any counterinsurgency texts. If he had, then he would realize that the Taliban are performing exactly as predicted as insurgents. Dr. Lieven's predilection for appeasement and his willingness to accept the promises, "under threat of bombing," of international criminals for the sake of ease is absolutely devastating.

Take note that this is what is passing for what the Financial Times would refer to as "substantive and authoritative commentary." Really? "Let's quit!" is the level of "substantive and authoritative commentary" in Great Britain?

My Infantry Tourette's is about to kick in. We've got words for this in Infantrese that would decidedly go against my attempt to keep this blog family-friendly. Words that contain references to the excretions of barnyard fowl and steaming cups of adamant invitations to silence swirl in my head.

How about "poppycock?"

This is yet another cry of, "It's too hard! The Afghans are magically different from the other peoples of the world... you just don't understand; I mean, look what they did to the Russians, for Gawd's sake! Those are the most foul, cruel and bad-tempered hillbillies you've ever seen. Just look at the bones, man!"

Good grief.

Now, I'm sure that Anatol Lieven, son of Russian nobility and British education, is a very smart man. He's a writer and political scientist with a PhD and experience in Central Asia as a writer for the Financial Times. He wrote a book about how Chechnya is the tombstone of the Russian Empire. He's also a Senior Fellow at a Washington-based think tank, the New America Foundation, whose mission statement reads, "to bring exceptionally promising new voices and new ideas to the fore of our nation's public discourse." Ladies and gentlemen, this is not promising discourse. It is pessimistic fog-wandering in search of a home. Lieven obviously wrote this article on a day that he forgot to take his antidepressants. The basic tone of his piece, read by millions who assume that they are being offered a serious solution to a difficult situation is, "Man, what a mess. Let's all hang ourselves!" If we were to accept the basic premise, we would believe that insurgents are victorious from the word "go!" and therefore central government and the rule of law is basically an archaic concept.

This must have been the conclusion he drew from watching the Russians, the world's most brutal and ineffective counterinsurgents, flail about destructively in Chechnya.


Okay, conniption complete. This American son of potato-grubbing Irish immigrants; this educationally-challenged blue-collar non-commissioned bastard child of the long war is going to deconstruct the bit of defeatist drivel that counts as "exceptionally promising""substantive and authoritative commentary" from what one would assume would be a leading intellectual in Great Britain and, apparently, America.

Let's start at the top.

This is less because of Afghanistan itself than because of the impact on neighbouring Pakistan – a country of critical importance to global security, where extremism is being gravely worsened by the war on its borders and the demands being placed on it by Washington.

Folks, Pakistan is more critically important to global security than Afghanistan because they have nukes and for no other reason. While Pakistan is not insignificant, relegating the problems plaguing Afghanistan to the level of an appendix on the bowels of Pakistan is ridiculous. Pakistan was the hotbed of recruiting, indoctrinating and training militants for the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance from the 90's forward. It was the pathway for our feeding of the anti-communist insurgents of the 80's, as we unwittingly strengthened the roots of a growing wave of religious insurgent zealotry begun on the last day of the last conventional defeat of Arab armies by the Isrealis. Pakistan is unstable because of many reasons, but one of them is the Islamic Fundamentalist warring parties that inhabit the part of Pakistan that Pakistan itself cedes to lawlessness. Pakistan is a problem, but Pakistan's problems are just as much a symptom of what is wrong with Afghanistan as Afghanistan is a symptom of Pakistan's refusal to adequately govern their own country.

Dr. Lieven assumes that we can walk away from this problem and let it sort itself out "under threat of bombing." This simplistic view fails to recognize that we did in fact bomb insurgent training camps in Afghanistan with cruise missiles, which the last time I checked met the basic criteria for being described as bombs, during the Clinton administration. The result of this demonstration to the Taliban and al Qaeda of the power of cruise missiles was the demonstration by al Qaeda on 9/11 that improvised cruise missiles are to be had for the price of a few airline tickets and are actually more devastating than 63 very pricey cruise missiles lobbed at mud huts in Afghan valleys. Oh, the Taliban are going to adhere to their agreements due to that fear, let me tell you.

