Bill and Bob's Excellent Afghan Adventure

The Announcement

2009-07-12T19:40:00.004+04:30

I'm currently in Kuwait, trying to find my way to Bagram. I'm going back to Afghanistan for a year. Hopefully I can help make a difference in my small way.

Also, this blog is moving to http://afghanquest.com

If you have me on your links; first of all, thanks. Secondly, please update your links. I hope that those who have been reading continue to enjoy.

~Blue

Still Holding

2009-06-30T22:09:00.002+04:30

I'd like to thank "Onparkstreet" for a question to answer in comments on the previous post. Unfortunately, I don't have the time right at the moment. Lots to see and do in the short term here, and the Genies of Bureaucracy are still in their bottle. This is a hell of a story... boring as hell, but still amazing. Perhaps someday I'll tell it.

And bore anyone who reads it to tears.

In the meantime, things are on the verge of exciting... and poised there seemingly eternally.

I will get to the very pertinent question as soon as I can.

Contributions

2009-06-26T21:39:00.004+04:30

I've said this before, and in the Obama Administration's new AfPak Strategy it was mentioned but got little attention. Now it is being echoed more and more; let's encourage our allies who have military caveats make other, perhaps more useful contributions.

PJ Tobia, an independent journalist in Kabul, has this to say about the Germans and their conundrum at home. The Germans want to be good allies, but they learned some serious lessons from the 1930's and '40's. Germany has a very different national spirit these days. Anyone I know who has worked with German troops in Germany says that the German troops are very impressive. They produce one of the best main battle tanks in the world, the Leopard II. They are smart, organized, well-trained soldiers.

They are horribly hamstrung in Afghanistan.

In January of 2008, at the German FOB in Konduz, SFC O was in the German TOC while they watched a group of insurgents set up rockets to fire at the FOB. The Germans could see them clearly on their sensors. The Germans possessed 120mm mortars which they could have easily used to put a stop to the insurgent's activities. Instead, the Germans were calling in to their higher headquarters for permission to place magazines in their small arms. Not to load the weapons... merely to place magazines in them.

O nearly went ballistic. He asked them why they didn't just mortar the rocketeers and get it over with. The Germans demurred. They were not permitted by their national caveats to engage, even when they saw the threat clearly and they were about to get rocketed. The Germans endured a brief rocketing (which never seem very brief when you are on the receiving end.)

The Germans have since changed some of their caveats to permit some more active roles. They are not, however, as able to take action as Americans, Brits, Canadians, or Dutch troops. What SFC O witnessed was merely an example, a single snapshot, of the type of incidents that occur when heavily caveated troops are put into situations that they cannot properly respond to.

The Germans are masterful organizers. The Germans, only sixty years ago, were rebuilding a country from the ground up. Afghanistan needs people who can mentor would-be administrators who are trying to work in a system that has no institutional memory of efficient governmental behaviors. As Tobia points out, it would not be perfectly safe, but it would be a very necessary contribution. The Japanese took a similar path, focusing their efforts on disarming local militias. The Japanese made massive contributions with this work... and it wasn't combat-related. The Germans, whose population does not support military involvement outside of Germany, could make similar contributions with governance.

Germany's initial role was in the development of the Afghan National Police. The Germans provided training, but could not perform the operational mentoring that is needed to really make lasting progress. German civilian experts could make huge, lasting contributions in non-military mentoring to help Afghan government officials to provide ethical, efficient government to more Afghans.

Calls for change like this are very slow-moving. We don't have time to screw around and cause a great NATO ally like Germany to become disillusioned when they could make such contributions that are so desperately needed. Let's work to get some of our allies more involved in ways that make more of an impact rather than mostly symbolic military contributions which can be less than effective.

Connect The Dots

2009-06-26T04:22:00.003+04:30

(Please excuse my lateness in weighing in on this... and in fact for not posting much lately. Lots to see and do lately, changes coming about, and I hope you keep checking back, as I will be able to discuss those changes openly soon, and they will have a significant impact on this blog.)

Michael Cohen is proving that he is still the guy who just can't connect the dots. His interest regarding COIN doctrine is bordering on a fetish, and his desperation to discredit the doctrine is palpable. As I've said, this is self-defeating. Cohen's primary advocacy dovetails very nicely with the capabilities that need to be developed in order to successfully shepherd Afghanistan and Pakistan through this very troubling and dangerous period of history in Central Asia. It boggles my mind that this man is so frightened that he literally loses his ability to reason, grasping at straws ranging from COL Gian Gentile's writings to Celeste Ward's article in the Washington Post cautioning an overcommitment to COIN.

Neither COL Gentile nor, from what I can gather, Ms. Ward really seem to agree with Mr. Cohen... he just gloms on to any argument that he finds remotely supportive. Desperation and fear are the mother of many inventions, most of them decidedly unhelpful, but the cowardly logic of Michael Cohen is reaching the point of ridiculousness. It seems to have become something of a mission for him to discredit the doctrine and its practitioners, which is peculiar given Mr. Cohen's self-admitted lack of any specific military knowledge. The natural question that one would have is, "What value is Mr. Cohen's opinion on the subject of military doctrine?"

The answer would be, "Absolutely none. Mr. Cohen has nothing of value to offer on the topic of military doctrine."

Why, then, would a man with absolutely nothing to offer... and knows it... on a subject such as warfighting doctrine suddenly be chiming in with vigor against the only doctrine that has even been remotely credited with any success in the insurgencies that we find ourselves embroiled in currently?

He's secretly a North Korean operative that has undergone plastic surgery and was implanted in a think tank in order to derail the United States by offering the worst possible advice imaginable.

I'm just kidding. But, on this issue Mr. Cohen is just about as helpful as a surgically altered North Korean in a Washington think tank. He is motivated not by any desire to see the current foreign policy objectives of the United States achieved, but in fact by a desire to see them fail. To that end, he advocates stridently against the propagation of COIN doctrine, even though he has absolutely no value as a military commenter. Why would he be afraid of success in Afghanistan?

Many seem to view COIN as the future of war and based on the "success" of COIN in Iraq, they seem to believe that the United States is uniquely positioned to do it . The question for many COIN-danistas seems to be not whether and when we should do counter-insurgency, but how the US can do it more effectively...

...The military needs to be making clear to the civilian leadership precisely how difficult counter-insurgency can be and why they should think twice about trying to implement such an approach....

...As I've written here many times the clearest and most unambiguous lesson that we should draw from the war in Iraq is that we should never get involved in such a war again - and that any benefit we accrue from invasion, occupation and nation-building will almost never be worth the cost.

*NOTE TO COHEN: It's COINdinista... just like Sandinista, but with "COIN" instead of "Sand." Let's get our terminology right, okay?*

So let me get this right... COIN seems to be successful in Iraq (although Cohen will also, when convenient, side with those who say that it wasn't in any way responsible for any success in Iraq,) Cohen is and always has been opposed to the war in Iraq or any similar action in the future... and so he feels that he should interfere with the military so that no counterinsurgency will ever be attempted again.

Of course, that was a few days ago. Here's what he said last night:

While there are signs of political reconciliation occurring on the local level and across the country there is a real question as to whether Iraq will turn into a stable country or will it turn in a violent and more deadly direction. While those of us who vehemently opposed this war would like nothing more to be proven wrong - and see a prosperous and stable Iraq rise from the ashes - that possibility is seeming more and more uncertain these days.

No, Sir; I don't believe that he would like to be proven wrong. I've shown Michael Cohen he was wrong before. He doesn't like it. I'll probably get another whiny personal email from him for posting this. No, I don't think that he does want to be proven wrong... because here's the very next paragraph he wrote...

So, the next time you hear a commentator talk about the success of the surge or the effectiveness of counter-insurgency tactics or what worked in Iraq can work in Afghanistan or that "the security situation is manageable" in Iraq be very dubious. What we are seeing today in Iraq is pretty compelling evidence that the institutionalized political reconciliation, which was supposed to accompany the US surge in 2007, is not occurring at a pace that inspires confidence.

As another matter of humor, Cohen quoted Juan Cole in that post. Talk about dubious. Oh, Cole is on target sometimes, I'm sure... but how can you tell? When an "academic" is as politically driven as Cole, it's hit or miss. He wouldn't admit that he was wrong if God were to explain it to him personally.

Here's the biggest problem that I've got with Cohen, and Cole, for that matter; they claim to analyze, but their analysis is politically motivated. It has nothing to do with getting the analysis right. Sometimes they are close, sometimes on, sometimes waaaaay off. There is no consistency, because the answer drives the question. That is not intellectually honest nor is it in the best interests of the country. Cohen, and his ilk, want what they want... and they are willing to say anything to get it. It's the old, "The end justifies the means," argument in action.

Sonic Must Die: Death To The Hedgehog!

2009-06-18T00:28:00.005+04:30

GEN McChrystal has taken command in Afghanistan, and one of the first things he began to do is look at the way that troops are currently disposed and the planned dispositions of incoming "surge" troops around the country. Under the former commander, existing FOBs were being expanded to make room for the influx of new troops. This often had unintended but not completely unforeseen consequences. This was a continuation of the Big Box FOB behavior which has proven unsuccessful in the past. When you look at it, it looked almost like the French "Hedgehog" strategy which led to Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. While the Taliban are incapable of the type of offensive tactics used to reduce the French hedgehog at Dien Bien Phu to the point of surrender, the hedgehog strategy was another failed counterinsurgency behavior. It would prove no less so in Afghanistan.

As the truism states, "The proof is in the pudding."

Amid a nearly slanderous outcry from opponents of his appointment, some of which makes him sound like a former concentration camp commandant, GEN McChrystal headed back downrange and assumed his new command. He stated that his objective was population-centric, or pop-centric counterinsurgency.

McChrystal cited additional NATO troops who will deploy this year to key regions of Afghanistan, providing the manpower required to conduct “population-centric counterinsurgency operations.” These forces will partner closely with the increasingly capable Afghan security forces. (via Defenselink)

One of the first things he began to talk about appears to be a move away from the hedgehogs to a more distributed and comprehensive, yet focused, approach to the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. This from the Washington Post:

"We are going to look at those parts of the country that are most important -- and those typically, in an insurgency, are the population centers," McChrystal said in an interview shortly after pinning on his fourth star.

Many people will assume that McChrystal seems intent on focusing on the cities, but that's not evident. As GEN Petraeus noted in his recent remarks at CNAS,

"Two-thirds of all the attacks in Afghanistan are concentrated in about 10 percent of the country's districts, areas where more than 20,000 new U.S. soldiers and Marines are flowing in to pursue insurgents and provide greater security for Afghans."

It has been pointed out before that in order to provide the accepted optimal level of counterinsurgents to population, hundreds of thousands more troops would be needed in Afghanistan. What this fails to consider is that large portions of the country are not under significant pressure from the Taliban. This doesn't mean that there should be no efforts in those areas to improve governance and work with the ANP, but the same ratio of troops/population would not necessarily be needed in those areas. Improvements in governance, the professionalism of the ANP and economic development and construction would go far in such areas to separate the Taliban, or criminal elements who borrow the name of the Taliban for credibility or fear's sake, from the population. GEN McChrystal's commitment to nationwide mentoring and development of the ANP remains to be seen.

However, by separating the insurgents from the population in the most violence-prone areas, progress will begin to be seen. With McChrystal reevaluating the planned dispositions of troops, it appears that troops will be expected to remain closer to the populace. GEN Petraeus, quoted in Australia.to News said,

"A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is what is required to keep Afghanistan from becoming once again a sanctuary for transnational extremism, as it was prior to 9/11."

Petraeus said the principles underlying the counterinsurgency in Iraq having troops protect and live among the civilian population, for instance -- can apply to Afghanistan.

GEN McChrystal also notes the effects of an effort that is too diluted.

"We've got to ruthlessly prioritize, because we don't have enough forces to do everything, everywhere," McChrystal said. He added that he would be especially reluctant to commit his forces to rugged areas where it would be difficult to extend the reach of the Afghan government or spur economic development. "If you are not prepared to come in with a reasonable level of governance and a reasonable level of development, then just going in to hold [the ground] doesn't have a strong rationale."(via Washington Post)

Clear, hold, and build. This is a strategy that both GEN Petraeus and GEN McChrystal have been talking about. The insurgents will respond by going elsewhere, of course. It's what insurgents do. In the meantime, establishing the local security apparatus and providing governmental and developmental improvements will help to prevent re-infiltration as the military effort eventually responds to the migration of the insurgency. However, the migratory opportunities for the insurgents are not unlimited. Migrating into a Hazara-dominated area, for instance, would be suicidal for Taliban unless done in significant strength. The Taliban insurgency would not do well attempting to migrate into the Panjshir Valley, either. The disposition of troops will eventually need to change, but in the meantime, having a General with the juice to say how things are to be done speaking of pushing out of the Big Box Hedgehogs is very significant.

GEN McChrystal also notes that some areas may not be worth messing around with right now. The Korengal, for instance, is an area that has produced more American casualties than any other similarly-sized area in Afghanistan. GEN McChrystal is reevaluating the current operations in the Korengal. It has been stated before on this blog that what is being done in the Korengal is more a counter-guerrilla campaign than a counterinsurgency. The Korengal does not appear to be amenable to counterinsurgent influence. If there is no hope of establishing Afghan governmental control over that valley, then what value is there to tying up resources and losing lives in a valiant but currently futile effort. Is the purpose merely containment?

"The question in the Korengal is: How many of those fighters, if left alone, would ever come out of there to fight?" McChrystal said. "I can't answer it. But I do sense that you create a lot of opposition through operations" by the military. "So you have got to decide where you are going to operate."(Washington Post)

GEN McChrystal appears to be willing to challenge assumptions and question accepted patterns of behavior. Moving out of the hedgehogs and out into the villages and valleys to be close to the population would produce significantly different results than have been seen to this point. Logistics are going to become complicated, and Green Beans Coffee is going to lose some business... but that's the price of counterinsurgency. Perhaps Pizza Hut will form a partnership with Jingle Air to deliver pizzas to the smaller outposts by helicopter.

Why Do We Need Metrics?

2009-06-09T23:51:00.004+04:30

The Center for A New American Security (CNAS) released a new document at the end of last week, and hopefully it will spark a discussion about measuring success or failure in Afghanistan. Even more hopefully, it will spark action following the discussion.

The discussion will hopefully refine the recommendations of some of the premier counterinsurgency theorists in the world today into actionable metrics for COIN, a subject that has been a sticking point in our execution of COIN, and potentially a shortcoming of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Military officers, like business leaders, are rated on their success or failure in any environment based upon measurements. The question has been, "What can we measure that will tell us if we are doing the right things?"

In business, successful behaviors are relatively easy to measure. How much money did the business unit make? How much of that money was spent on making/delivering the product or service? How much money was left for profit afterwards? There are a lot of measurable factors that go into those main factors, but in the end there are lots of pertinent things to measure success or failure of any business unit, making managers easy to reward or disincent. In counterinsurgency the military officer is confronted by a seemingly nebulous environment, and he/she will often fall back on traditional military measurables, which have been demonstrated not to correlate to success in counterinsurgency. Worse, in their search for quantifiable meaning, officers will be forced to come up with equally or more meaningless measurables that can trick them into continuing unsuccessful behaviors.

The funny thing is that, while they are untrained doctrinally, the average Joe on the ground often sees the futility of the measurables that the officers above him are depending on. The guy on the ground may not understand what the hell "hearts and minds" is supposed to be all about, but he recognizes wasted action when he sees it. He may not have a better answer... sometimes he does... but he does know when his time is being wasted on unproductive behaviors or that potentially positive behaviors are being quashed in favor of an unproductive metric. All we have to do is look at the words of junior leaders who are in the suck or who have returned from it. These words help to diagnose our unproductive behaviors and our failure to train our junior leaders in the doctrine that they are expected to execute. They also diagnose our failure to choose objective measurables that mean anything.

Leaders, whether military or civilian, will strive to affect the measurable factors that they are measured against. Military officers begin their rating process by completing an "OER Support Form," or Officer Evaluation Report Support Form, in which they tell their boss what they are going to achieve during the rated period. The results of the OER affect their promotions... they mean money and career progression. Basically, they tell their boss what they will do and how they will measure their success or failure. They will choose metrics that are, first of all, measurable... usually easily measurable... and secondly, achievable. No one will set themselves up for failure. While we all agree that we are engaged in a fight against insurgents, we do not all agree on how to measure success or failure in such an environment.

We haven't all bought off on the appropriateness of the doctrine to actually fight against the insurgents, hence the COINdinista vs COINtra struggle.

This blog has pointed numerous times to the necessity to hold commanders accountable for their effects on success or failure during the time they spend in theater. In all previous conflicts, officers who were unable or unwilling to achieve the necessary results on the battlefield were relieved and replaced. Careers were stymied and ended. Until very recently, with the relief of GEN McKiernan, no such message was being sent in the current conflict. Very few officers have been relieved, and most maneuver unit commanders have declared excellent performance regardless of the security situation in their particular areas of responsibility. Since they set the measurables, which their higher commander have agreed to, they can point to these measurables and declare that they had positive effects on those metrics. Based on these, the declarations of success are warranted... but do they mean anything? Only one commander has been held accountable for the loss of "ground" in Afghanistan; and I posit that he was relieved in such a manner as much as a statement as for any lack of success that was worse than his predecessors... as well as to make room for a commander that GEN Petraeus believes will be more successful.

Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal gave a hint during his confirmation hearings that the measurables are going to change. He said that we will not measure success by body counts, which we have been sliding towards, but by the percentage of the population shielded from violence. This is difficult to measure in its own right, and there are many things that will go into it. While, in a population-centric counterinsurgency, securing the population is job one, how do you measure something that hasn't happened? How do you measure the activities... and thereby incent their application... that contribute to providing security? Since COIN is really a political struggle where perceptions are important, how do you measure those?

This has been a key piece missing from the puzzle. It has resulted in rewarding failure. It has resulted in the continuation of failed behaviors such as staying rooted on what Tim Lynch has labeled "Big Box FOBs." This is a behavior which will never, as LTG McChrystal states is important, secure the population and prevent their being victimized and intimidated. You have to be there. Going home to the Big Box at the end of the day, only showing up to the village every once in awhile and demanding that they tell you where the Taliban are just doesn't prevent intimidation.

Commanders will do what they are incented to do. When they set the metrics, based on what they feel that they can do, and based on concepts that have nothing to do with preventing intimidation of the population, they will. They will choose metrics like force protection or tons of Humanitarian Assistance distributed, or missions run vs number of casualties or, as has been a trend lately, on enemy body counts. The population will still be subject to the predations of the Taliban or Taliban-like or affiliated groups; and we still lose ground. The point is that commanders need to be given metrics that work to measure positive counterinsurgent indicators. They will measure something. We need to ensure that the metrics that they use mean something to the counterinsurgency.

That's why metrics... good, meaningful metrics... are so important.

D-Day; The Benchmark

2009-06-06T05:00:00.004+04:30

Those of us who have been to combat all have our D-Day. For most of us, it wasn't called that. Sometimes it was; many invasions and operations have had their start day, also called, "D-Day," but there is one day that forever bears that name. It is the symbol, ever since June 6th, 1944, of D-Days. Ever since that D-Day, it has affected all of us who have had our own D-Day. For me, that effect began as a child.

In movies, books, and in my imagination, I tried to understand what the thousands of men who participated in that operation went through. It set a standard in my own mind for what a Soldier must be willing to do, to endure, to brave. It inspired, shocked and loomed over me. I was in awe of those who rode the C-47's, gliders, and landing craft. The exploits of the Rangers at Point du Hoc humbled me. The catastrophe at St Mere Eglise shocked me. The carnage of Omaha Beach overwhelmed me.

The bravery of those who jumped, crashed or made the landing stunned me. How could I ever live up to that? How did they? What, I wondered in my young mind, separated the living from the dead? Was it skill? Was it determination? Was it blind, dumb luck? I wanted to live. I pictured myself as the tough survivor. I found no empathy for the dead in my young mind. No, that wouldn't be me.

D-Day was the calliope of war going full tilt all at once. Hundreds of thousands of individual stories, thousands of ships, aircraft, landing craft, and the terrible crescendo of all that noise. To my mind it was an overwhelming scenario, and the humanity of it overwhelmed my mind. So many men, each with a life and a history of their own. So many experiences being had in such a small area. So many individual acts of bravery and valor; many of which eventually came to light and so many of which will never be known. So many lives and their stories ended.

It was so much to ponder. Too much. I can never get it right.

For myself and my generation, and for generations that follow, it sets the benchmark. Cries of "Currahee!" still inspire feats of amazing courage, and raise the wounded from comas. Young Soldiers, particularly in the Airborne, are still bred with stories of their regiment's legacy from that day, the night that preceded it and the months that followed it. That legacy sets a benchmark that generations of young men attempt to measure themselves against. I was one of them. There is no reaching that standard; only striving to come as close as one can, to do one's job under such horror, to not let one's compatriots down. To move one's feet though hell and horror await.

My D-Day was anticlimactic in comparison. My baptism of fire was practically gentle in contrast to the roar and confusion and mass fear that reigned on June 6, 1944. Nothing that I have tasted, though it may be in some small way similar, truly compares. I remain humbled. It will forever remain unknown to me what I would have done when the ramp door dropped, or when the green light lit. They knew. They felt. They did. For so many, it was the last thing that they ever knew, felt, or did. Each risked that, knowingly, and did anyway... and became legend; the greatest generation.

I stand in amazement. I am struck by their courage, I am overwhelmed by their experience. I am grateful for their actions. I am humbled by their sacrifice. I am astounded by their grace. I am led by their example.

I am free by their choice.

Mambo # 3

2009-06-05T01:21:00.005+04:30

Mambo #3: When you're a lousy analyst, out of your league and talking smack about things that you genuinely are clueless about, and you are called on it, backpedal. Though you have accused others of raising strawmen, admit to raising a strawman on a limited basis, but call it something else, like a "false choice." Claim you did it not because you are a lost ball in tall grass, but for effect. Subtly imply it's because your opponents are really the idiots, and so you had to go for theatrics, not having the ability to use sock puppets on teh internets.

He's getting his intellectual ass handed to him over at Abu Muqawama in the comments, but he's the smart guy.

Like a child with ADHD who's eaten sugary food late in the evening, Cohen just can't shut up. Even though he is ridiculously soft headed on the topic, he still claims to base things on "my analysis." Cohen's analysis of AfPak is about as strong as Nixon's memory, Clinton's monogamy, or Hitler's fondness for Gypsies. His reasoning amounts to proclaiming that it's about to rain because he's seen a duck, and the duck's water repellent qualities are there for a reason. That reason must be an imminent rain storm. He also describes Charlie "Let's forget the lessons of Iraq" Dunlap as "a wise man."

Basically, he thinks that anyone who opposes the application of COIN principles is a wise man. Again, his fear is that it will work, and will then become a cornerstone of national policy abroad. So, in the meantime, he tries to talk everyone out of using it, forecasting defeat. He claims that it is not in our strategic interests to stabilize the government of Afghanistan and that of Pakistan. He asserts that we should, in the next 12-24 months, kill as many Taliban and al Qaeda as we can and then pull out, sending instead a few civilians... not many, just what we can find and afford... to build schools and teach in them, plant daisies, drink chai and some other stuff like making paper dollies.

He then goes on to say that he's all on board with Obama's new plan by way of saying that Obama's on board with his plan...

And it seems that at least one important man agrees with me - Barack Obama. In March when he laid out the US mission for Afghanistan he articulated three clear objectives - the first two are below:

"I have already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months. These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan Security Forces and to go after insurgents along the border. This push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential election in August.

At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan Security Forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That is how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our troops home . . We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 - and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward."

Here the President is laying out a very specific strategy for degrading the Taliban's capabilities and offers a very specific benchmark for training the Afghan security forces (two points that I have made repeatedly in my posts here).

All except for point number three, about the "civilian surge."

Now for the third part of the President's plan, which is a bit fuzzier and open to some interpretation:

"This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. . . . To advance security, opportunity, and justice - not just in Kabul , but from the bottom up in the provinces - we need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers. . . That is why I am ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. . .

We will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province. As their ranks dwindle, an enemy that has nothing to offer the Afghan people but terror and repression must be further isolated. And we will continue to support the basic human rights of all Afghans - including women and girls."

Now, here's the thing. I'm skeptical about this third part of the President's plan. First of all, we lack the civilian capacity to implement it (an assertion borne out by the fact that much of the civilian surge in Afghanistan is being carried out by the military). Second, I for one am unconvinced that it falls within America's national interests. Third, I think "a reconciliation process in every province" is unrealistic. But it bears noting that the President is a lot less specific about this part of the plan than he is first two parts. And, if the President's first two goals are met (degrading the Taliban and improving the Afghan security services), I would imagine there would be some incentive to jettison the more amorphous third part and get the hell out of Dodge.

D'oh!

Yep, we do lack the civilian capacity. I know that the administration is attempting to build that capacity. As a matter of fact, they are looking to attract National Guardsmen to tap their civilian skills as part of this "surge." Don't know how that's going to work out. Also don't know how many daisy eaters are going to volunteer to join up and put their butts where their little daisy munchers are. It's always a lot harder to do things than to say them, though. I got into a bit of a tiff with a peacenik recently who advocated pulling out all of the troops and replacing them with teachers. I told her that she should go. "Oh, no," she said quickly, "we just organize and advise government on our issues. We don't actually go overseas."

Uh... yeah. Okay. Patriots all. Hey, you don't have to carry a weapon to be a patriot... got that... but the moniker wears thin pretty quick, doesn't it? Real patriots do something. There's an old saying, "Don't confuse meetings with actually performing work." I think that it could be extended to, "Don't confuse 'organizing' with actually accomplishing anything." Come on, lady... put your butt in The Stan and show us how it's done!

Or, you can just shut up. That part's safer. It's tons more comfortable, too. You still get cable TV, soy lattes and organic whatever-you-want down at the hippymart. She will do neither. She will continue to make noise and "organize," and Cohen will continue to "analyze," and they are both just gongs in the wilderness, signifying nothing.

As Cohen goes on to explain how the most powerful man in the world has cleverly laid out a strategy that means, "Joe Biden is the smartestest man in the whole wide world," he admits confusion. Cohen senses the disconnect. He thought that the first two parts meant, "Judge, I wanna kill, kill, kill..."

He thought we were on our way to the Group W bench. He figured that Part Three stuff was just window dressing that we were never going to fulfill, anyway... and that the President could be talked out of when he saw how hard it was.

Suddenly he senses that somethings gone horribly awry... but he can't admit to himself the awful truth.

Now whether you agree or don't agree, something here doesn't smell right. Either President Obama is misleading the American people about his true strategy in Afghanistan or Lt General McCrystal is preparing to carry out an approach there that is decisively more population-focused and less military-centric than what the President described in March.

DingDingDingDingDing!

(This is the moment in the old cartoons when Elmer Fudd realizes that Bugs Bunny actually handed him a bomb. It's the old "Warner Bros Moment of Clarity.")

So, Mr. Cohen, you're confused. Your suddenly worried that the President has no idea what his pick for Commander in Afghanistan is really up to. You raise the insidious thought that perhaps the President himself actually misled the American people. Could it be that you were misled? Could it be that you misled yourself? Perhaps that's because, oh, I don't know... perhaps it's because the President said we're going to do COIN and you thought you heard what YOU wanted to hear!

Could it be that you can barely even spell COIN, and you don't know a COIN strategy when it's laid out in broad terms for you????

In the immortal words of Bugs Bunny, "What a maroon!"

Contrast To Brass

2009-06-04T08:54:00.003+04:30

Read the post below first and then...

Contrast Cohen's chickenshit with Tim Lynch's brains and brass cajones. One man gets it, does it. One man does neither. The contrast is nearly perfect.

'Nuff said.

There Is A Word In English For Being Compelled By Fear

2009-06-04T05:26:00.006+04:30

Michael Cohen is at it again, trying to tear away at the War in Afghanistan, selecting seemingly random information and using it out of context to support his fear-driven position. He is afraid that if we succeed in COIN in Afghanistan, it will become a cornerstone of American foreign policy. We have a word for actions that are driven primarily by fear: cowardice. Michael Cohen's writings concerning Afghanistan and counterinsurgency are the most cowardly things you are likely to find in print this week.

First of all, we don't all agree that we're engaged in a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Indeed, I'm pretty sure President Obama would not agree that we are engaged in a full-fledged counter-insurgency campaign. (Perhaps COIN-lite or Skim COIN).

Huh? We are fighting against insurgents in Afghanistan. That means that we are countering insurgents. That means counterinsurgency. What the hell does he think that we're fighting? Whether or not we are doing it well is open to discussion... and I frequently do... but contending that it is not counterinsurgency is absolutely ridiculous. It's the type of outlandish stuff that a coward would utter to back up his reason for running away from whatever threat he may find.

The fact is that the new strategy for Afghanistan announced less than two months ago lays out more of a counterinsurgency than we've actually performed in the past seven years. I didn't see Cohen arguing that Afghanistan wasn't a counterinsurgency two years ago. Cohen's analysis starts out with this ridiculous assertion and goes generally downhill from there. It is the rhetoric of desperation and fear. When called on this fact over at Abu Muqawama, Cohen states his fear of success clearly:

"look COIN works - let's do it elsewhere"

This is his greatest fear, and what drives his analysis. It's the most clearly you will ever really get him to state his fear. This is what beats in the heart of the coward. He's afraid, and it drives his thoughts and his actions.

Cohen later follows up Chris Mewitt's question of what objection he's using to reason against COIN with this:

To answer your question Chris, both. It doesn't work and it's bad policy. But if you don't show that it doesn't work - it will become policy.

Notwithstanding the fact that as a military analyst he is completely unskilled, but he attempts it to avoid his phobia... that COIN will become a cornerstone of American foreign policy, by misusing worn-out talking points about Iraq; discounting the effects of the surge as having any influence on the outcome there. Half-informed twisting of that history may sound like informed analysis to those who wish to believe such fallacies, but each has his or her own reason for wishing to believe. Generally, the motives for wanting to believe such a version is self-serving. Self-serving analysis is just as flawed as fear-based (or cowardly) analysis; just as intellectually dishonest.

Cohen then answers Abu M's post with an even more ridiculous and poorly constructed argument, claiming that Exum countered his post poorly; which is just silly. Cohen spews a load of hurt feelings all over his site. It's really not hard to insult the man. Cohen is not only compelled by his phobia into blundering into an area where he is truly ill-equipped, but he is very thin-skinned.

What Cohen fails to realize is that his proponency of failure is in direct opposition to the national security of the United States. Note the International Crisis Groups's evaluation of the results of failure or premature withdrawal from Afghanistan in their April report. It is simple, it is concise, and it is, to my understanding, accurate.

Withdrawing international troops with the threat that any regrouping of jihadis or al-Qaeda can be countered by air power and special forces would simply return the country to the control of jihadis. Air power has not proven successful against insurgents or terrorist bases. Neglect would allow the region to descend into further chaos, as it did in the 1990s.

Cohen advocates doing what even the Brussels-based peace advocacy says should not be done, and advocates against what even they say should be done. History will prove Mr. Cohen to be a very flawed thinker. Those who are driven by fear usually are. Now, Mr. Cohen will object to this characterization of his position, but I'm standing by it and I believe that it will be borne out by the events of the future.

Mr. Cohen also describes himself as a warrior, and yet nothing in his bios that I can find online mention military service in any way. Just giving yourself the title of warrior just because you feel like it is like proclaiming yourself a Ranger and tossing a tab on your shoulder without ever having gone to Ranger School. Whatever, Michael. I'll humor you the same way that I humor a child with a nerf gun who pretends he is a warrior. "Sure, Mikey. You're a warrior, and a tough one, too. Here's a cookie. Go have fun!"

But we really know that people who are motivated by fear are not warriors. Warriors experience fear, but they think and act in spite of it, not because of it. No, Cohen is not a warrior. Calling himself one is absurd. It would be insulting to real warriors if it wasn't so ludicrous.

What continuously slays me about Cohen is that he totally misses which side his bread is buttered on. The civilian capacity-building capabilities that are necessary for success in the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan are exactly the types of capabilities that Mr. Cohen advocates as some primary tools of foreign policy. Afghanistan gives us the strong motivation and the proof to develop such capabilities. Mr. Cohen's disconnect from reality is that developing such capabilities and employing them before insurgencies develop, or early in them, could help prevent such conflicts and/or involvements in the future. Afghanistan gives us the interest and motivation to actually develop such capabilities as part of the counterinsurgency, giving us skilled civilian government employees with experience in such matters. This expertise, developed in war, could help prevent war elsewhere. By arguing against COIN, Cohen weakens his own advocacy. His unreasoning fear, peeking out from behind really poor analysis, is really shooting himself in the foot.

Trying to refute what has obviously become more of a counterinsurgency than it has been in the past seven years as being not a counterinsurgency or "COIN-lite or Skim COIN" blah blah blah is just ridiculous. More really poor analysis. By setting up such obvious straw men, nobody who knows anything follows him any further. Cohen's advocacy for the civilian capacity-building, which would be really good foreign policy that helps to avoid military involvement in COIN in the future, suffers as a result.

Cohen is his own worst enemy. He's not doing the rest of us any favors, either.

Stand By

2009-06-02T20:11:00.003+04:30

There are going to be some changes around here. I cannot go into detail right now, but will clarify shortly.

What I can tell you is that it will be significant and relevant. It has also been time and focus consuming, so please stand by.

~Blue

"At War": Stunning.

2009-05-25T04:34:00.002+04:30

I've been waiting for months to review Scott Kesterson and David Leeson's film, "At War." I finally received a copy for review purposes and took awhile this afternoon to sit down and screen it all by myself.

I'm glad that I was alone.

I have permission to share it with family, which I will do, at least with my immediate family and my older children. I am still glad that the first time I saw it, I saw it alone. I've read that when it was screened at the Milblogging Conference, many Afghan vets were deeply affected by the film. I was immediately engaged by "At War," but about a third of the way through it, I was wondering what was different about me that it wasn't affecting me so deeply.

At the end of it, I sat there stunned; a tear rolling slowly down my left cheek, glad to be alone. It's that good, that powerful.

It wasn't a single moment that took me there. It was the entirety of it. There was so much of my experience in it. Scott Kesterson and his collaborators have captured the unique experience of what was like to be there, especially as an ETT or PMT. The only thing missing was the gritty taste of the Afghan dust and the distinct smell of cooking fires in the villages.

Kesterson's ground-level visuals are more than just documentary. He captures the impressions. He captures those moments that I think that all of us who have served as advisors have had. He captures the simple truths about working with Afghans. He captures the frustration and even the humor of dealing with the Afghan personality as advisors work to convert the raw warrior into a soldier. He captures the drawbacks and the small joys; finding your influence making little differences in the way that these men, whose fierceness cannot be denied but whose disorganization is just as marked, do their jobs.

"At War" also captures the sense of caring that develops between an advisor and his charges. You can see the duality of the cat herder and the brother-at-arms who speaks only a few words of his brother's language yet gets the intent of so many communications. As one advisor goes "grocery shopping" for hamburger on the hoof for his men, you see the paternal aspect of the mentor.