If the Obama administration’s goal in the surge is to buy some more time for a continuation of existing policies, then the Taliban will simply bury their weapons, melt into the population and across the border into Pakistan and lie low until US forces pull back to their bases. Thirty thousand more soldiers can certainly drive the Taliban underground for a while but they are not remotely enough to garrison their strongholds permanently.

That's why counterinsurgency isn't about the Taliban so much as it is about establishing and strengthening the Afghan government to be able to provide security, rule of law, and basic services to the population, removing the Taliban's base of power. That is why economic development, helping create jobs for Afghans so that they don't need to earn money by working for insurgents and so that they are too tired at night to run around planting IEDs and nailing night letters to mosque doors, is important. That's what counterinsurgency does when it is done with well-rounded vigor. The fact that we are not doing that right now means we should fix what we are doing, not leave the mess for the next generation to clean up.

The British are no longer in Malaya, and the Malaysian government doesn't have to maintain a huge military. I guess that's because the insurgency was defeated by sound counterinsurgency and economic development ensued, leaving the communists irrelevant.

Gee, what a concept, Doctor.

As many US officials and soldiers recognise in private, there would be something profoundly odd about Washington risking a bloody disaster only in order to re-elect Hamid Karzai’s administration, in which most Afghans and westerners have long since lost all confidence.

The usual response to this argument is that Washington cannot find anyone to replace Mr Karzai.

What? What kind of imperialistic drivel is this? Who's going to decide if Mr. Karzai remains in power? Well, if we remember what elections are, that would be the Afghans. There are many who say that the next Afghan President cannot be elected without some kind of U.S. approval, but if elections are still elections I'd say that it's the Afghans themselves who will demonstrate at the polls whether or not the majority of Afghans have lost confidence in Mr. Karzai. I think Mr. Karzai himself recognizes this, because he is trying to curry favor with the Afghan voters at the expense of his relationship with the U.S.

It's not up to us to find someone to replace Karzai, folks; it's up to the Afghans themselves. That's the wonder of democracy. That, and the peaceful transfer of power. Man, if Karzai lost the election and there was actually a peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan, that would be the first time that it has happened in oh, say, ever. And we thought we were making history electing Obama.

I love political scientists. They're so... politically savvy. It gives me goosebumps. Brrrr!

Instead of dreaming of a new strongman, the Obama administration should use the military surge to buy time for a different plan altogether. This should begin with the calling of a new Afghan national assembly, or Loyah Jirga, in order to change the Afghan constitution.

This change should include the suspension or abolition of the executive presidency in favour of a prime ministerial system, with a cabinet composed of non-political technocrats; a law allowing political parties to put up candidates for parliament; and on this basis, the legitimation of political forces representing the Taliban, which, as with Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, can then be used to open serious negotiations with the Taliban leadership.

Oh, yeah; now we're getting into some meaty "substantive and authoritative" recommendations. Abolish the constitution with a new Loya Jirga; tell them that what they came up with the first time is no good. I'll admit that there are some changes that need to be made in the executive branch, but I think that Provincial and District governors need to be elected instead of appointed. Afghan villagers think so, too. Never heard one of them complain about the Afghan Constitution. Not one. I guarantee that you'd have some elected Taliban in Helmand and Oruzgan, but that's called engagement. Expecting formal negotiations with Omar? Not right now. More on that later.

Prime ministerial system? Uh huh. Then the Afghans can change Prime Ministers the way they wash their feet. Great recommendation, Doctor. We'll get right on that. Next!

In the long run, the aim should be a radically decentralised Afghanistan in which the Taliban can be permitted to take over much of the country in return for a guarantee – under threat of aerial bombardment – not to give shelter to terrorists.

WHAT????

Notwithstanding some of ridiculous recommendations made earlier in his article, this is where Mr. Lieven goes clean 'round the bend. I am mentally converting Infantrese exclamations of shock, dismay, disbelief and pronouncements of irretrievable stupidity; suppressing another conniption. I'm white-knuckling this one, folks. This man is a PhD, for Pete's sake, and he's advocating ceding a large area of Afghanistan to the Taliban? Has this man been smoking the Taliban flowers?