The soundtrack is unique and, I thought, very well done. This is not a soundtrack done twenty years later, seeking to evoke a sense of period via aural memories; it is a distinct soundtrack made for this movie. At times folksy, at times the edgy metallic background that draws one more deeply into the tension of the moments when death can suddenly materialize like an entity in your midst, this soundtrack adds shading to the color. It is not an attempt to shoehorn popular culture into what is not a popular experience. It is seasoning, adding to a flavor so few have tasted. It gives this film a flavor as distinctly different from the standard American experience as kabuli pilau is different from McDonalds.

Kesterson captures the Canadians doing a fantastic job as well. He captures Canadians advising and as maneuver forces, showing that the Afghan experience is the Afghan experience, not just an American Afghan experience. The Canadians do themselves proud, and Scott Kesterson's videography captures it.

Kesterson's triumph transcends the excellent capture of the moments that bring the Afghan experience home. It's also what this film is missing. While the editing carries the veteran viewer like the current of the deployment, you cannot edit some things in or out. Kesterson is a participant, and he's accepted. He's just like another rifleman, grenadier, or gunner... except his weapon system is a camera. There is no friction between the journalist and those he is with. You can just tell that he is accepted as a professional in a soldierly sense. It's hard to explain how you can accept someone as a professional and still feel burdened by them when you have to carry them along with you operationally. There is no sense that Kesterson is viewed in this light by those with whom he embeds. He's another combat system operator. This comes out not only in the way that he operates around teams of men under fire, but also in the way that they speak as if they are not talking to a camera. They aren't. They are speaking to Scott Kesterson, a guy they know and accept, who just happens to have a camera on.

It's hard to explain how rare, and therefore how brilliant, that is.

"At War" is a film that I can point to and say, "That's it. That's what it was like. That's a sample of my experience in Afghanistan." There is a total lack of judgment in "At War." It's not a morality play or a political message; it's an experience captured.

Afghan veterans, beware; this film may kick your ass. For those who want to get a sense of what it's like, "At War" is the best you can do without deploying.

And Now This Day Is Yours

2009-05-22T22:44:00.006+04:30

I know that a lot of folks use Memorial Day as a day to honor all service members, but that's not really what it is. It was started as a day to honor the dead; those who gave their all for this great republic. I've often spent this day as a living symbol of those who have gone before me. Parades, memorials, ceremonies; I've accepted the thanks of grateful people... but it wasn't for me. It wasn't my day.

I've gazed upon the graves of soldiers lost in the Civil War and wondered about them. I've seen the photos from the Civil War, WW-I, WW-II, Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Beirut, Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Iraq; photos of the anonymous dead who symbolize all of the dead of each of those conflicts. So hard to personalize beyond the abstract... they were, "the other guy." They weren't like me. I was the survivor, the one it wouldn't happen to. Memorial Day was their day.

I have two brothers who are significantly older than myself. One, since passed, spent a career in the Army and a tour in Vietnam that forever changed him and may have ultimately led to his loss at a young age. My other brother was in ROTC for a spell in college. He eventually went on to a doctorate, but one of his closest friends was also in ROTC, accepting his commission when I was fairly young; perhaps seven or so. His name was Bob Rice.

Before he went to Vietnam, we went to what was, at the time, Cincinnati's amusement park, Coney Island. Since replaced by Kings Island, I remember it to be pretty cool. I thought Bob and my brother were the coolest things going. I was in awe of Bob, the strong young man who carried me around on his shoulders that day and accompanied me on the roller coasters I was tall enough to ride.

I never saw him again after that day. 1LT Robert Thomas Rice, Jr., 23, of Springfield, Ohio, was killed near Pleiku, RVN, on August 8, 1970. He was in B Co, 2nd Bn, 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division. He was awarded a Silver Star. For me, he and my brother were the face of the Vietnam War.

Memorial Day is his day.

Many years later, I met a man who seemed to be liked by all who met him. He was fairly soft-spoken and calm. He carried an air of self assurance and common sense, and, like me, he loved to play golf and was just as much an amateur. We became fast friends. He was prior service Marine Corps and Army, and pined for an opportunity to do his part in this war. He had been turned away by recruiters who didn't want to make the effort to go through the medical review process his back injury would have required. They preferred the low-hanging fruit. Jon Stiles would not be deterred.

He fought his way through bureaucracies across state lines, and eventually got back in, joining the Colorado Army National Guard. When their scheduled deployment was delayed, he found an open position with a unit from Louisiana and actually transferred across state lines to make sure that he wasn't left behind.

Last November, Jon saw a suspicious vehicle approaching his Route Clearing Team of Engineers in Jalalabad. Sensing danger to his team, Jon went through his escalation of force measures and wound up engaging the vehicle with his M-240B machine gun. The vehicle-borne explosive device detonated and Jon caught a facefull of the blast and fragmentation. He was knocked unconscious immediately, and SGT Jon Stiles, 38, of Highlands Ranch, Colorado, died in the helicopter on the way to the hospital of head and neck wounds. Numerous Afghan civilians were killed, but Jon was the only American casualty. He couldn't prevent the civilian carnage, but he forced the bomber to detonate prematurely, saving his buddies from the blast. He was awarded a Bronze Star for valor for an action the previous month in which he pulled soldiers from a burning vehicle after a similar attack. He had declined medical leave for his wounds from that day which would have had him at home on the day he met his fate.

Jon joins the ranks of such men as Bob Rice in the ranks of our hallowed dead. This is his first Memorial Day, a day that he earned with his sacrifice on that dusty road in Afghanistan. I can barely remember Bob Rice's face these many years later, but I can still see Jon's, and I can still hear his voice and his laughter.

I will spend part of this Memorial Day in uniform, standing in for Bob and Jon at a ceremony at a school, symbolizing those who are the very fabric of the red stripes in the flag. It's not my day, though. It belongs to so many men just like Bob Rice.

And now, Jon, this day is yours.

**UPDATE**

CJ put up this post, a tribute to 1LT Schulte, killed recently in Afghanistan.

Implementation

2009-05-21T12:31:00.003+04:30

The "surge" of troops into Afghanistan is something that most of us who have been there have been recommending for years... as long as the added troops do helpful things. It does matter what they do, not just that they are there. It's important that we change not just the numbers that are in-country, but also the way in which they are used.

Most of us who have been there have pointed out the FOB mentality that reigns in Afghanistan, that ISAF forces withdraw into large FOBs at night and cede control of the countryside to the ACM, primarily operating under the name of the Taliban.

An article recently published details the problems that came up with the attempt to expand FOB Wolverine in Zabul Province. CPT Paul Tanghe, an ETT advising the ANA operating in the area, warned of the backlash that the locals would have against interfering with their water supplies, which run through an underground channel called a "karez." No one listened to him, and by the time they figured out that there was a problem, they had already really ticked off the locals and unknowingly fed the living hell out of the Taliban IO. Good job, gentlemen.

Next time, listen to the advisor. He might just know something about what he is doing there. He also has closer contact with Afghans than most Americans (NO, a shura once in awhile doesn't count as having a lot of contact with Afghans.) Instead, as many of my advisor brothers can attest, we are (much) more often regarded with suspicion, as if we'd been photographed leaving a Communist Party meeting or something. More than once, I heard the words, "gone native." I'll tell you what; if more senior leaders would go a little native, we'd have a much better grip on what the hell we are doing there and what we need to do to succeed.

My second question about that article is; Why in the hell are we shoving all of these new capabilities into the same boxes? If it's going to be more commuting to work and a Green Beans Coffee shop, I'd recommend putting a few more FOBs, COPs, Firebases, or whatever you want to call them around the countryside. Hey, I've seen it done, and it makes a difference. They don't have to be really big. The first time I saw FOB Kutschbach, it was a rocky open area at the foot of a ridgeline that overlooked Tag Ab. It started out as a VPB and was grown into a full-fledged FOB from there. A lot of people put serious work into making it into that.

I wonder if the "Mosh Pit" is still there.

In any case, building accommodations to cram all these new troops into FOB Wolverine is just repeating the mistakes of what Tim Lynch calls the "Big Box FOB." By the way; if anyone wanted to see "change we can believe in" regarding the way we do business in Afghanistan, they'd be beating this guy's door down to hire him to manage something for us in Afghanistan. Careerists would hate him, those who like to see progress would love him, and Afghans would likely feel like they were being listened to. But what do I know?

Don't tell him I said that. I don't think government work is on his agenda. Oddly enough that's why I think that someone with half a brain would badger him to death to get him on board to change the way that we do business.

He's safe. That'll never happen.

Finally, we've got the issue of staffing the mentoring effort to do JOB #1; bring the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) like the ANA and ANP up to speed. We're now throwing Lieutenants and buck Sergeants at Kandak (Battalion)-level mentoring jobs, and a brigade of the 82nd augmented with a very few field grade (Major and above) officers attached to take over mentoring for a significant portion of the ANA. Time will tell, but the level of training that the 4th Brigade, 82nd Airborne is receiving to prepare them for mentoring doesn't appear to be a lot.

LTC(R) John Nagl once proposed an Advisor Corps. He concept received little serious consideration and is still thrown at him by his detractors. I'm not sure that such an organization is sustainable, but I can testify that mentoring ANSF requires certain attributes. Truly professional mentors are hard to come by. For an Army that doesn't even bother to train its NCO's in COIN, I think it's a pretty ballsy move to just toss a few paratroops at the problem and hope for the best. I think that we're going to get what we pay for out of it. Dr. Nagl recognized the importance of professional mentors to security force development in foreign countries. His proposal was a way to retain that critical skill as a set. He realized that what we were doing was hit-or-miss. It just got worse.

Hey, if you can't just toss a BCT at it, how are you supposed to solve the problem?

That's not to say that a tremendous amount of good can't be done, but we'll see.

Two recommendations:

1) Don't just expand the "Big Box FOBs" and stick all of these new assets into them. Spread it out and take control of area that have lacked control in the past. You have to BE THERE. You can't mail this shit in. Start pushing out; FOB Kutschbach can be replicated... over and over again.

2) Figure out how to train these BCT-A's to actually do the "A" part. Just sending in Americans isn't going to cut it, no matter how highly we think of our young soldiers. We have left them out of the revolution to this point by not training them in COIN. Now we're going to expect them to advise ANA and ANP in how to perform COIN? Not what I'd call a recipe for resounding success. You need a plan to train the junior leaders in COIN and in advising. Winging it is not a solution.

A Word For "Generic Concept"

2009-05-17T23:08:00.003+04:30

This from an Anonymous commenter on the last post:

The crazy vet is a generic concept. It's like the "Postal" guy. While a Middle Easterner or an Arab or a Muslim is an actual guy. There are actual kids and families who are Arab, Muslims from the Middle East.

Behind every veteran identity (Marine, Ranger, Soldier, Sailor, etc.) is an actual identity, that is off limit.

Most law enforcement are military veterans, I think they know what they need to prepare for.

That's exactly what I'm talking about. It shouldn't be a "generic concept." It has been made that way by a meme that has been started and supported by anecdotal evidence; by such things as Lizette Alvarez's slanted reporting in the New York Times. She's not the only one; she's just my poster child. A word for "generic concept" is stereotype.

The same could be said of the Arab stereotype. Each Arab has their own story, their own history, their own experiences, their own trials and tribulations. Take this logic and turn it the other direction and it works just as well. As a matter of fact, in the original article I wrote about, the law enforcement officer wondered if he might offend the ethnic group by stereotyping them, but gave not a thought to training children to shoot a veteran and depicting the bad guy as a veteran; as if that were completely inoffensive and rational.

We are a country of images. Someone pointed out recently that many Americans have little contact with this war or the men and women who are fighting it. The image of the "crazy vet" has taken hold to the point that when a cop is tasked with coming up with a training scenario, he dreams up a crazy murdering vet. That is completely unacceptable.

Completely unacceptable.

There are no other words for it. It's no understandable. It's not accurate. It's stigmatizing, and while people like Lizette Alvarez couch their writings as "bringing attention to the plight of the veteran" as if they really give a damn, they are doing more harm than help by a far sight.

Most law enforcement are military veterans, I think they know what they need to prepare for.

No, many law enforcement officers are military veterans, but I don't believe that most of them are. And no, I don't think they do know what they need to prepare for. I'll bet you a quarter that the Border Patrol Agent who dreamed up that nifty little scenario isn't a vet. With cross-border kidnappings and murders happening on a fairly frequent basis, I'd think that they could come up with a more realistic scenario. In fact, in the general geographic area where these men operate, there have been hostage situations involving drug traffickers barricading themselves in houses with competitors held hostage. Those are realistic scenarios, and things that the Border Patrol may have to deal with.

Perhaps they don't want to stereotype drug dealers.

What struck me about this comment is the matter-of-fact way that someone who has come to accept the meme justifies this subtle form of abuse as completely reasonable.

Lizette's work is nearly complete.

Here are the facts; you are less likely to be harmed by a veteran than a non-veteran. We are not "victims." There are a tiny tiny tiny minority with chips on their shoulders who participate in such jackassery as IVAW and their ridiculous "Winter Soldier" displays. They cry out in some crazy mimicry of "victimhood," but for the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of us who don't participate in such bullshit, they are the complete dorks of the veteran world. Many of them have been thoroughly discredited, and some have proven to be frauds. All of them will live forever in shame before the rest of us.

We are not victims. We are not crying babies. We are grown adults who have made the choice to stand between this nation and whatever danger presents itself, even if there are sheeple who don't believe that the danger is there.

I see a lot of honorable people dealing with the effects, physical or otherwise, of their sacrifices for their country, only to have writers with beautiful prose and oafish motives cast aspersions on them en mass with manipulated data and piteous cries of how they "care." These honorable veterans are not moaning in victimhood, nor are they dangerous. They are the people who, if anyone's life was in danger, would be most likely to endanger their own lives to protect that stranger. These are people who very often give of themselves, of their own time, their own efforts and their own money to make a difference; and they do make a difference. They are the ones who find ways to personally contribute to making the lives of wounded warriors better, instead of moaning about how "someone" or "the government" or "they" should take better care of our veterans. These veterans are the ones who are not so overwhelmed by the dichotomy between war and patient caring that they shirk it off for someone else to do something, satisfied with their acceptance of an ignorant stereotype.

"Generic concept" is exactly what I'm talking about.

So, what Anon is saying is, "Hey, it's only a stereotype. Behind the stereotype identity is an actual identity, and that's off limits."

Errr... what?

Never mind that it doesn't make a lot of sense, or that the whole thing is contradictory. What this says to me is, "Yeah, it's become a stereotype, but don't worry about it. It's just like stereotyping Postal workers because of all the workplace killings. As long as you have your actual identity, then you can just withdraw from your military identity and you're just fine." The thing is, it's not fine. In this country where intolerance is unacceptable, in this country where stereotyping is decried... when it is against a group for whom sensitivity is bred in the media... we are sliding down a slippery slope towards demonizing and victimizing those who have demonstrated commitment to this country, and it's led by the media. Those who have sacrificed their safe easy chair in their living rooms, those who have sacrificed time with their families, firsts for their children including the births of those children, those who have lost friends and given of themselves are becoming the accepted bogey man of training scenarios as if it were simply a matter of course.

Regardless of what the facts say.

We have the Department of Homeland Security writing opinions that returning veterans are a threat to domestic security, and instead of some great hue and cry against it (except from veterans groups themselves,) there is, "Hey, it's okay... law enforcement knows what they're doing."

Nice, people. Really nice.

Now, I've been thanked personally by more Americans than I can count; these are people who are not going to listen to such claptrap. Many of them are veterans themselves, or have family members who have served or are serving. They cannot be turned against the veterans. It's the other, larger, portion of the population who can be influenced by images and repetitive, subtle messages that are at risk of buying into the imagery that is being created. As a matter of fact, the comment that this post regards is a great example that the unacceptable is being accepted.

I saw the slope, and I pointed it out, and we are well down it right now. The only answer is to react with vigor every time the stereotype is forwarded. When there is significant pushback whenever such a falsehood is advanced, there will be a little more thought put into a concept, instead of the lazy acceptance of a stereotype.

My brother returned from Vietnam to people waiting to shower him with dog feces and epithets. I have not had that experience, nor will I tolerate it while I have the words to fight back with. The Deer Hunter didn't come out of the blue; it was a culmination of the distrust that developed between the country they had served and the veterans of that war. It started with stereotyping and demonizing. It resulted in the largescale casting of Vietnam veterans as hapless victims. There are groups at work here in the United States whose business it is to create that same divide. Their tactic is to shape the vocabulary of the current conflict. They resolutely use certain terms, paint pictures and advance stereotypes in order to further their ideas. My tiny voice will not likely stem this tide, but I will not sit silently by as my cohorts and I are cast in a suspicious light in the very country we have risked our all for.

Politically Correct

2009-05-15T06:23:00.003+04:30

There is this snippet about Boy Scout Explorer training in New Mexico.

In a competition in Arizona that he did not oversee, Deputy Lowenthal said, one role-player wore traditional Arab dress. “If we’re looking at 9/11 and what a Middle Eastern terrorist would be like,” he said, “then maybe your role-player would look like that. I don’t know, would you call that politically incorrect?”

Yes, yes, God forbid we should offend foreign nationals; but don't let that take away from the full magnificence of the article.

IMPERIAL, Calif. — Ten minutes into arrant mayhem in this town near the Mexican border, and the gunman, a disgruntled Iraq war veteran, has already taken out two people, one slumped in his desk, the other covered in blood on the floor.

The responding officers — eight teenage boys and girls, the youngest 14 — face tripwire, a thin cloud of poisonous gas and loud shots — BAM! BAM! — fired from behind a flimsy wall. They move quickly, pellet guns drawn and masks affixed.

So the Deputy who leads these kids is worried about being politically correct about simulating someone from the Middle East, but a disturbed veteran is okay. It's not even an issue. This is a training scenario that some guy came up with off the top of his head, and the first thing that occurs to him is a disturbed Iraq veteran; but the idea that someone thought up a scenario involving an Arab makes them wonder if maybe they're being insensitive?