We've already demonstrated that the Taliban aren't particularly straightened out by the threat of aerial bombardment. On a tactical level, they hate the A-10's and B-1's (which they never see... just a bomb goes, "BOOM!") What Dr. Lieven is advocating is that the threat of aerial terrorism will keep the Taliban in check. What, pray tell Doctor, are you going to threaten to bomb? Villages? One dude's house? How are you going to know what to bomb? SIGINT? Are we now going to trust the CIA and MI-6 with choosing bombing targets to influence the government of Talibanistan?

I'll go you one better, Doc; let's just figure out the demographics, abolish the ill-conceived Durand Line and create Pashtunistan? Then at least we'll know where the terrorists can all go to be happy, joyous and free. That's a great idea! Let's create the Insurgent Republic of Pashtunistan. That would put a stop to all of this silliness right now. Then the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan could all figure it out together, as they may be actually capable of doing in the absence of those mean old Pashtuns, and everyone can go home. I'm sure the Pakistanis won't mind at all, as it would alleviate their problems in the northwest as well. They just won't have so much land that they're afraid to actually govern. Not a problem, I'm sure. So simple, so painless, so devoid of any effort to solve any really tough problems other than the relocation of millions. It's foolproof; it's purrrrrrfect.

I guess I lost that conniption struggle, but come on; that's the most asinine thing I've heard all year, and I live in America for the love of Mike. Just goes to show you that the unwashed masses and underclass NCO's don't have a lock on jackass.

To pursue any successful US strategy will, however, also require a definitive answer to a second important question: Is the surge intended to allow the US to leave Afghanistan with honour and limited success, as is President Obama’s stated intention in the case of Iraq? Or is the plan to establish a permanent US military presence in the country?

Running away with "honour;" what a concept. Limited success... in Iraq I guess that means a freely elected government that is taking over responsibility for security and providing basic services on a growing basis. Limited, yes; very limited success. And your definition of limited success, Doctor, in Afghanistan is to abolish the Constitution, change the structure of the government to include more non-political technocrats and cede a large portion of it to an international terrorist/insurgent organization in order to "harass" al Qaeda? Brilliant. I'm in awe of a man who is clearly the Steven Hawking of political thought. More goose pimples. Brrrr!

I also love the Imperialist alternative. We're either there to "do unto other, then split" or we're there to stay in perpetuity. Think tank kind of guy here, folks.

If the latter, then there will never be peace because, as long as US troops remain in Afghanistan, Pashtuns will be found to attack them and anyone allied to them. This has been the pattern of Pashtun history ever since the British showed up in the region more than 150 years ago.

We've already seen the Russian lineage come out with his horror for the fate of the Soviets in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Now here comes the British horror of Kipling's Afghanistan. The bogeyman of British nightmares is a Pashtun with attitude. When a Brit gets up in the middle of the night to check his closet, he's expecting a guy in man jammies with a long beard and an angry glint in his eye.

The prior withdrawal of American forces has been set by the Taliban as a precondition of negotiations but it seems possible that, in certain circumstances, they would in fact accept a formal guarantee to leave by a fixed date not too far in the future.

Dr. Lieven, go buy a copy of Galula and spend a couple of hours reading it. If you have read it before, try it this time without the scotch and pills. Galula points out that insurgents will not negotiate unless it is to induce the government to give crippling concessions as part of a desperate final attempt to avoid total destruction, thereby ensuring their destruction. What part of "we blow up, decapitate, hang, beat and threaten civilians to let them know that the government can't protect them," makes you think that these are honorable people who simply want to make peace?

Oh, don't forget the acidic squirt guns turned on schoolgirls.

You complete nimrod; you are buying the Taliban IO? The insurgents say, "Throw away all means of support and we will partner with you even though today we can't wait to kill you and take what you have... trust us, brother Afgan, we have changed. We won't be mean and dominant anymore. We are only hateful towards the infidels. We have learned our lessons, and we love you. Make the Americans go home and we can all have some chai and a nice hug. Ignore the gallows we are building. That's for an unrelated party later. The Hazaras are coming over for dinner later, and we wanted to show them a good time, Taliban style."