The guy who thought up the "disturbed vet" scenario was a federal law enforcement agent, and he's teaching this to kids. We've already pitted our law enforcement professionals against veterans to the point that when you say, "Okay, come up with a training scenario where a guy has flat lost his mind and he's killing people," his first response is, "Got it. Disturbed Iraq veteran. Let's do this."

That wasn't the point of the article in the New York Times, it was background, but it's the part that leaped out at me like the DHS report demonizing veterans.

Then there's this. There is an unchallenged statement in this article by a gun control advocate who unequivocally states that veterans are more likely to kill people, when we've already seen in the past, when people have looked at the numbers, that it just isn't true. It's a myth, a meme, that some state as if it's actually knowledge. It's not. It's misinformation at best and disinformation at worst; a lie to support their stance. The more people that they can frighten, the better for their agenda.

In the meantime, the very people who have had enough love for their country and their fellow citizens to go and put up with the worst living conditions and the most dangerous situations that most of them are ever likely to face are sliding down that slippery slope into becoming the suspects of their society.

What Do We Know?

2009-05-13T03:18:00.007+04:30

There is a tremendous conversation going on now that the firing of GEN McKiernan fits right into. There are many voices, with standard bearers on each side. It is a conversation that contributes directly to whether or not we actually succeed in the current conflict. Many of the posts on this blog have been outliers to this central conversation.

Central players in the conversation like David Kilcullen, John Nagl, COL Gian Gentile and Andrew Bacevich have been going 'round and 'round for quite some time now. I have sparred a bit with Gentile, and more recently with Michael Cohen, a relative late-comer to the conversation.

I've heard the arguments. I even hear the others, who are not "spokesmen" for one side or the other. For quite some time now, I've said that a lot of this is diversionary. Recently, a comment string had me about to tear my hair out as the conversation turned to such things as whether or not COIN was done in Somalia, which is pretty inane, really. (It came from my assertion, in refuting Cohen, that there had been no nascent nation-building in Somalia.) Some men who consider that they have a grasp of counterinsurgency, at least strong enough to intimate that my understanding is not quite up to their standards, wrote authoritatively about Afghanistan, though they had not been there. In putting forward my opinion, I was running into quibbling over such things as terrain denial and purely kinetic operations being possibly the direction that we need to head in Afghanistan. I've also run into some kind of derision about population-centric COIN, which is interesting in that it doesn't seem to make any sense.

Strangely, if you call it something else, they will often agree that the action would be a good idea. They suggest things that are part of pop-centric COIN as if they weren't, and that's fine with them, too. There's some kind of knee-jerk negativity, but it seems to be emotional, which I find strange.

There's something that I would like to point out; there is very consistent feedback coming out of the veterans of Afghanistan. There are a number of us now, and there are a number of us who write, and we all say very similar things. Whether or not we are fans of Galula or of FM 3-24 or whatever. We differ on small points, but our feedback is remarkably similar.

Discussion can be a lot of fun. It can be stimulating. It can be maddening, especially when those of us who have been there, particularly those of us who have been there as advisors, keep saying the same thing over and over and those who have their opinions about COIN or the war or both just brush past it dismissively. I can point to a number of bloggers who say similar things, who have provided similar feedback, and this has not changed in several rotations.

I can still say that I'm encouraged. Prof. Bacevich may not like it, as his viewpoint is clearly marginalized in the new administration, but I'm encouraged. We may not be doing a great job here in the States preparing our NCO's for leadership in COIN environments, and that's more than a shame; it's dangerous. I'm still encouraged. I was encouraged when the strategic plan for "AfPak" was released, and I'm even more encouraged now. Sec. Gates, ADM Mullen and GEN Petraeus have shown that they are career-ending serious about what we are doing. That's the kind of message that has been a long time coming.

The message that the advisor veterans of Afghanistan have been bringing back for years may not be clicking with all of those who enjoy the various discussions; but it seems to have caught on with those who are calling the shots now. Don't get me wrong; I have no illusions that this is being read by those leaders. GEN Petraeus was the driving force behind the manual which lays out the doctrine.

The point is not lost on me, though, that advisor veterans say very similar things and we have pointed out a number of things consistently... and when the leaders who proposed the doctrine for counterinsurgency get their time in the barrel, they appear to be moving in a direction that addresses those concerns.

Many argue, as COL Gentile does, that other factors were more responsible for the improvements in conditions in Iraq than was GEN Petraeus and "the surge." They claim that Iraqi just happened to get tired of the violence right at that point. They argue that the "Sunni Awakening" occurred independently of American actions or any change in behavior on the part of our leadership. They speak convincingly, and they have an audience. It is their argument against a narrative which would tend to disprove their assertions. Basically, they argue fortuitous circumstances that magically made it appear as if the surge in Iraq worked. While to me their narrative seems a bit self-serving, here comes Act Two.

If this team is able to begin to reverse our recent fortunes in Afghanistan, it will still be argued that other factors beyond our control were responsible. It's going to ring a little more false, though.

In my opinion, the self-serving narratives of the COINtras, though persuasive, are diversionary. Counterinsurgency is the most complex environment that can be imagined for a military leader. With so many factors, there will always be plausible alternate explanations. Here's what I know; if you do the right things, a lot of different moving parts will begin moving in the directions that you need for them to. This is not a science, it's an art with a lot of science involved. COL Gentile says that COIN requires a lot of leaps of faith. I can see where he would get that. I would say that it's just my observation, but it's more than just me, who has seen both good and bad done and seen the results.

Following a series of moves over the past few months, particularly the past seven weeks, I have found room for optimism. Not all of my fellow advisor veterans share my optimism. They have come to distrust the system, or the administration, to too great a degree and have gone into "show me" mode. Again, understandable. I have a lot more faith in this team from the Secretary down, and they have shown that they have teeth that they are willing to use.

In an email exchange today with a few veterans, we all acknowledged having seen horrible leaders who were just breezing through disastrous combat tours and still getting promoted. I don't think that this team is going to completely eradicate that type of behavior; but I do think that they've sent a strong signal.

I'm more encouraged than I was after reading the strategy review.

Now, a real telling point will be what the civilian governmental agencies such as State and USAID do to handle their responsibilities in the new strategy. All of the military changes in the world are not going to amount to much if Afghanistan's government is left with such corruption, and if there is no economic development the outcome will remain very much in doubt.

A New Accountability? UPDATED

2009-05-11T23:38:00.004+04:30

SECDEF Gates spoke this afternoon on the replacement of GEN David McKiernan as the commander of US forces in Afghanistan. McKiernan was on the job for less than a year, having been appointed the task under the Bush administration. LTG Stanley McChrystal will replace him. McChrystal was a Special Forces officer, and former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command.

The whole thing was quite civilized; GEN McKiernan's service was duly praised... perhaps eulogized. It is the first major sacking of a commander in this war. Could it be that senior officers will be held accountable for the success or failure of their mission, or is this just a political move to replace a Bush assignee?

Based on Gates' announcement, it appears that it is a signal that field commanders will be held accountable for the lack of progress in their areas. Gates spoke of LTG McCrystal's experience as a counterinsurgent. He announced the appointment of a Deputy Commander in Afghanistan, LTG David M. Rodriguez, who he also touted as an experienced and strong counterinsurgent. LTG Rodriguez was the commander of the 82nd Airborne when I was in Afghanistan. I saw him once as he conducted a FOB visit. Being a good little advisor, I wore my uniform properly and stayed the hell out of the way, taking care of my business whilst he went about his.

I do not know GEN McKiernan. I have no reason to have anything other than respect for him and his service. I wouldn't be disrespectful to him. It appears that he is being used to symbolize to the Officer Corps that counterinsurgency failures will come home to roost. This is a message that needs to be taken to heart.

I think it's more about the message than the man.

It's unfortunate that one man has to take the blame, but that's the nature of command. A commander is responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen. I saw one joyful commenter on a popular counterinsurgency website today, figuratively jumping for glee that GEN McKiernan was being sacked for this "cavalier attitude towards civilian casualties." This is clearly not the case, but the man will have to live with that kind of speculation from here on out.

That being said, it's time that leadership downrange hear the bell clearly; no more losing ground and coming back holding your place on the promotion list. Many have commented that a tower guard at Camp Phoenix could lose rank at the drop of a hat, but there was no accountability for the myriad of broken systems that were run by officers. A team could spend weeks downrange without the proper equipment while staff officers bickered over who got one of the 42 new humvees... but no officer's career was ever in danger while a team of advisors was rendered nearly disabled for lack of the equipment that the denizens of Phoenix cast lots for. A brigade or battalion commander can leave an area notably less secure than when he got there and go back with a shiny new medal, a great evaluation and a choice assignment.

I recently asked in the comments on Abu Muqawama if there had been a single maneuver force commander who had suffered any negative impact on his career due to the degradation of security in Afghanistan or Iraq. There had not been. Battalion and brigade commanders came back from the theaters of combat having visibly lost ground, or having failed to make progress, with medals and nice new assignments including promotions. Apparently, that has now changed.

This should not be construed as a criticism of GEN McKiernan; I think it's more about the message than the man. I feel for the man, but I applaud the message.

*UPDATE*

On his blog, Andrew Exum agrees with the commenter below. In an NPR interview on 5/12/09, Exum sounds more like the above. In the end, a significant portion of the event is about the message that there is a new strategy and it will be ruthlessly enforced.

Dogs And Cats Sleeping Together

2009-05-09T01:39:00.004+04:30

From the time following the election, there was an increasing pace of articles, papers and interviews geared towards "informing the President's decision" about the way forward in Afghanistan. Since the plan was announced just over a month ago, there has been a swelling cry amongst those who did not find their opinions well-represented in the new plan. These people knew, with the appointments of a number of those who champion opposite views to influential positions in the Pentagon and elsewhere, that their chosen paths were probably not going to carry a lot of weight. The reaction has been to raise a hue and cry in an attempt to catch hold of any lack of commitment or loss of enthusiasm due to difficulty.

This has resulted in some strange actions, such as calling Andrew Bacevich during Senate hearings dedicated to hearing from Afghanistan veterans. It has also made for some strange bedfellows. The website AntiWar.com recently published an interview with COL Gian Gentile, which many would find odd, in that a serving officer and department head at West Point would grant such an interview. The author of the article does rather stridently go after Gentile's ideological opponents, presenting his opposition argument in a purposely dim light. This prompted one commenter on Abu Muqawama to point out that the author, Kelley B. Vlahos, is a correspondent for Fox News and a writer for conservative publications, labeling her among the "Paleo-Conservatives."

Regardless of the political affiliation of the author, it is very odd that a military officer who has become a lightning rod for the traditionalists in the military establishment would find, or accept, such a warm embrace from AntiWar.com. In fairness, COL Gentile explains that he did clear the interview with the West Point PAO. I would expect nothing less, really, nor would I expect a different answer from that PAO. That does not make the interview less odd in its character.

Those who are on the side of the argument that hasn't found favor in the administration are arguing strenuously that the administration is continuing to pursue "failed policies of the Bush administration," which has become the ultimate political slam, the equivalent of labeling someone a racist to those who use it. Of course, those who advocate the adoption of the "new" strategy for what has come to known as "AfPak" are painted with that same brush here. COL Gentile comes out looking like the great patriot, while those who differ with him are painted as, well, not as patriotic. In fact, Gentile is painted as being the one who is sincere for simply being willing to embrace AntiWar.com, while his opponents receive a slightly different treatment.

Gentile laughed when he thought of the ribbing he might get among the COIN-set, being interviewed by a site with the name "Antiwar." Ultimately, he doesn’t care. He is driven by a sincerity his detractors cannot touch, and a personal mission not to let current war doctrine go unchallenged. He might just have a ghost of a chance.

A sincerity his detractors cannot touch. Nice. Sincerity, for a military officer, is now defined by their willingness to interview for AntiWar.com. We've come a long way, baby. Note the overwhelming sincerity below that cannot be touched by the likes of Nagl:

Deny it they may, says Gentile, but today’s policymakers are promoting a similar Surge strategy for Afghanistan (See congressional testimonies by Flournoy and Chief Af-Pak envoy Holbrooke this week: clear, hold and build, with more boots on the ground, more civilian experts, more COIN). As an active duty officer, Gentile won’t question current plans outright, but he left me with this:

"As soldiers, our role is to do whatever we are told to do by our civilian masters. However, my experience is, that the idea of using military force to change entire societies — to use John Nagl’s words — at the barrel of a gun, is highly problematic and it is not as clean and as clear and as sensible as I think our own COIN doctrine makes it seem to be," he said. "I saw what it is like changing the entire society at the barrel of a gun in Baghdad in 2006, it wasn’t as simple."

The wording of this quote is unfortunate. Nagl has made the statement about changing societies. I cannot find any reference to this change being, "at the barrel of a gun." There are several instances of Gentile saying this, however. It's actually a phrase that he resorts to repeatedly. It's part of his schtick. Now, I may be wrong, and I'd have no problem with having it pointed out, but while I have found those two elements linked together frequently in Gentile's writing and again in quotes from him, but I have not found an instance of it said by Nagl.

It may also be cleverly worded, especially in the quote above, to appear that Nagl has said that the Army, "can change entire societies at the barrel of a gun." Now that's sincerity that cannot be matched. Clever = sincere.

Overall, this is an exercise in First Amendment rights, and I support it as such. No problem there. Other than that it is quite the display of odd bedfellows. It was also a great way to challenge the patriotism of his ideological opponents, and specifically Nagl, without having to say so himself. Nicely played. I can't say that it added to COL Gentile's stock in my book, but it was well played.

DC/Richmond Fly For A Dollar

2009-05-06T08:02:00.001+04:30

JetBlue is honoring service members with flights for a buck. Book by May 7th.

Never Again

2009-05-05T21:41:00.005+04:30

The post regarding Mr. Cohen's articles on Democracy Arsenal on COIN and specifically John Nagl and Brian Burton's article in the April issue of Washington Quarterly was cited on Abu Muqawama and began a lively discussion thread over there. This is good, since the COINtras are raising a point that needs to be discussed, dealt with, and moved past. It is the politics of fear.

More after the jump

Here is the lone comment that was left on this blog (there are nearly 140 over at AM) regarding the post, made by Mr. Anonymous:

You completely miss Michael Cohen's point. Utterly.

As simply as possible: There is an upper bound on the efficiency of COIN. No matter how good you get at it, as a policy option, it's always bloody, expensive, and comparatively undesirable.

The problem with the COIN industry is that getting better at COIN is on some level a futile endeavor. You can get better enough to perform better tactically, or operationally, at the current goals of your campaign. But you can never get enough better to make being in COIN strategically positive.

Through the power of agent theory and path dependence, by making us better at COIN, you are making us more likely to use it, thus making us actually worse off, because two competent COIN engagements are still worse for us as a country than one incompetent COIN engagement.

It would be one thing if you actually engaged this argument, but you instead quite failed to comprehend, articulate, or rebut it.

I do get Mr. Cohen's point, actually. Mr. Cohen is afraid that if we grasp the doctrine of counterinsurgency well enough to be successful in Afghanistan, we will be, as a nation, forever seeking new venues in which to display our counterinsurgent prowess; that the civilian masters of the military will find a new and irresistible toy with which to play endlessly.

The operative word is afraid. It's the operative word in all of the COINtra dialogues. They are afraid that by retaining the lessons learned in Iraq and the lessons being learned in Afghanistan, they will lose control of something. Some fear that the United States will lose its conventional edge. Some fear that they will lose massive budgets for very expensive new aircraft. Some fear that the stigma of Vietnam will be lost, and that the deterrent to engaging in counterinsurgency or nation-building will melt away, allowing America to be drawn endlessly into long and messy engagements in strategic backwaters.

The commenter writes about a COIN industry. Aside from a few publishers (have you seen the price of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice lately?) I fail to see an industry. I do see a massive conventional weapons industry. I do see that the funding for the F-22 has been cut. I do see an industry to support the military that guards us from the bogeyman who can nuke us to death or supposedly invade our country and subjugate it. I don't see a COIN industry. COIN actually pushes back against the greater defense industry in many ways. It does not play to technological strengths, heavy equipment, or present a technical challenge in overcoming enemy systems. It does not respond to advanced radars that can pick out a gnat at a hundred miles at 50,000 feet. It does not spur the development of more capable fighters or of advanced armored vehicles networked seamlessly together. It doesn't respond to generals who can see each detail through a Predator feed and a networked map.

It responds to a man on the ground, dirty and tired and frustrated, trying to get a bunch of backwards people to feel safe enough to tell him that their neighbor likes to play with explosives at night and threaten to cut their heads off if they tell anyone.

COIN strategically positive. Now there's an idea. COIN is not strategically positive. It never was. It may support a strategic goal, but it is never strategically positive. COIN is the end result of failed strategy or the failure to strategize. It is the end result, as are all wars, of failure to resolve problems non-violently.

Failure in an endeavor is not strategically positive, either. In fact, it is strategically disastrous. Maj.Gen. Charles Dunlap states that the loss in Vietnam didn't cost the United States the Cold War, and it didn't cause the nation to become a failed state, and therefore loss in Afghanistan is acceptable, perhaps desirable. Yes, it would be desirable to him. It would once again cause a version of the Powell/Weinberger Doctrine to be adopted, perhaps by law. The lesson learned from Vietnam; "Never again."

Never again would an advanced fighter be put on hold while the military pursued an objective in which they held air superiority by default. Never again would all of his training and planning for a conventional knockdown of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Air Force be rendered useless. Never again would he face internal dissent from a guerrilla group of junior officers who point out that a two-engined version of the Spooky gunship could be bought by the squadron full, to include crews, for the price of a single F-22.