You actually buy that? Come on Mr. Chamberlain, we've got a meeting with the Fuhrer. After that we're going to plant a garden so that we can all have peas in our time. Hey, with that and a blender we can actually experience whirled peas.

This guy teaches future leaders and sits on a think tank, folks. This is an academic; a published thinker... a doctor, no less. It is time to pray.

All this will not be easy for the US to swallow.

No shit, Sherlock? Hey, I'm only one citizen of the U.S. and I'm gagging and trying to keep from spitting coffee out of my nose. This guy's going to win a Nobel, people.

...given Afghan realities, there is really a reasonable chance that 10 years and tens of thousands of deaths from now, a continued US military campaign will be any nearer to creating a successful Afghan state than it is today; and what appalling damage may have been done to Pakistan in the meantime.

Given Afghan realities and our failure to actually do counterinsurgency, there is a chance that Dr. Lieven may be right. However, the solution isn't going to be to run away with "honour," allow the reestablishment of a terrorist haven on Pakistan's frontier and think that's going to make Pakistan more secure. This guy pisses me off.

You see, short-sighted educated people like Anatol Lieven threaten my sons' lives. I want for my sons to go to Afghanistan... as tourists, not as Soldiers. Mark my words, if we abandon Afghanistan because it is too hard right now, we will consign ourselves to at least another generation of warfare in what will definitely become known as "The Long War" instead of the GWOT. We will be back in Afghanistan with the stain of two abandonments on our faces instead of just one, and the Afghans will most assuredly not be any happier to see us the next time.

Over the course of the past 40 years, when has the International Islamic Insurgency taken a break? Don't read this to say that I am anti-Islamic, because I'm not; but if you have to describe who these militant radicals are, isn't that an essential part of the description? Were the Viet Cong just a bunch of guys with no ideology? No, they were communist insurgents. Well, the Taliban and AQ are radical Islamic insurgents. If every Muslim were an insurgent, we'd have a really big problem. Not every Muslim is an insurgent, but these insurgents are driven by radical Islam.

In any case, when have they taken a break? Never. They have either been kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, terrorizing or otherwise molesting Israel and any Western society that supports Israel either materially or politically... or planning such mischief... for the past 40 years. Osama is angry with the United States because of our support for Israel. The only way to appease this international terrorist network is to summarily destroy Israel, reinstall the Palestinians, declare the Middle East off limits to infidels and hope that the desire of some for a Global Caliphate evaporates. This is just not going away.

We expect to be able to listen to men with such academic standing with some level of assurance that we may be hearing something of value. Dr. Lieven may, on any other day, be an actual brilliant thinker. On the day he wrote that article, he was a whackjob whom I vehemently disagree with. Much of what he says has no place in the public discourse; these ideas would more appropriately be found written with a crayon clutched in the toes of a man wearing a jacket with very long sleeves; safely ensconced in a rubber-lined room.

Conniption complete.
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Tribal Militias; Listen To The Local Voices

Abbas Daiyar, a member of the Editorial Board at Daily Outlook Afghanistan has written a good piece about arming tribal militias in Afghanistan. I maintain that listening to the Afghans on this issue is very important. As Mr. Daiyar points out, what worked in Iraq is not necessarily the solution in Afghanistan.

The change of tactic vision was also under discussion among circles. Seeing the success story in Iraq, the US decided to try the Anbar Module in Afghanistan. Which in my previous articles, I have been articulating that it would result vice versa. Afghanistan is not Iraq therefore; similarities of insurgency should not be a justification for a similar military strategy. Iraqi society is merely divided on sectarian bases while Afghanistan’s is ethnic and clannish. Here tribalism plays vital. After political circles and media strongly opposed the idea of arming local militias against Taliban, the stakeholders in Afghanistan decided to launch the militia idea under another label maybe “pilot program”.