I don't know where Maj.Gen. Dunlap was in the years following the humiliation of Vietnam. Of course, Vietnam had positive effects on the Air Force in many ways. The Red Flag school was begun, the F-15 and F-16 learned from the challenges faced by the F-4, and the United States fielded the best fighter in the world as the world watched America's panicked flight from Saigon.

The disaster in Vietnam did irreparably harm the United States. We were lucky that the Soviets did not view our weakened Army as the easy prey it would have been in the mid-'70's. The services struggled with drug addiction and the Vietnam veterans suffered from the double edged sword of fighting the wrong doctrine in an insurgency, which to me complicates PTSD, and the stigma of failure which cannot but increase their suffering. These men and women who fought as well as any in the history of the United States were failed by their leadership and training.

Laos and Cambodia fell. Millions perished. To this day, none of these countries match their liberal neighbors economically. Malaysia, which survived an insurgency only a few years before Vietnam collapsed, produces computers. Vietnam produces cheap clothing and hats.

The loss of American prestige, the aura of invincibility shattered, led to numerous confrontations abroad. The USS Pueblo, the Embassy in Tehran, and a myriad of other incidents demonstrated our loss of standing. It changed the way that America views itself and its government forever. It emboldened asymmetric threats around the world as they saw the limits of American resolve and learned that if they had more patience, we would tire and concede any fight.

It made our media and our Armed Forces mortal enemies, which they remain to this day. The relationship between the American people and their Armed Forces did not heal until the Gulf War. I know. I wore a uniform during the 80's, often in public on American streets.

One incompetent engagement is better for those who live in fear of the future. It is not better to me, who has lost friends and allies and has sacrificed months and months of my life and family time for it. It is not better for the legions of Vietnam veterans who live daily in the aftermath of futile sacrifice. No. It is not, and it never will be. Question the motives for engagement, do reasonable work to prevent such occurrences in the future; but do not make our sacrifices mean nothing so that your fear can rule you.

The military response, following the insidious behavior of those who had resorted to lying, cheating and cover-ups to justify failures and poor behaviors, learned a lesson; "Never again." To them, "never again" meant never again engaging in asymmetric warfare. Documents were written, studies done, to demonstrate the failures and point the fingers at everyone and everything except themselves. First the Weinberger Doctrine and later the Powell Doctrine aimed at avoiding all such engagements, keeping our military restricted to "short, sharp" engagements, which to military officers was both exculpatory and very desirable. It simplified their jobs, and, confident that they would never again be called upon to perform in an asymmetric environment, allowed them to focus strictly on AirLand Doctrine and the weapons required to prosecute it.

Meanwhile, the government failed to learn how to engage the true might of our nation, its economic might and the freedom of its people, to engage in the diplomatic and developmental activity that would prevent the failure to thrive that pushes individuals towards extremism. We set up our own enemies of the future.

As the Armed Forces recovered from the TBI of Vietnam and built into a force that the Soviets dare not challenge across the Fulda Gap, American Soldiers and Marines muddled through a series of asymmetric disasters for which they were untrained and unprepared. Having thrown out what we had learned from Vietnam, eager to distance ourselves from the memory of having our collective asses handed to us by a nation of rice farmers, hundreds of Marines were killed by what we later came to call a VBIED in Beirut. The ignominious withdrawal from Somalia and the vision of naked American dead being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by dancing Somalians did not wake up the leadership but instead inspired the Powell Doctrine.

Yet the political masters of our Armed Forces ventured forth again, into fields where our mighty M-1 Abrams meant nothing more than a really nice roadblock.

I see the fear in every argument made by the COINtras. Fear for their particular rice bowls, fear of losing a glorious image, fear of success driving future endeavors. I am a Soldier. This does not mean that I do not feel fear; far from it. It does mean that I am not bound to a course of action or inaction because of it. Cohen's fear is that by adopting the doctrine that is necessary for success in the current war, and by being realistic enough to look at our past and maintaining the knowledge, skills and abilities to succeed again, we will ensure the advent of future instances of involvement in foreign insurgencies. We, however, realize that civilians will, for whatever reason, throw me and my brothers in arms into a similar situation, regardless of their fluffy expressions of goodwill and world brotherhood.

When they do, after we have taken their well-intentioned advice and planning for a raging conventional holocaust and the righteous, clear-cut conventional victory Americans crave, we will once again make mistakes that cost young men their lives.

The right lesson that we should have derived from earlier failures in such situations was indeed, "Never again." Never again will we send young men out to "chase ghosts" untrained in the doctrine and tactics that will keep more of them alive, end your adventures more quickly, and avoid failures that invite such events as the Tehran Embassy due to our loss of prestige. Never again will we have officers who attempt to fail at their tasks with cries of, "We don't do windows." Never again will we, through willful negligence and wishful thinking, endanger the lives of our Soldiers and the accomplishment of whatever mission our nation calls upon us to perform.

I see the COINtras fear, and I see Cohen's. It's okay to be scared. It's not okay to let it rule your life or your decisions, and it's not okay to allow it to rule the advice you give to others. It is particularly not okay for it to rule the minds of military officers, and especially not for reasons of individual or service-related selfishness, parochialism, or their boyhood visions of glory.

I get Cohen's point all too well. His point was arrived at before his readings and his writings and that, to me, is intellectually dishonest. That's why I wrote about it.

If anyone wants to avoid such future entanglements, then learn your own, "Never again." Learn that by establishing an excellent Phase 0 capability, you position yourself better to never have to consider Phase IV COIN in a kinetic environment. Influence your government to deal with the development of radicalized elements by addressing them at their birthplace, before they plan attacks on our home soil for whatever crazy reason that their minds grow into. Start addressing the next Taliban or al Qaeda now before they kill Americans.

COIN is awful business. It boggles the best minds. It can never be done perfectly, only adequately, but it can be done. I hope that Afghanistan is the last time this nation ever engages in foreign COIN or FID, but I don't for one second believe that it will be, especially in a world where the only way to really interfere with American interests or strategies is asymmetric. I am here to tell Michael Cohen, Maj.Gen. Dunlap, or anyone else that never again will I listen to someone who tells me to be willfully negligent in my duties to my Soldiers and my nation, and to help them prove their points by purposely failing in Afghanistan; or that it would be alright to do so. Never again will I heed leadership that tries to guide me away from having the knowledge, skills and abilities to perform in whatever role my nation tells me I need to function in. That is my never again.

Listening? That's A Start.

2009-05-05T09:28:00.001+04:30

Lt.Col. Glen Butler is on to something here. Listening would be good. Empowering would be better. The only problem is that it would involve training them. It's amazing how many are doing good things without being trained.

Imagine what training them would do for us.

Depending on where they go, the Captains are likely getting some COIN education. The Corporals? Not so much. COIN is not trained in NCOES. In fact, many tactical tasks are trained to Cold War standards. Emplacing an M-8 chemical alarm was not done on one single OP I ever saw in Afghanistan. Nor were anti-tank mines. Both are still part of the ARTEP standards for tactical tasks trained/evaluated at the first line leader level.

What happened to, "Train the way you fight, fight the way you train?" For us, it's "Train the way you train, forget it. Fight the way you fight."

No, instead we train for a war that will not be fought again until well after these Corporals are out of the military entirely. But by golly, we're ready for those pesky Reds!

I've been to Gondalabuk

2009-05-04T10:25:00.002+04:30

Just found this. I'll dig up the pictures of a place few Americans have been. These went further. A little over a year ago, the Police Chief of Doab was known to have Taliban affiliation, was fired for staging a Taliban attack on his own district center, and somehow found his way back into power. Wonder if he's the same one now. Oily guy...

I'll try to dig up the pictures of Gondalabuk.

Outclassed by Gentile

2009-05-04T04:22:00.004+04:30

No, not John Nagl. Not in this lifetime. No, we're talking about Democracy Arsenal's Michael Cohen who, for a fellow at a think tank and a former speechwriter for the United States Representative to the United Nations is pretty thick on a subject into which he has been putting a lot of study. He's been taking on the COINdinistas and being a bit condescending about it at that, which is ironic. In a May 1st post on Nagl and Burton's article in the April edition of The Washington Quarterly, Cohen writes some pretty silly stuff.

More after the jump.

The COIN-danistas deterministic notion of future military conflict is particularly hard to reconcile with Nagl's later point that "U.S. conventional military capabilities still qualitatively outstrip those of potential adversaries to a significant degree. Such capabilities are too costly and infrastructure-intensive for most countries to develop, purchase, or field. Instead of playing the U.S. game, current and potential enemies have turned to asymmetric approaches designed to neutralize our strengths and exploit our relative weaknesses."

Well wait a minute here - if no country can qualitatively match the United States and if our enemies only approach for confronting the United States is through asymmetric approaches then wouldn't this suggest that the United States has a rather fulsome capability to decide when, where and how to fight wars?

Ummm... no. It gives us a fulsome capability to decide when, where and how to react to being attacked by non-state actors. It gives our nation a fulsome inability to have someone against whom to declare war because we don't have an institutional memory of declaring hostilities against a non-state. It gives current and potential enemies a fulsome and demonstrated ability to confuse us, play against our demonstrated weaknesses and strike against not only our homeland but those of other nations with whom we share good relations.

Simply, it puts us in the position not of actor but of reactor. Our conventional primacy in the world precludes any nation-state from having a direct conventional assault on our interests or allies. As Nagl points out, likely scenarios for traditional state-state war are pretty scarce. This forces those who would see the United States taken down a peg to resort to the unconventional, asymmetric insurgent type behaviors that we have a demonstrated difficulty in dealing with.

It does allow us to determine how, when and where to react. Cohen points out that in the days following 9/11 we had choices in how to pursue al Qaeda. This is true. While he points out an obvious truth, even divining the method of our reaction, there is an essential failure in his logic; that our conventional primacy completely failed us; we had been attacked. We had been attacked not on the fields of Europe, not by a nuclear strike by a conventional power, but on our own soil by a non-state actor. We did not choose the fight. We did choose, in the aftermath, to fight. In the end, citing a favorite childhood movie, Cohen advocates choosing not to fight.

Take it on the chin, America, and just say no.

This is simplistic at best. Simplistic answers in a complicated world are absolutely worthless.

In another post, made the same day, Cohen tries to tackle Nagl again, this time on the subject of failed states.

Note to Cohen: Dude, you are so totally out of your league. You thoroughly miss the point, and for someone with your credentials, this is absolutely frightening. Truly sad.

Nagl is not an advocate of COIN for the sake of COIN. Nagl is an advocate of being able to prevail in the conflicts at hand, and for never again being such utter failures at having the ability to achieve what this nation's civilian leadership decides is in the nation's interests. We are not out of the woods yet; not by a far sight. The Army has a long way to go, and will likely never really commit culturally to accepting the abilities to overcome an insurgency. There are points of light, though, and they are increasing in both number and influence.

Nagl is an advocate of being capable of facing the threats that face us in the modern world, where the new phenomenon of globalization has given non-state actors the ability to strike within the shores of the United States on a scale that has never been done by any state actor since the War of 1812.

This is highly misleading. The experience of the US military in Somalia was a disaster and conveniently ignored is the fact that this intervention -- where we sent ground troops and tried nascent nation-building -- was stunningly unsuccessful. As for the Balkans, the United States did not intervene with ground troops (peacekeepers) in Bosnia or Kosovo until only after a peace agreement/cease fire had been reached in both locales - and it was not our military that did nation building in either country, it was the United Nations and other civilian agencies. And while Nagl is right that the demands to intervene militarily in places like Darfur and Rwanda have grown, doesn't it tell us something that such demands have gone unmet? It is hardly accidental that the United States did not send ground troops into kinetic environments as nation builders in each of these situations.

Failed and weak states represent areas of potential threat to the US, but Nagl's response - counter-insurgency and nation-building -- is not only political realistic it makes little sense from either a strategic or tactical perspective. Above all, it is a disproportionate response to what are, for the most part, not vital threats to the United States.

What horrible analysis. Somalia was nothing like Afghanistan or Iraq, nor were the goals. There was no "nascent nation-building" in Somalia. It was a humanitarian intervention and, while terribly ill-conceived, had nothing to do with any real or perceived threat to our national security. The Balkans was, again, a response to a humanitarian disaster. In both cases, it was a military response to a humanitarian crisis. They are great examples of why Nagl is right, but horrible examples of why he may be wrong.

Nagl does not advocate counterinsurgency as a driver of national policy. What he does is point out that because of our conventional primacy, we are unlikely to face a conventional threat. He also points out that most military activity in the past 60 years, that which our nation has asked us to do, has been unconventional, asymmetric and often insurgency-related. He points out that the real threats to our country are now and are more likely (than conventional) to be asymmetric. He also points out that the civilian capacity to avoid using military force to assist in stabilization is woefully lacking.

Why people like Cohen find John Nagl to be threatening and feel a need to argue with him or discredit his ideas is beyond me. There have been military thinkers over the years who have examined the failures of Vietnam. Most got it wrong. Much of the military analysis has been flawed in the favor of blaming the civilian government for the failures of the Army to figure it out. They have ascribed abilities to supposed counterinsurgency in Vietnam that wasn't there. Even in the wake of asymmetric failures such as Somalia retrospective analysis failed to do more than reflect a desire to force the Powell Doctrine (a military solution to counterinsurgency that amounted to the Cohen Doctrine of "just say no" on the civilian leadership) to the level of law. Nagl never would have written his book Learning to eat soup with a knife had such efforts been successful.

Oh snap; Cohen calls for the Powell Doctrine, too.

COINdinistas, who Cohen treats with derision, are not advocates of looking for more opportunities to do COIN. John Nagl doesn't advocate COIN as national strategy. Nagl advocates COIN as the proper doctrine for achieving the goals of our civilian leadership in cases where failed states harbor asymmetric threats to our national security. Use a hammer to drive a nail, use a shovel to dig a hole. As our experience in Iraq has shown, when you put down the shovel and pick up the hammer, suddenly it's easier to drive the nail.

COL Gian Gentile makes much more cogent arguments, fundamentally flawed but intellectually honest, than Cohen. Cohen's arguments are driven by a conclusion already arrived at. Cohen has been studying COIN not to see what it offers but to see how to discredit it. He has done a terrible job.

Gates On Fareed Zakaria's Global Public Square

2009-05-04T01:50:00.002+04:30

SECDEF Gates is on GPS on CNN right now. I'll try to find a link to video later. Really good explanation of the strategy.

UPDATE "If there ever was an example that military force alone cannot succeed in Afghanistan, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was it."

"If the Afghan people begin to see us as the occupiers, then we will lose."

Gates says he would be skeptical of any further raising of force structure in Afghanistan. He says that the partnership with the ANSF is the key to success for security in Afghanistan.

Plenty of other stuff on Afghanistan and the SECDEF's views on it. I'm nodding my head. My only question is if he can find enough leaders who can actually implement it. The Army is apparently full of COL(R) Macgregor mavens, still hoping that the halcyon days of the Weinberger/Powell doctrines where the military thought for some reason that it could determine its own role in national policy.

Update 2... the video. Part 1. Part 2.

A.L.L. Launch

2009-04-30T21:45:00.002+04:30

Recently I got an email from a fellow milblogger who experienced a change of mission from Iraq to Afghanistan. Iraq didn't bother him... he's been there before... but he doesn't know anything about Afghanistan. I thought about it and realized that what I was missing when I went into country was significant. Our young friend asked for a post on what he needed to know, but I realized that the knowledge that needed to be transferred could not be dealt with in one post. I also realized that there were others who had knowledge that needed to be provided. From this point, Bouhammer tells it better than I do, so I'm copying his post on it.

It started as a lengthy phone call between Old Blue and myself. Thanks to a private online chat group that a whole bunch of us milbloggers talk on, it grew to include Vampire 6 and WOTN. Four veterans of Afghanistan, Four milbloggers, Four guys who care about passing on the Afghanistan Lessons Learned (A.L.L.) to others that are deploying. 2009 is going to be challenging enough for this country in regards to Afghanistan and even more challenging for those that are heading over to risk their lives and spend a year away from home.

The last thing they need to do is worry about a lengthy ramp-up period to learn the unique challenges that the war in Afghanistan has to offer. They need to hit the ground running, which means having all the lessons learned already in their head.

This is where we come in. We call it A.L.L. and it is for all going to Afghanistan. We foresee this blog becoming the one-stop shop of knowledge needed in order to step into the country knowing all there is to know without having physically been there.

You can find it at http://afghanlessons.blogspot.com/

Go there to check it out, and if you know anyone heading to the “Popular, Forgotten War” tell them to check it out too.

Now That The Cat's Out Of The Bag: I REALLY Like This

2009-04-29T21:11:00.003+04:30

The irrepressible Christian Bleuer of Ghosts of Alexander has found the document on the web. This document was posted on the Army's BCKS (Battle Command Knowledge System,) an internal password-protected forum that includes many lines of discussion, one of which (thank God,) is COIN. I don't drag documents off of the more secure side into the public, but now that the cat's out of the bag, let's go.

The document, "Winning in Afghanistan" was written by CPT Carl Thompson, a Maryland Army National Guard officer who is embarking on his fourth tour in the ~~War on Terror~~ Overseas Contingency Operation. It is an amazing document. I have linked to Bleuer's PDF file, as it is the most accessible and readable.

I spoke with CPT Thompson by phone this morning, catching him in the field at Camp Shelby, MS, where he is training for his second deployment as an ETT. It turns out that he's been getting lots of calls from Soldiers who have discovered that 2009 will be their year to experience The Lumpy Suck for the first time, and they are looking for G-2 (intelligence, the straight scoop, the skinny, poop, the word, no BS info) on how to prepare for it. I gave him a quick brief on A.L.L. (Afghan Lessons Learned; the collaborative project recently launched by Bouhammer, WOTN, and Vampire 6 to put non-classified info and advice about Afghanistan out on a single site for the benefit of those headed to Afghanistan for the first time) and he thought it was a great idea. He's suffering through another "Afghan-specific" train-up that lacks real-time, real-world applicability in Afghanistan. We agreed that the Army is just too slow and, for lack of a better word, politically-correct with its training. Some of it is totally irrelevant. It's something that you have to suffer through to earn the right to go downrange so you can forget it and do your real job.

Which is sad, to say the least. I was raised in an Army where, "Train the way you fight, fight the way you train!" was the mantra. Now it's more like, "They taught you WHAT??? Forget everything they taught you. Do this."

This varies from place to place, but we've utterly failed at implementing lessons learned. So, the new repository of scoop will try to balance that, sharing lessons learned on the ground for the benefit of those headed downrange to A'stan in 2009. CPT Thompson has agreed to make a contribution with his excellent piece.

If you Google the phrase, "Winning in Afghanistan," you will find many documents that have it as their title or as part of the title. Thompson's "Winning in Afghanistan" is light years from any of those documents. This document takes COIN from the lofty world of saying COIN to this is how you do COIN in an Afghan village. It gives real-world, gritty, no-shit advice on what you will find when dealing with Afghans, and my head started nodding immediately as I read it the first time.

It is an absolutely fantastic document and should be required reading for all Soldiers going into Afghanistan. There should be a test on it for leaders, and leaders who fail that test should be sent back for remedial training. It should be published on that paper that your credit cards come in... the stuff that won't tear or turn to pulp when it's wet... and issued to each and every Soldier and Marine headed to Afghanistan. This, ladies and gentlemen is the freaking Handbook for COIN Application in Afghanistan. Deploying troops should be required to read Galula's Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice first, followed immediately by this, given guided discussion time and then tested.

This is a war, and it's time to get serious about winning this war on its own terms. If Soldiers and leaders follow the guidelines in this book, we will win. If they don't, well, you've seen what happens.

It's the best thing since sliced bread.

The document is too big for me to digest its wonders in one posting, but with the permission of the author I will link to it. Bleuer's take on it is good, and from the academic point of view, take a gander at what he has to say about it. He quotes areas that I won't go into in this post. Here is, for me, a significant piece of this that I think says so much; and it's true.

The US military has become more attached to procedures than it is to outcomes. This mindset has the effect of causing us to lose a war and no one cares as long as we are following the procedures. The first step to winning is to stop losing habits. We continue to "check the blocks", so we must be successful because that is how we have now defined success. Success is a completed process, not an outcome to the military. The rotations come and go through Afghanistan, people collect a good OER and an award, but we continue to lose. However, no one is ever held accountable for the failures and everyone just continues to cycle through and get a "go" for their career. Consider a few issues:

- We have well educated officers leading capable soldiers. Our enemy is generally led by illiterate or partially literate commanders with part-time minimally trained soldiers -- yet the enemy is winning
- We bring billions of dollars into a country to try and win a war. Our enemy doesn't spend 1/1000th of the money we do, but they are holding their own -- and winning
- The strategy for many is not to win or defeat the enemy. It is to rotate through and go home with a good award and OER or NCOER
- We cannot get scopes for weapons in-country, but we had so much new office furniture and flat-screen television sets on the FOBs people were throwing away things that still worked

How can we possibly be losing in a war we should be easily winning? Because we are tied to a myriad of multiple processes that are not outcome based. Additionally, these processes are completely uncoordinated. For the military, the process is definitely more important than the results. The processes must be followed even if they result in the unnecessary loss of life, equipment or even a war. This mentality must change drastically for us to achieve victory.

What the leadership, across the board from lieutenant to general, needs to realize for us to win is that everything needs to be oriented toward what works on the ground. Every person at every level is putting in place a policy. There are policies for going to sick call, leaving the wire, taking prisoners, writing memos, reporting to higher, etc. Most of these policies were put into place in order to make it easier for someone in a bureaucracy to do their job. This does not make it easier for the person on the ground to do their job or to win the war. It makes it harder. Every policy or rule throughout the military is one of two things: an enabler or distracter. There is nothing else. What happens is a soldier is required to take an action or not allowed to take an action according to a policy. That policy either helps him accomplish his mission and win the war or it distracts him from his mission and makes it tougher to win.

There are multiple policies in place that prevent us from winning and there are more being added every day. We were doing better in 2002-2005 when soldiers were unobtrusively running around Afghanistan in ordinary pickup trucks and no body armor. Now we have large HMMVs that limit us to certain roads and are required to wear large amounts of body armor which prevent us from moving. We have lost our flexibility, maneuverability and versatility because someone who is not even fighting (and probably never has) wrote a policy about what the soldier needs to do n the ground at all times
.
These policies put into place and stacked on top of each other, have eroded our combat effectiveness. In some areas it has made our soldiers useless and combat ineffective. From stateside training to operations in theatre, there are multiple policies put in place that PREVENT us from winning. The argument can easily be made that we are a tougher obstacle than the enemy. Policies are usually put in place based on the assumption that if the last guy did X, then the next guy needs to do X + Y. The problem is that X was good enough and should have been left alone. The addition of Y canceled any value X originally had.

There is one key element to remember in all of this -- there is a limited amount of time and effort for anything. If we need to win, we need to be flexible enough to do what it takes to achieve victory and not let people who are completely enamored with policies and procedures get in the way. They look at victory as a nice, clean bureaucratic system. Victory should be seen as dead enemy, reliable governance and a peaceful place for people to live.

CPT Thompson has put this all together with a direct clarity that is truly impressive. There is no getting lost in the weeds. I, and others, have said much of this, but this document brings it all together so nicely. This needs the widest possible dissemination, and to be published as a handbook in its own right.

In short, I really like it. I look forward to meeting CPT Thompson some day.

A.L.L. (Afghanistan Lessons Learned) Soldiers Should Know This When Deploying To Afghanistan Chapter 2: History Lesson

2009-04-28T10:01:00.000+04:30

This post is in response to a direct request from SGT Danger, who has experienced a change of mission.

First, read some basic history on Afghanistan. You don't need to know a ton, but being familiar with the history there is a good idea, and Afghans are very impressed with someone who has taken the time, and had the respect, to learn about their history. Afghanistan has a long history and is a witness to many empires, most of which have run over Afghanistan like steamrollers. Afghanistan has been like the cartoon character who is run over by a car, struggles to his feet and has scarcely dusted himself off when he is run over again. And again. And again, ad nauseum. Afghans, particularly the Pashtuns, have been called xenophobic, and while they have some xenophobic tendencies, it is this role as the speed bump of history that has ingrained this.

In your research you will find that the Persians, Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, and more recently the British Empire and the Russians have all swept through Afghanistan. For some, this paints a picture of the indomitable Afghan. I tend to disagree, as the Afghans have indeed been conquered on numerous occasions. However, Afghanistan has never been the prize, more like a necessary bridge from where the conqueror was to where he wished to be. What the Afghans are, however, is survivors. The ominous name "graveyard of empires" is a misnomer. None of the great ancient empires were undone in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan was instead a way to measure the waxing and waning of these empires. They all swept through on their way to expansion, and then had to retract through Afghanistan again on their way back whence they came, leaving their genetic mark on the land. The Afghans, however, have survived. Afghans are not indomitable; they are consummate survivors, amazing in their flexibility and often playing foreigners off of each other and their domestic competitors.

More recently, the British and Russians have found great difficulty in Afghanistan, mostly through their own idiotic mistakes. These experiences in particular are held up as some sort of omen as to the fortunes of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. I caution you not to give much credence to such examples, for there are significant differences. No one through history has gone to Afghanistan for the sake of Afghanistan. What we are doing in Afghanistan is for their sake, but do not become confused; it is not because we are so selfless. It is because by doing the right thing in Afghanistan, we make ourselves safer. Do not buy in to any thoughts of whether or not they deserve our assistance. The question is in itself diversionary. We chose this mission eight years ago because it is our best interests. The Afghans need a lot of help. Theirs is a society that has been developmentally disabled by thirty years of warfare. They have forgotten how to govern even as well as they were ever governed. Forty years ago, Afghanistan was on its way towards modernization. Events since the deposition of the king in 1973 (the king died in August, 2007) have taken Afghanistan back until they are now ten minutes out of the stone age.

If you think of Afghanistan as an individual, this would be a person who has suffered repeated blows to the head and suffers from TBI and PTSD.

A basic understanding of this will assist you in your observations of Afghan behavior. Observations of behavior are critical; your best way to prepare for danger is to be able to recognize what normal looks like. It is only through learning what normal looks like that you will have any hope of recognizing what abnormal looks like. Being able to recognize abnormal behavior or circumstances will help you to stay alive and keep your Soldiers safe. At first, when you arrive, your "Spidey sense" will be alerting you constantly, overloading your mind and your emotions. Relax. Learn. In a short time (2-3 weeks) you will have seen much of Afghan behavior enough to know (mostly) what normal looks like.

Expect to see crushing poverty. Expect to see children who appear to be about four years old herding goats or sheep off by themselves in the middle of the day. Expect to see more Toyota Corollas than you ever thought were built. The general feeling has often been described as Biblical times blended with the Wild West with a touch of Mad Max.

Do not confuse illiteracy with stupidity. Afghans very often learn quickly by observation. They have a strong tradition of oral history. Be aware of why they are consummate fence-sitters, the ferocity of their lack of commitment born of a strong survival instinct. Understand that, often, what we see as corruption they see as the price of doing business.

Be slow to judge them by American standards. While the easy answer, it will only breed discontent in your own soul. There are many Afghans who are very glad that you are there. If you have close contact with them, you will quite likely be thanked by some for being there. There will be more on culture in further chapters.

The link to the history of Afghanistan above is to Wikipedia's good synopsis of Afghan history. It's not terribly long, and it provides links to any particular area you'd care to explore.

An excellent introduction to the modern history of Afghanistan and the development of the Taliban is National Geographic's "Inside the Taliban." This can be found in ten parts here (follow stu106 thread of ten parts on YouTube.) It can also be downloaded in full here.

There are other websites with more anthropological examinations of Afghanistan, like Registan and Ghosts of Alexander. Both are written by academics and offer insight that can be helpful. Joshua Foust, author of Registan, recently returned from Afghanistan.

Finally, if you get a chance to catch a screening of "At War," a documentary film by independent journalist Scott Kesterson, miss an entire night's sleep to do so if necessary. This film will give you a sense of what it's like on the ground. It has been known to make veterans of Afghanistan experience the same rush of combat they felt in country. It's that good.

Once you have completed the above ("At War" film optional based on availability,) you will have a passing knowledge of the land for which you are bound.

A.L.L. (Afghan Lessons Learned) Soldiers Should Know This When Deploying To Afghanistan: Chapter 1; Gear

2009-04-28T07:12:00.005+04:30

In partnership with Bouhammer, we are starting a new series of posts designed to help inform the thousands of troops headed to Afghanistan in 2009, some of whom expected to deploy to Iraq. Those who thought they were headed to Iraq now find themselves behind the power curve in coming up to speed on the peculiarities of Afghanistan. By request from SGT Danger, here is the first chapter in our attempt to help them to be more successful in A'stan.

List of Gear for Afghanistan-Updated

Posted By Bouhammer on April 27, 2009

Old Blue and I are combining our knowledge and experience to jointly publish blog posts under a shared Category called A.L.L.

A.L.L. stands for Afghanistan Lessons Learned, and is intended to document our knowledge and experience in a fresh perspective for any and all service-members who may be part of the upcoming surge into Afghanistan this year. He and I and maybe others (who could one day also join this endeavor in the future) have walked the walk and walked the ground. We have learned the lessons the hard way, so there is no reason for others do to do the same. The wheel has been invented and there is no patent on it.

This is the first “chapter” in this new joint blogging adventure. This list was originally published on this blog back on Jan. 26th, 2007. This is a list of good equipment to have.

The following list is from my experiences and from friends in Iraq that pertain to here Afghanistan also. Some of these won’t be needed until you get in country, so you may want to set them off to side for mama to pack up for you and send to you once you get settled. This listing has been the single most popular blog posting ever, here on Bouhammer’s Blog.

1. Any extra ClassVIII you can bring with you is good to have.
2. Wolfhook single point slings
3. Desert Tan Spray paint
4. Space blanket(s)
5. 100 mph tape, 550 cord, TP, other expendables you think would come in handy
6. Drop Leg Holster (blackhawk or SERPA) and Uncle Mike’s Paddle-Holster for wearing around every day (drop leg will wear a hole in ACUs over time). I also have one for my IBA so I can have my 9mm handy when in the gun hatch going through towns.
7. Weapons lube that DOESN’T ATTRACT SAND. (MILTECH or Remington Dry Lube only)
8. Two copies of addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, etc.
9. 2 pairs of GOOD boot insoles
10. A Good Tactical Flashlight (SureFire, even though you will get issued one with M4)
11. Red/White light L.E.D. headlamp
12. Spare pair of running shoes
13. MP3 PLAYER W/ x-tra pair of spare headphones
14. Enough batteries to last you 30 days
15. Chapstick
16. Lotion
17. 30 SPF or higher Sunblock
18. Bar soap- for some reason its in short supply….almost always
19. Small compact rolls of TP. A lot of places make travel size, half the time you get to a port-a-potty the jackA$s before you ganked the TP
20. Baby wipes- 30 days worth. Expect that the power and water will either go out, or the water will be contaminated at least once a month.
21. Gold Bond Foot and Body Powder
22. Small clip on LED light-clip it to your IBA….it will come in handy….quite often.
23. Drink mix for 16/20 oz bottles of water
24. Weightlifting supplies
25. Small photo album with pics from home.
26. Hand sanitizer (small bottles to put in ankle pockets)
27. More books/magazines than you think you will need.
28. DVDs, for you and to loan out for swapping purposes
29. Tactical gloves- military gloves are sort of clumsy ( I love the $9.95 whitewater brand gloves from the clothing sales). Also standard flight nomex are good.
30. Lens anti fog agent. Shaving cream works in a pinch, but you have to apply it every other day or so.
31. Good pair of shower shoes/sandals. I recommend the black adidas….lasted me all year.
32. Small pillow (air inflatable)
33. Cheap digital camera (at least 2.1 mp)
34. Boot knife
35. Gerber multi tool
36. Fabreeze-sometimes the laundry is few and far between.
37. Armor Fresh
38. Extra boot laces
39. Stainless steel coffee cup with screw on lid.
40. Soccer shorts/normal t shirt to sleep in, hang out in your room in
41. Sweatshirts for winter times hanging around
42. A couple of poncho liners for privacy, nasty mattress cover, etc.
43. A set of twin sheets with pillow case
44. Good regular-size pillow
45. One or two good civilian bath towels
46. Buy a good set (>$200) of winter desert boots. All they will give you is a regular summer set and a set of goretex lined for waterproof needs. Desert is a cold place at these altitudes in the winter time.
47. Bring a laptop!!! Also may want a PSP or some other handheld gaming device.
48. Get an external USB hard-drive (>120gb). You will need this to back up data to, and to store movies and MP3s that you will fall in on from previous teams.
49. Get a Skype account and download the software from skype.com. This is how I talk to home 95% of the time. If you call computer to computer it is totally free. You can also skype out from your computer to a regular phone for $0.021 a minute. There is nothing cheaper than that.
50. Decent headset with mic for computer (skype).
51. Webcam for video calls back home.
52. Bring a min. of 18ea. M4 mags per person. 9 that are loaded and 9 that rest. Plan to do M4 mag changeover once per month.
53. Bring 8ea 9mm mags, for same reason above. Change these over every two weeks.
54. Order a LULA mag loader/unloader. It will be the best $12 piece of plastic you every bought. I have 12 mags loaded at all times and when I do change over it will do it in a fraction of the time and save your hands, and save the ammo.
55. Try to get your state or purchase yourself one 12v DC to 110 AC inverter per man for your trucks. There are crucial on mission to charge personal items, cell phone, ICOMs, and especially ANA radios (they only have re-chargeable batteries).
56. Dump the IBA tac vest you get issued. Get a Tactical Tailor MAV chest rig (does not matter if you get 1 or 2 piece one as you want to keep the front open for laying in the prone. You don’t want mags pushing into your chest making it hard to breathe) . I wish I would have bought mine at the start. It makes a HUGE difference on the back and shoulders when carrying a loaded rig.
57. Get comfortable pair of desert boots. I wear only the Converse 8” assault boots (non-zipper ones). Oakley, Bates and several others are similar in style and comfort.
58. Bring some good snivel gear for the winter time. Extra poly-pro winter hat, gloves, neck gators, etc.
59. Lock de-icer for the winter time
60. Disposable hand and feet warmers
61. Canned-air, lots of it for electronics weapons, etc.
62. Lens wipes for optics
63. Screen wipes for computers

There are probably many other things that could go on this list, but a lot of that is personal preference. The purpose of this list is to provide some insight into things that could make anyone’s tour easier.

*Reprinted by permission of and in partnership with Bouhammer.

On The Same Day, A Different Game

2009-04-25T09:12:00.005+04:30

As War On Terror News pointed out in comments, and I have said in the past, not all of the Obama initiatives regarding Afghanistan are worthy of praise. Undermining President Karzai is not, in my opinion, what a loyal ally does, regardless of how irritating he can be. The Afghan government must not be, regardless of folk lore or propaganda, a puppet. It must be an Afghan government. It must be the legitimate government of Afghanistan, chosen by its people. They have elections; they have the vote. We must respect it as we respect our own if anything we say is to be taken seriously.

So, putting together a dream team must be accompanied by practicing what we preach. Given the President's "initiative" to unilateral introduce a new office to "balance" Karzai, that remains to be seen. So, good point WOTN, and one we would all do well to bear in mind.