So it appears that even the Afghans realize that Afghanistan is not Iraq. Perhaps we should listen to them. There are some very good reasons not to rearm militias that have been so painfully disarmed in Afghanistan.

Here is another point from Mr. Daiyar that helps keep me from feeling alone:

Interior Minister, Hanif Atmar said this is a “Public Protection Police” which would a semi-paramilitary type force against insurgents. He said “in its first unit, youth from insurgent areas would be chosen by community elders.” How a Government police force is it that personnel are being chosen by community elders? Who are community elders to choose Police operating under Interior Ministry? Was there a real need of such a force when already our National Police is fighting Taliban?

Indeed.

Before arming tribal militias, we should do everything possible to work with and mentor the ANP. We have not done this with anywhere near the vigor required before giving up on them to arm locals. Anbar is a far cry from Wardak.
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Registan In The House

Joshua Foust of Registan is in one of my old stomping grounds in Afghanistan this week. He's apparently the guest of the French at the moment, experiencing the wonders of the Tag Ab Valley. Go over to his site and see how the place has changed. Unfortunately there are no pictures, but I almost lost my mind when he was talking about chatting with people that I know.

By the way, the District Sub-governor that he's talked with is not the same one that I had my little chat with when we took one of the local Maliks into custody for tea-partying with the Taliban and possessing prohibited stuff, like Kalashnikov ammunition. That Wuliswahl was fired, and rightfully so, some time ago.

Anyway, Mr. Foust tells the tale of what it's like to arrive in Tag Ab for the first time. I remember that feeling... but the first time I was there it was quite the Wild West. It sounds like the ink blot that we started is spreading. You know, even with the pessimistic stuff you hear about Afghanistan, there was and is tremendous progress being made in placees like Tag Ab, which was the nearest Taliban stronghold to Kabul. It was a place where coalition troops raided but never stayed. Now the ANA and their French compatriots are doing the deal there.

I had to call O about that tonight, and we talked for some time about how it was "back in the day" in Tag Ab. I think we both miss it a little.

Go read Registan. He's also got some really good pictures of Parwan Province in an earlier post. If we're lucky, maybe he'll post some pictures of Tag Ab. Maybe he'll even get up into the Panjshir and take some pictures there. I exchanged an email with Mr. Foust this evening and asked him to pass along a message to Colonel Jhala if he sees him. I hope he does. I miss that guy; he was one of the good ones.

Nostalgia. It really wasn't that long ago.
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Quote For The Day

We are proving this true. Today the AP reports new recommendations by a Pentagon panel apparently commissioned by the Joint Chiefs. If you read that and much of the other statements made about the potential way forward, then read the quote below.

Traditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of warfare-that is, by the pursuit and destruction in combat of guerrilla bands on the ground-operational commanders invariably hope to succeed in maneuvering them like regular units and to gain a rapid and spectacular success. They have little interest in the less noble work with the population and the destruction of the clandestine organization that enables guerrilla bands to survive despite local defeats the forces of order periodically inflict.

Only a long occupation of the countryside, which will permit police operations among the people...can succeed. ~ Roger Trinquier, "Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency," 1961

Is it just me, or are those who are famous for fighting the last war seeking to drop the counterinsurgency and just go with counter-guerrilla warfare? Those who have studied successful counterinsurgencies and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies, including the men that wrote the basis for our current doctrine... and even including one of the men who actually helped write the doctrine... have demonstrated that this is exactly what unsuccessful counterinsurgents do. Pakistan has become our great national excuse for not practicing our own doctrine in exactly the type of situation that challenges us to be expert practitioners of our that doctrine.

It is, alas, not sexy... "less noble," as Trinquier puts it. Perhaps "less glorious" is along the line of his meaning. AirLand warriors find it repulsive, inglorious and weird. Those who advocate it thoroughly are the military equivalents of nerds. Nerds are decidedly unmilitary. As one Captain told me in Afghanistan while observing another Captain, "The Army is like a sports team, kinda like a bunch of jocks." Nerds and Jocks. Anyone want to predict which way that struggle is going to go in a jock society?