That said...

It was interesting to note that on the same day that the House Armed Services Committee was receiving testimony from three wise men, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was having hearings of its own. Titled "Voices of Veterans of the Afghan War," Committee Chair Sen. John Kerry that the purpose of the hearing was to get the perspective of the Afghan veteran, the soldiers who had experienced the challenges of Afghanistan.

They promptly called forth Vietnam veteran Andrew Bacevich.

More after the jump

The upshot is that with the eighth anniversary of the Long War now approaching, fundamental questions about this enterprise continue to be ignored. My purpose today is to suggest that the members of this committee have a profound duty to take those questions on. In his testimony before this committee, the young John Kerry famously – or infamously, in the eyes of some – asked: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”

So it's not worth dying for...

The mystical war against communism finds its counterpart in the mystical war on terrorism. As in the 1960s so too today: mystification breeds misunderstanding and misjudgment. It prevents us from seeing things as they are. As a direct result, it leads us to exaggerate the importance of places like Afghanistan and indeed to exaggerate the jihadist threat, which falls well short of being existential. It induces flights of fancy, so that, for example, otherwise sensible people conjure up visions of providing clean water, functioning schools, and good governance to Afghanistan’s 40,000 villages, with expectations of thereby winning Afghan hearts and minds. It causes people to ignore considerations of cost. With the Long War already this nation’s second most expensive conflict, trailing only World War II, and with the federal government projecting trillion dollar deficits for years to come, how much can we afford and where is the money coming from?

It's not a real threat, and it's too costly. That, of course, is Bacevich in a nutshell. Always.

There is a simple question that just screams to be asked: What in the hell does Andrew Bacevich have to do with Afghan Veterans? This man is beyond unhelpful in the national conversation regarding Afghanistan, other than to be some sort of straw man. Having him testify with the other four was akin to introducing a blind owl in the middle of the lion tamer routine at the circus.

Performer: "Now I will have Simba jump atop this pedestal and roar!" *CRACK*

Lion: "ROAR!"

Performer: "Look at this rare blind owl. Isn't he odd?"

Owl: "WHO?"

Performer: "Simba, roar!" *CRACK*

Lion: "ROAR!"

That wouldn't even make sense at the circus.

One problem; this is not the circus. It is the United States Senate. This was the day for the lions, not to trot out the embittered owl blinded by loss. This was the day that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee set aside to listen to the voices of veterans of the Afghan War, and 20% of those who testified were not Afghan veterans or even veterans of Iraq, but instead of Vietnam. One out of five. That is a waste of limited bandwidth; a failure of your declared mission that day. Are there so few Afghan Vets that they couldn't fill five out of five with the real deal?

Bacevich, a professor and no doubt an educated man, served in Vietnam and lost a son in Iraq. He is an outspoken critic of "The Long War," basically counseling that we should quit and go home, that there is no real "existential" threat here, and he completely separates the Taliban and AQ, as if they have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. When looking for coherent insight into this war, Bacevich should not be on the recommended reading list, because we only have so much bandwidth available. Other than being a strong critic of the war, and being a professor, Mr. Bacevich brings no specific knowledge to the table other than a skewed understanding of the specific situation in Afghanistan. His very presence was such an anomaly to the stated purpose that there had to be some underlying reason for it, relevance being lacking.

The lions were played this day by SSG Genevieve Chase, SSG(R) Christopher McGurk, CPT(R) Westley Moore, and former Marine Corporal Rick Reyes.

Two of these veterans, SSG Chase and SSG(R) McGurk are IAVA members. It is unclear if CPT Moore or CPL Reyes have any group affiliations, but for two of the four to be affiliated with IAVA bespeaks their influence in getting before Congress.

The testimonies of SSG Chase, SSG(R) McGurk, and CPT(R) Moore were interesting reads, and completely contradictory to Mr. Bacevich's testimony. Each of them, without specifically stating it in such language, asked for a balanced counterinsurgency campaign and a dedication to the mission. I found myself in agreement with much of what they said.

Former Corporal Reyes' testimony was a case study in a young warrior who idealistically went into a war being very well trained in kinetic operations; and completely untrained in counterinsurgency. His story is the perfect illustration of what I have been telling these officers for months about how we don't train our young warriors in COIN, and it causes problems not only in their performance but in their heads. This man is completely disillusioned, and that's what happens when your leadership fails you on the level that he was failed.

I will say this again; when your young warriors talk of, "chasing ghosts," you are not doing the right things, and your young warriors are not properly trained. This is a leadership failure. If you are a leader, this is the foot stomp. This will be on the exam.

An interesting read is Senator Kerry's statement about Afghanistan. I've kept this link until last, because reading the testimonies of those who spoke without knowing beforehand what Sen. Kerry's frame of mind at the outset made them more dramatic. It brought the immediacy of the influence that words carry home.

Quite a contrast with the activities of the House on the same day and not so far away.

Optimism

2009-04-24T01:06:00.003+04:30

Say what you will about the Obama administration's domestic policies, which this blog is not about, nor will it ever be. Somehow or other, they have managed to put together the dream team on Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have listened to them in forming the new "AfPak Policy," and when you see such men as David Kilcullen testifying before the House Armed Services Committee and hear the things that they are saying... and being taken mui seriously... there is room for hope.

Even though the "new policy" appears to back away from nation-building, it holds more hope for success in and for AfPak than what we've been doing in the past. The "surge" may or may not be a wonderful thing in Afghanistan. It depends on whether the troops are used properly, but if GEN Petraeus pushes his authority and begins to be ruthless with commanders about enforcing a standard of counterinsurgent achievement, it will much more helpful than harmful. I'd like to quote an email from my friend and fellow blogger Vampire 6 here regarding the counterinsurgent behaviors versus words he finds in field grade officers in Afghanistan, but I didn't ask for permission. Suffice it to say that there is a significant variance. Of course, that is only the military side of the question.

What is even more encouraging is the recognition of the importance of the civilian/economic aspects to stabilizing the societies of both Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan. This war is about society and its conditions in both areas, really. The insurgency will never be resolved through killing bad guys exclusively. While we should never shy away from killing bad guys, an exclusive quest for kinetic engagements is a great way to fail at COIN. While this causes many military listeners to shut down completely (a symptom of the problem we have in successfully implementing COIN doctrine tactically,) the more military leaders can hear that message and understand the linkage, the more success we will find. Each one who "gets it" is then capable of making a difference in their discrete area of operations. All politics is local, and as these discrete areas come under the influence of leaders who are making a difference, the balance will start to swing.

It starts at the top. While today's hearings are only one day's hearings, the momentum towards an effective application of national abilities in the pursuit of sane and rational foreign policy objectives is mounting. I see wicked smart people being listened to at the highest levels, and this is extremely encouraging. Nobody is perfect, and just like a sports team on game day, we play with the team we have. President Bush went to war with a team that had never anticipated or trained for, and had a policy of stringent avoidance of, irregular warfare. He had a Secretary of Defense who was more interested in showing off the conventional primacy of the our nation by beating Iraq's military with one hand tied behind our backs, totally missing the larger picture. He had officers who had never seriously contemplated the challenges of counterinsurgency and an Army and Marine Corps without a relevant doctrine. It took the Bush administration's Army and Marine Corps over five years after the start of hostilities to publish the relevant doctrine, and there are still traditionalist dinosaurs who resist the promulgation of the only doctrine that has a hope of succeeding against an insurgency, which is not AirLand Battle Doctrine, but Counterinsurgency Doctrine.

These are our cavemen. If GEICO were to make doctrine commercials, the slogan would have to be, "COIN; So difficult a caveman can't do it."

There is a saying that one good way to discredit a good idea is to execute it poorly, and as has been pointed out in two recent posts, we have an Officer Corps rife with those who wish to refuse the mission. These leaders will use all the right buzzwords and then proclaim the failure of a doctrine which is not really applied, but instead merely parroted. If the mounting momentum towards an actual integrated policy such as the one being developed by the Obama administration continues, we may yet see the ruthless weeding out of such officers from the ranks and the furtherance of a corps of leaders who have the mental and professional flexibility to actually practice what is being preached.

Hell, they may even start teaching COIN Doctrine to NCO's in their professional education, bringing the Backbone of the Army into play. Training your troops to execute the doctrine you need to win? What a concept.

Domestic policy will never be the subject of this blog. But it would be a kick in the head if President Obama, who was expected to be a domestic policy wonk and never a foreign policy success, actually brings success not only in Afghanistan but the region. The team he has assembled has advocated a plan to do this through the proper and synergistic use of the military and civilian power of the United States to achieve excellent results. The team he has assembled are, without a doubt, world class. There is room for optimism.

Journalism Update: WhereintheworldisNickMeo?

2009-04-23T10:50:00.002+04:30

This is what happens to you when you suck at combat journalism. I think this is funnier than covering dog shows.

Karma is a bitch, and she is pissed!

AFJ; Breakfast Of Champions: Part 2

2009-04-22T01:09:00.004+04:30

Previously an essay published in Armed Forces Journal by COL(R) Douglas MacGregor which advocated "refusing battle" was addressed in this space. There is a companion piece in the same issue which directly references MacGregor's essay, written by an active duty Army Major named Daniel L. Davis, entitled "The Afghan mistake, Why sending more troops won't work." MAJ Davis is currently serving as an military trainer in Iraq, and while it is unclear if he has any experience in Afghanistan, it appears that, while he waxes scholarly about Qawms and so on, he has no real experience in working with Afghans. This impression is reinforced by the fact that he refers to Afghans as their money, the Afghani, which is an amateurish mistake and does not bespeak Afghan experience. At the same time, he chides the United States for its lack of cultural understanding of the Afghans, which is kind of rich, given the above.

More after the jump

The main point of MAJ Davis' essay amounts to the "counter-terrorism strike theory" of containing threats emanating from this region. MAJ Davis declares al Qaeda to be in such a weakened state as to be incapable of causing any real harm to the United States interests or security and declares the Taliban to be absolutely harmless to American security. Davis invokes the specter of the indomitable Afghan who will draw together against any outsider and who will then set upon each other following such victory to squabble over the scarce resource spoils of Afghanistan. While ominous sounding, and backed by holding the defeated Soviet "counterinsurgency" up as an example, the analysis and recommendations are so disastrously flawed as to be irrelevant. This again begs the question of what is going on among the editorial staff at Armed Forces Journal. Of course, in the wake of the Obama administration's announcement of their policy for Afghanistan, it is irrelevant. One must wonder, though, if our Officer Corps is setting up the "I told you so." If this what is occurring, what is the commitment level of our officers in general to succeeding in this endeavor? If we are attempting a task with leadership who question the validity of the mission, what effect on that mission does this lack of commitment have?

Compelling evidence suggests that our previous troop increases have served only to increase the number of casualties we’ve suffered while witnessing a concurrent rise in enemy capability. MacGregor posits that military action ought to be avoided unless the probability of success outweighs the cost to achieve it, and even then only if our vital national interests have been sufficiently threatened. The main tenets of this concept, if applied properly, can provide a blueprint for an effective resolution to this complex and volatile war.

This evidence compels only when viewed through the particular lenses MAJ Davis has chosen to wear. When viewed through different lenses, it could compel one to agree with those many who have been on the ground in Afghanistan and decried the continual withdrawal into large, well-protected FOBs, and the resulting lack of security. Many who have served in Afghanistan and who "buy in" to the tenets of counterinsurgency have pointed out for several years that such "safety" is illusory. There is compelling evidence that as American forces withdrew into the large FOBs in Iraq, their casualties rose as they ceded the areas outside the Hescos to insurgent control. This tacit concession of the area "outside the wire" allowed insurgents to operate freely, to influence the population and to plant the most casualty-producing weapons at their disposal; the IED. We have done exactly the same thing in Afghanistan. Following Petraeus' pushing out from the FOBs, casualties spiked as the insurgents resisted losing their gains and then dropped sharply. By early summer of 2008, Afghanistan outstripped Iraq in American casualties. That is compelling evidence, too.

One other point about the paragraph cited above is that the Soviets did not perform counterinsurgency. Not in the least. The stories of Soviets who actually performed COIN are rare as hen's teeth. What the Soviets conducted was a brutal counter-guerrilla campaign. They did not appeal to any nascent government support. They did not try to win hearts and minds. They tried to stop hearts and destroy minds that they even thought supported the Mujaheddin. The Soviets razed and gassed villages wholesale. Destroyed villages still litter the countryside, mute evidence of the excesses of Soviet arms. There are no such villages slowly eroding in the Afghan sun evidencing such American displays of wanton destruction. Comparing the American experience in Afghanistan to the Soviet experience is a complete farce, and any officer who stretches that far shows no real understanding of a very simple difference.

MAJ Davis then publishes a time line which, while largely accurate in regards to timing events, slants the actual events. Again he refers to Soviet "counterinsurgency" and he also dismissively refers to a "small scale civil war" between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Again MAJ Davis demonstrates either willful slanting of events or an ignorance of events that disqualifies him from offering any advice for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan. The international recruiting and support for the Taliban by Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and al Qaeda was documented in the summer of 2001 (prior to 9/11) by a journalist/researcher who actually interviewed POWs held by the Northern Alliance recruited by, paid by, and armed by both of those groups in the 1990's. This included Arab prisoners who were part of an "Arab Brigade" funded by al Qaeda.

MAJ Davis argues for disengagement in Afghanistan by maneuver forces and a fallback position of providing aid, support, air power and advisers to the Afghans, who he predicts would then fail to hold their territory. He finds the failure of Afghanistan to be acceptable, echoing Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap.

If we redeploy the bulk of our military forces — even if we provide advisers, logistic, intelligence, air and other support — it is possible that the Afghan government might eventually prove unable to stand on its own and could collapse. Zeihan went so far as to suggest this is inevitable because, as he put it, “geographically speaking, Afghanistan is ungovernable. It is a recipe for a failed state.”

But the hard question must be asked: Would the collapse of the current government after the withdrawal of our main combat troops, however undesirable, be better or worse than increasing the number of American combat forces in Afghanistan and possibly keeping the government afloat — but at the cost of a continually strengthening Taliban and increasing the number of dead American soldiers and Afghan civilians?

Geographically speaking, then, West Virginia and about half of Colorado are ungovernable, too. We should withdraw any United States support for the governments of both of those states and hope that nothing bad happens. If it does, though, there is no real security threat to the rest of the country then. Perhaps Idaho should be lumped into this as well. This all amounts to, "It's too hard! Why do we have to do this? Can't we just quit and go home?"

Forget the essay. It's just ridiculous pseudo-reasoning to support another, deeper goal. It's the song of an overwhelmed warrior who can no longer see past his own desire to go home and stay there, who has lost his will. There is a deeper problem.

I've got a really hard question for the editors of AFJ, which is; why in the past six months have they not published a significant article which advocates anything remotely resembling the plan for Afghanistan that was adopted by the Obama administration? Say what you want about the administration; they have tied into the smartest people on these issues, like David Kilcullen, that can be found; warriors who actually have the mental bandwidth to see the hard job clearly and come up with an actual plan. The major essays that AFJ has published are geared towards the abandonment of either the mission or the doctrine/lessons that have been learned in the past eight years. MAJ Davis, and the other contributors that AFJ has selected for publication are irrelevant to actually solving the problems that face our military, instead advocating abandonment of missions with which they have been tasked and a resolute clinging to doctrines that they feel are threatened by the requirements of the current conflict. In other words, the publication which is geared towards informing discussion among the flag officers of this country is not being helpful at all, but instead ridiculously archaic and obtuse.

While men like Kilcullen can put together a plan, we depend on these other officers to execute it, and you can tell from their rhetoric that they just don't want to do it. Read what they write, and it becomes clear.

Why would our nation's "premier publication for flag officers" continually counsel cutting and running? Is this the state, overall, of our Officer Corps? Are these gentlemen so baffled as to how to accomplish the mission that they shout what amounts to defeatism in the name of security from their main mouthpiece? It's actually quite disturbing, but it points out a significant problem with our refusal to embrace the mission with the vigor that a military mission requires. This is the root of the "two Armies... the one that is downrange fighting and the one that is in garrison in the United States." It also is a strong indicator why we do not train COIN in NCOES.

The nation is not asking us to consider showing up for work while explaining why it's not such a hot idea, gentlemen. It's telling us that it needs a job to be done. When I see this publication looking for a pathway to success and not a path to retreat, I will start to feel as if we are on the right track.

AFJ; Breakfast Of Champions: Part 1

2009-04-21T07:08:00.002+04:30

This month's Armed Forces Journal, the journal of the American flag officer, published two articles that I cannot believe that they put between the covers of such a publication. The first of these is "Refusing battle, the alternative to persistent warfare" by COL(R) Douglas MacGregor. COL MacGregor argues that the United States, by failing to have a clearly defined purpose, method and end state when applying its military has bound itself to destroy the very society that this military was born to protect. This is not his only argument, but the one upon which the rest of his essay is based. The essay itself is incredibly flawed, which makes me question the editorial staff of AFJ.

More after the jump.

As alluded to in the title of the article, COL MacGregor advocates refusing battle as a grand strategy, pointing to the troubles that our military has had in the past few years in closing the deal; accomplishing the foreign policy goals of the civilian government. For this the Colonel blames the previous administration and the strategy itself, calling upon the current administration to set a new course of conflict avoidance that sounds so wonderful and peaceful that it's almost too utopian to resist. It makes one want to plant daisies and wear woven hemp sandals. It is also filled with flawed analogies, and the basic premise is in reality a call to the Obama administration to adopt Weinberger/Powell Doctrine as national policy. There are, as always, the simple questions. Which end of this dog wags the other? Does the military try to tell the civilian masters when it is appropriate to use military force? Who decides when to refuse battle? Is the answer to always refuse battle, no matter what the cost?