Granted, I have not read the study. There are some things lower in the storyline that allude to some recommendations that may indicate that the study said more than what the AP reporters were able to glean.

That would be a shock, wouldn't it?




I sat in on a seminar during my lunch hour today, a panel discussion by three subject matter experts on information operations. One was Shameen Rassam, an Iraqi-American journalist with tons of experience on the media side in the Middle East, one was Farhad Pashwak, an Afghan-American on the verge of a doctorate who has been downrange in this war, and the last was Dennis Murphy, staff member at the Combined Arms Center, a retired officer who has taught at West Point and specializes in "New Media." It was an interesting discussion.

The room was full of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. The questions were good, but the while there was the acknowledgment that we are being schooled in Information Operations by the Taliban, no one noted that the Taliban choose their message and put all of their efforts into supporting that message, while we are always just doing what we do... disjointed COIN... and then trying to come up with something to say about it.

Ms. Rassam stressed that our message must be culturally understandable to the target population. Mr. Pazhwak stressed the change within the Taliban message to include more of the international Jihadist message and their emergence into more sophisticated media while still utilizing traditional appeals to the romantic oral historians of the Pashtuns. Mr. Murphy stressed the fact that commanders in the field needed to determine their IO message in the planning phases, that the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) needs to present IO in the courses of action.

Mr. Murphy's recommendations come closest to actually raising the idea that the idea needs to drive the actions. Both Ms. Rassam and Mr. Pazhwak pointed out that when you come up with your message, it needs to be something that the indigenous population actually cares about, can understand, and finds it appealing. This goes for both your positive messages and countering the enemy's IO.

It's all interesting in the schoolhouse. Wonder how it's going to fly on the football field.
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Rescued From Comments: Anonymous Vern

I had to rescue this one from comments. It provides a unique viewpoint. While I do not find myself as pessimistic as Vern, His viewpoint is so diverse as to beg a post of its own.

I guess I come at this from a different perspective from most of the contributors. Having a nearly 40 year interest in South Asian Islam and history, a graduate degree in Islamic history and just happened to be married to an Afghan, a Pushtun, to be exact, has really focused me. I have witnessed much suffering over there, most of it inflicted by the Afghans upon themselves. I say this based on three tours to Afghanistan myself, tours in which I did not hide in FOBs or at Bagram or Kabul, but actually went out and about (alone and afraid, often enough). I have witnessed some really amazing attempts by US military and civilian personnel to provide assistance in a humane and localized manner that would benefit locals and not the wallahs in Kabul or former warlords. I have witnessed the callous disregard for truth by western journalists (in one case, the journalist was actually standing on a destroyed wall, beneath which lay the bodies of dead civilians as she loudly searched for the bodies to blame on US fire). I have also read and heard, extensively, just as most of you have, from the American political elites and academic elites, but I generally either disagree (sometimes in person) with them or ignore them as their "observations" and "recommendations" are not only not based on reality but apparently on wishful thinking from inside too many "Western paradigms." Some of those are listed in the above comments as well as in the extracts from Senator Lieberman's extracts Bill & Bob have provided, although there are some good points as well. Obversely, I don't have all the answers either (that'll be a surprise to my wife!).

That said, despite the vast foreign interference in Afghanistan, dating from, oh, let's say, just after the Kushan Empire and especially during the time of Timurlane, most of the present problems of Afghanistan are because of the Afghans themselves, albeit "recently" with a large dose of "negative" assistance from the Soviet Pushtun genocide, the Pakistani efforts at control and the Deobandi/Wahhabi Arabization efforts by the Saudis and their ilk. The 1990s were all about the Afghans, and look how well they did in fixing their country and situation. Many Afghans have a huge reservoir of business initiative but when preyed upon by smugglers, criminal gangs, corrupted local leadership elites and "fundos," they have little recourse but to go along, lest they be killed. No amount of aid, reconstruction, externally applied COIN or hand wringing protestations about women's rights, the children, or drug cultivation versus subsistence crops will change that, especially if that hand wringing is done in Europe or America.

I just wish, from all readers and speakers, a more holistic and reasonable approach to the problems (and opportunities) of Afghanistan. The truth about Afghanistan is rarely understood or articulated, as too many people have created a "body guard of lies" to protect their particular piece of the exploitation pie (be they newsies, humanitarian gypsies, druggies, fundos, external foreign "players" or plain criminal types). No single "strand" is to blame nor can any single "theme" bring success.

Time, lots of time, is needed, along with real work by the Afghans themselves, and a realization that NOBODY "owes" them anything. To alleviate their pain so we (Americans, Europeans, liberal do-gooders, military control freaks, etc) "feel" better is to continue to institutionalize it for the majority of the populace. Only pain will force the Afghans to stop hurting themselves. Pain from shattered lives and society, pain from lost opportunities and present oppresion; only pain will force the Afghans themselves to correct themselves.

Sounds harsh but when has it ever been any different, historically? We are not, as some have stated in the past, at "the end of history," nor are we engaged in a unique "clash of cultures." Cultures always clash, be it openly or benignly. Stone age (neo-Stone, Bronze, early Iron, Luddite) cultures and societies wil always fall before modern Steel and Information Age culture, despite the most ardent and savage efforts of those in those cultures or the "Romantic" efforts of those misguided enough to assist in trying to retain them by rationalization of humanitarian cause(s). Progress is painful, and it is made worse by Progressives.

I would dearly love to see a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan but I am very aware that it has never been a "Westphalian" state, much less a peaceful unitarian state, unless that has been enforced by brutal genocidal policies (refer to Timurlane, the Mongols, Alexander the Great, etc). Ski chalets in Nuristan, golf course in Kabul and dune buggying in Nimruz would be wonderful, but it won't happen until the residents therein understand that societal trust needs to supersede tribal blood lines, xenophobic ethnic codes of conduct (Pushtunwali) and the self-imposed strictures of a backwards looking religion of stultifyingly repressive communitarianism (Wahhabi/Deobandi Islam).

I would be more than willing to go back and help, if the carrion crows on the body of Afghanistan could be driven off. Until then, despite the humanitarian urge within me, I will not pour even more good money down a bad hole. I am even against sending more young men and women there unless domestic political concerns cease to hamper their ability to not only provide real assitance, but to even properly defend themselves. As for the Afghans themselves, reconstruction of the Sufi networks and "lodges" would be a tremendous step in that direction, one I fear the Deobandi/Wahhabists will fight against.

Just my opinion.

S/F, Vern
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This Is Why

'Nuff said.
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The Toys Of Castle Argghhh!

I got to spend some quality time with John Donovan, lord and master of Castle Argghhh!, and his wife Beth yesterday. It was great to get to spend some time with such fine people. Along with wonderful hospitality, I was treated to a tour of John's toy room, which is incredible. For anyone who is a collector of militaria wondering if they should be jealous of John's collection, just defer to John without argument. He wins. No doubt.

I saw things that I had never seen before. Ever seen a "fencing musket" before? I have. Very innovative bit of kit, that. I would have to say that if the end goal in life is to have lots of toys, John's in the running. If it's judged by weight, he's right in there, too. I don't think that I've ever met anyone who was so undeterred by the mass of a collectible item.

The highlight was the gun salute fired with a Winchester Signal Cannon. Very nice. The steak was great, too... but not nearly as loud.

In any case, as well as being an accomplished blogger, veteran and Rotarian, John is one of the most knowledgeable people I have ever met concerning a wide range of subjects. He not only owns some really neat toys, but he can explain each of them in detail. He's not just knowledgeable, but reasoned as well. It was a treat to hear both of their opinions on a wide range of subjects.

In the blogosphere we are often on our own. It's not like we have club meetings every week or anything. Getting the chance to share blogging with someone who does something similar (I don't think many of us do exactly the same thing as anyone else,) is a good thing.

I'm glad I had a chance to meet them. The world just keeps getting smaller.


I almost forgot that John's Unicorn Watch has finally borne fruit. Last evening John and Beth found the promised unicorn. Details and photographs at John's site.
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