The Bush legacy in foreign and defense policy presents Obama with a stark choice: Will we continue to pursue global hegemony with the use of military power to control and shape development inside other societies? Or will we use our military power to maintain our market-oriented English-speaking republic, a republic that upholds the rule of law, respects the cultures and traditions of people different from ourselves, and trades freely with all nations, but protects its sovereignty, its commerce, its vital strategic interests and its citizens? This essay argues for the latter approach; a strategy of conflict avoidance designed to make the U.S. more secure without making the rest of the world less so.

In historically demonstrating his argument, COL MacGregor uses two inherently flawed analogies. In the first he likens our situation to that of General Lee when he found himself decisively engaged at Gettysburg. His argument is that Lee should have refused battle. Okay, tactically that would probably been a good thing for Lee to do. Question: How does this relate to modern man as we know him today? Answer: It does not. Lee was engaged in a war. If he refused battle that day, it would have been to accept it on ground of his own choosing or at least much more advantageous to him. Lee had invaded the North and was seeking to sever Washington from the nation that it was the capitol of; a thrust at the heart of the Union. He was seeking battle. While the Colonel makes a good point that Lee accepted battle at a poor time, how this relates to our current situation is not so clear.

His second analogy relates our current situation to the quandary the British found themselves in at the advent of WW-I. He argues that the British should have refused battle on the ground in Europe, being safe upon their island homeland from the end results of any terrestrial battles and possessing a mighty navy. This, he argues, would have maintained the standards of living of the British citizen and avoided the dissolution of the British Empire. Again, this analogy is miserably flawed and simplistic. It also fails to answer the question of what would have been Britain's future across the English Channel from a Europe learning to speak German. It also fails to recognize that while WW-I may have contributed to the end of the British Empire, there were many other factors that doomed imperialism in the 20th Century and that the avoidance of British entry into WW-I would not likely have staved them off as well.

It may have had an entirely ugly outcome for the British, and ourselves, but we shall never know, because there is no historical model, nor can anyone accurately predict what the world would look like now if the Germans had taken an abandoned France, Belgium and Holland and established a German Empire that spanned Europe in 1916. There is little doubt in my mind that Germany would have overwhelmed a solitary France, as even with massive British help all the two could manage together was a fragile stalemate on the Western Front.

Regardless, I found the analogy to be ridiculous. COL MacGregor also assumes that the British did not fully realize their predicament and had they had the sense of asking just one more question, they would have refused to participate and therefore would have salvaged not only their empire, but the riches of the Commonwealth. Oh, wait, they never would have needed a Commonwealth, as they would still be a global empire. Poppycock.

Britain fought a war that cost the British people their national power, their standard of living, and, in less than 20 years, their empire. Had anyone in London’s leadership stopped to seriously examine what outcome (end-state) it was they wanted to achieve with military power (purpose) and what military capabilities (method) were at their disposal to do so, it is doubtful they would have reached the decisions they did.

That is because, assuming Colonel MacGregor is calling this one correctly, the entire British cabinet was full of idiots. Had they seen how ludicrously simple it was to make that easy decision, they would clearly have agreed with the Colonel and saved their empire. For the lack of such pragmatic genius in that chamber, the empire was lost.

What the article boils down to is a massive excuse for the difficulty that the United States Military in general, and the Officer Corps in particular has had in taking responsibility for doing their jobs, which is to accomplish the goals set for them by their civilian masters, with the overwhelming support of the population, and to properly advise that leadership as to what the needs of the mission would be and the military doctrine necessary to accomplish it. The article is put forth as some kind of educational tool for the Obama administration to learn that either the military itself should be the determiner of when and where to use military force or that President Obama should learn how to determine where and when a short, sharp, decisive action can accomplish the foreign policy objectives of the United States. All other confrontations are to be assiduously avoided, and that should be the stated policy of the United States.

The lesson is a straightforward one: When national military strategy fails to answer the questions of purpose, method and end-state, military power becomes an engine of destruction not just for its intended enemies, but for its supporting society and economy, too. Regardless of how great or how small the military commitment, if the price of victory is potentially excessive, then the use of force should be avoided. After all, the object in conflict and crisis is the same as in wrestling: to throw the opponent by weakening his foothold and upsetting his balance without risking self-exhaustion.

In other words, "Dear Mr. President, please use military force only when it is easy and clearly defined. Please do not give us any hard jobs. You may never be sure when the leadership of your Armed Forces may not have the mental flexibility to learn how to accomplish your task, and so we will fail while blaming you for not using us properly. In fact, Sir, please don't use us unless our shores are directly threatened with an invasion by a classic nation-state peer competitor. For everything else, please threaten our enemies with assured nuclear destruction (or some other form of undefined "attack") and leave us to our peacetime garrisons, where we can tout our superiority without ever having to prove it. Thank you, your officers."

Once again, the specter of Vietnam is raised.

The Johnson administration’s decision to intervene with large-scale conventional forces in Vietnam rested on this delusion. Even worse, President Lyndon Johnson subscribed to the idea that whatever military action the American government initiated, it was inherently justified on moral grounds, even if, as in the case of Vietnam, the military action turned out badly for the U.S. Tragically, Johnson’s wish-based ideology made retreat from inflexible and irrational policy pronouncements impossible when they no longer made sense.

Later he adds this.

American military interventions have routinely violated this line of reasoning. In Vietnam, American military assistance failed for many reasons, chiefly because the Saigon government was thoroughly corrupt and indifferent to the security of its own people. All the military might at America’s disposal, whether the North Vietnamese military enjoyed sanctuaries in neighboring states or not, was never enough to rescue the incompetent South Vietnamese government from its eventual conquest by North Vietnamese communists.

Any time from here on out that a military officer raises the specter of Vietnam, he should be summarily slapped and given a timeout on a chair in the corner. I've got news for the Colonel; the military lost Vietnam as surely as the President or the American people did. It wasn't the Soldier's fault; he fought well and hard. It was the leadership's fault, because they never did learn how to fight a counterinsurgency, just as they are resisting it today. Vietnam failed because our military and our civilian leadership cannot wrap their minds around the concept that firepower is not the answer, and that propping up a corrupt regime without working to make it responsible and accountable to its own people will never work.

Oddly enough, the British brought Malaya out of a similar morass. The only ones who are bigger screw-ups against insurgents than us are the Russians. In several books, the United States in Vietnam is used as an example of how not to do counterinsurgency.

We are making similar mistakes now. The Officer Corps must take responsibility for not predicting that toppling the government in Iraq would result in anarchy and a power vacuum that would naturally end in civil war and insurgency. Our Officer Corps and our State Department must take responsibility for not projecting the power forward with the proper training to fill that vacuum instead of showing off our conventional prowess in the ultimate manifestation of the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, trying to keep it short and sharp, which fails to take into account such events. Instead they advocate choosing to "refuse battle," which is a wonderful idea until your president tells you to go and do a job. Our Officer Corps and our State Department must take responsibility for not understanding that one cannot just have an election and the most popular former warlord will somehow become a master administrator, flawlessly organizing a government devoid of the traditional graft and corruption that results from tossing a bunch of former mountain fighters into cabinet-level posts in a country bereft of any real infrastructure or institutional memory of good governance. Our Officer Corps must take responsibility for a culture which has failed to properly train Soldiers and leaders in counterinsurgency doctrine and the tactical practice of the types of actions on the ground that will have a positive effect on what COL MacGregor describes as an impossible situation. GEN Petraeus proved in Iraq that COL MacGregor is full of beans. MacGregor ignores this completely and resorts to Vietnam, the ultimate example of the obstinate refusal of American officers to adapt and learn; their continual attempts to apply conventional firepower without attempting to establish unconventional superiority. COL MacGregor functions from a position that these situations are impossible to resolve and therefore inappropriate as national objectives.

The fact is that COL MacGregor has no idea of whether or not the United States Military can accomplish the national objectives using the proper doctrine. MacGregor can cite examples from two past centuries as if they did not leave gaping holes in the analogy and sound quite learned, but that does not make them germane, nor does the underlying premise, making excuses, make them any more useful. In the meantime, adequately executed and adaptive counterinsurgency in Iraq has resulted in the possibility of a stable self-governing post-Saddam Iraq. Go figure. MacGregor does take a spirited poke at Petreaus's success later, though.

Today, America’s economic woes along with the larger world’s unrelenting drive for prosperity creates the need for new choices in national military strategy. The most important choice Obama must make is to reject future, unnecessary, large-scale, overt military interventions in favor of conflict avoidance; a strategy of refusing battle that advances democratic principles through shared prosperity — not unwanted military occupation.

Here is where COL MacGregor seems to recognize the influence of globalization, and he begins to speak of respecting other cultures like some kind of zen master.

As a declaratory goal of U.S. military strategy, conflict avoidance is not merely a restatement of deterrence or a new affirmation of collective security. It is a policy stance that stems from a decent regard for the interests of others, regardless of how strange and obtuse these interests may seem to Americans. It is an explicit recognition by Washington that no one in Asia, Africa, the Middle East or Latin America wants American troops to police and govern their country, even if American troops are more capable, more honest and provide better security than their own soldiers and police. The question for Americans is how to translate the goal of conflict avoidance into operational strategy: What will the U.S. do if it is not compelled to fight?

Conflict avoidance would appear to require action on several levels. First, conflict avoidance requires that America continue to maintain the military power to make a direct assault on U.S. and allied security interests unthinkable and then pursue peaceful relations with the peoples of the world, so the danger of war involving the world’s great military powers is reduced and contained.

What of terrorism? Still avoiding the subject of non-state actors, The Colonel speaks to terrorism.

This strategy does not change America’s policy stance on Islamist terrorism. The exportation of Islamist terrorism against the U.S. and its allies must remain a permanent red line in U.S. national military strategy. Governments that knowingly harbor terrorist groups must reckon with the very high probability that they will be subject to attack. However, long-term, large-scale American military occupations, even to ostensibly train indigenous forces to be mirror images of ourselves, are unwise and should be avoided.

So the solution is merely to attack your enemies, but more in a punitive expedition; or perhaps without any expedition.

America already has a surplus of military power for this stated purpose. American nuclear power is overwhelming, and any state or subnational group that contemplates the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. or its allies understands that nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in general have “return addresses” on them with ominous consequences for the user. American conventional military power is no less impressive when it is employed within an integrated, joint framework that exploits capabilities across service lines.

Oops, there it is. The "N" word. This is going to be as succinct as possible; to this writer, any national policy objective that includes the use of nuclear weapons is either a failed policy or a policy of failure. I've got another "N" word for the Colonel; NO. Weapons of mass destruction, on 9/11, included airliners. If someone tries to tell me that four rounds fired that resulted in over 3,000 casualties were not weapons of mass destruction, I'm going to stop listening because that individual is obviously cracked. So the response to that would have been to nuke Afghanistan.

No. Pretty simple; no. I'm sorry, Colonel, you're going to have to figure out how to do your job in unconventional war. I'm sorry that nuclear weapons are but two things; a deterrent to nuclear attack and a final suicidal vengeance weapon if the first goal fails. Conventional superiority? Sorry that it's not the Fulda Gap. Guess what? The Fulda Gap never happened. I'm sorry that it's not Desert Storm, but that didn't solve all of our problems, either. If men who held the rank of Colonel and above had figured out what would have been needed to do the job right from the start, it's very very possible that Iraq never would have become what it was, and that Afghanistan wouldn't be struggling now. This proposed policy is simplistic, overly reliant on overwhelming firepower, and maintains a dreamily wistful vision of classic military asskicking blended with a flower-petal dispensing foreign policy which would somehow placate the world and make it magically safer.

Second, conflict avoidance balances the need to make the U.S. secure against the danger of making the rest of the world less so. Instead of defining events around the world as tests of American military strength and national resolve, and rather than dissipating American military resources in remote places to pass these alleged tests, the U.S. should define its role in the world without feeling compelled to demonstrate its military power. Otherwise, the U.S. runs the risk that other states, not the U.S., will dictate America’s strategic agenda.

That sounds great, but as many times as I read it, the more it just doesn't say anything. It sounds like what my son's mother tried to tell him about dealing with a bully at school, which eventually had my son feeling personally powerless and trapped. When I gave him permission to stand up for himself, he did and, without having to actually perform violence, the bullying stopped and my son's "definition of his role in the world" took on a decidedly positive tone. The fact of the matter is that we are the biggest kid on the block, and as such we will be poked, taunted, and prodded from time to time. Because of our conventional superiority, that goading will most often take the form of sneaky, terrorist activity because nobody in their right mind is going to challenge us with a direct conventional threat. It's not other states that are going to set our strategic agenda, it's more likely to be non-state actors with capabilities to strike that used to be the exclusive domain of states capable of power projection. Huge hole in the analysis.

Third, when the U.S. confronts crises and conflicts, American armed forces should be committed on terms that favor the U.S. where the use of military power can achieve tangible strategic gains for the nation. As Churchill argued in 1909: “It would be very foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt. If we win the big battle in the decisive theater, we can put everything else straight afterwards. If we lose it, there will not be any afterwards.”

Well, it seems that the empire was threatened prior to WW-I. Yes, it would be nice if everything were clearly cut-and-dry. I would like to hear what a tangible strategic gain would be for this nation. Land? Natural resources? Would ensuring security be a tangible goal? Would it be appropriate for the civilian government to decide what a strategic goal for the United States would be? As the Colonel would argue otherwise, our sitting government in 2001 decided that there was a strategic goal in Afghanistan and in 2003 it decided that there was a strategic goal in Iraq. I really didn't think that the objectives set were all that ambiguous. I do think that they were not expeditiously achieved by those given the missions. They achieved, in each case, half of the mission, failing the rest.

America’s decision to garrison Iraq after its initial goals of removing Saddam and eliminating WMD were achieved added little, if anything, of strategic value to American security, but the presence of so many conventional American forces did present America’s enemies in the Muslim world with an opportunity they would have otherwise missed: the chance to directly attack U.S. forces, damage American military prestige and exhaust American economic resources while strengthening their own. By the beginning of 2008, the most serious unanticipated outcome of this exposure was a monthly bill of $12 billion to maintain U.S. forces in support of a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad that was and is effectively tied to Iran.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military has become a co-belligerent for the various factions and peoples — Kurds, Turks, Iranians, Saudi, Sunni or Shiite Arabs — struggling for power inside Iraq. These realities explain why the Bush administration was reluctant to remove large numbers of troops from Iraq. The current status quo is not merely fragile, it will not survive the withdrawal of U.S. military power.

He's right, you know. We should have turned around and left right after toppling Hussein. That would have been best. I'm sure it would have worked out much better. I'm sure that between the Iranians and al Qaeda making a power grab closer to their homeland, Iraq would have quickly stabilized.

No, the current status quo will not survive the abrupt withdrawal of military power. Here's a bell-ringer; what damaged American military prestige was sending conventional forces into a situation that was conventional for one month, followed by unconventional/asymmetric for years, and we never trained them for the unconventional. They developed coping mechanisms, and we helped them with that, but we to this day do not train our young Soldiers and leaders in COIN. That is a failure on the part of senior military leadership, not the civilian government that gave those officers their orders.

Arguing about the objectives that the civilian administration set is useless. Those objectives were set, and the Officer Corps went to work; planning, recommending, publishing orders and making coordination. The military leadership failed to possess a doctrine, and they failed to train for the contingency of having to deal with the end result of decapitating two nations. Now, one can argue ad-nauseum against those goals, but those are just excuses for not seeing it coming and pretending that the Weinberger or Powell doctrines would somehow save the military from another asymmetric challenge, having determined in their warrior hearts that they would never again have another Vietnam. It wasn't the President that harmed American military prestige; it was our military leaders. The results are manifest. It's not the job of senior officers to determine national military policy. It's their job to execute it. You don't choose the mission; the civilian government does. It's the military's job to get the job done, not tell the civilian government later that it's all their fault.

Although that tactic did work after losing Vietnam. What the hell... let's try it again!

In consideration of what to do next about Afghanistan’s rapidly deteriorating situation, current discussions in Washington are dominated by people who advocate increasing force levels and plunging these forces into Pakistan’s tribal areas. Yet a more sober analysis suggests the real problem with Afghanistan resides in Kabul, another corrupt and ineffective government unworthy of American military support.

"Unworthy of American military support?" Another slapping, another timeout. That "real problem" residing in Kabul didn't even exist when we went in there. We helped them set that up. We screwed that up just as surely as they did, and we helped to topple the Taliban regime for our purposes, not theirs, overwhelmingly supported by the American people. How arrogant to determine that they are unworthy of our support. Again, it's an excuse. It has been written many times on this page that the military isn't the best instrument for many of the tasks of nation-building, but this could have been done a ton better. It took us five years after entering Afghanistan to publish counterinsurgency doctrine, and over two years after that doctrine was published, there are still COIN horror stories being written in Afghanistan by field grade officers who should be experts in it and junior leaders who are completely untrained in the doctrine. In the meantime, we have senior leaders publishing essays in a magazine designed for our Generals and Admirals excusing such failures with trite advice for our civilian government about what they must do to prevent such challenges in the future? In what parallel universe does this make sense?

The key questions missing from discussions in Washington about Iraq or Afghanistan since 2001 include: Where is the legitimate government that asked for help from the U.S. in defeating the internal armed challenge to the government’s monopoly of control over the means of violence and political power? Legitimacy is not exclusively a function of elections. Legitimacy is also defined by a government’s competence to win and hold power in ways that benefit American and allied interests.

What part of we did it for our purposes, not theirs is unclear? There have been dissident groups inside and outside of Afghanistan asking for help for over a decade. Did we do this for them? Not just no but hell no. We did it for us. We did it because we were mad, and we did it because the longer we let the Taliban provide a happy home for al Qaeda, the less secure we were. We did it because a non-state actor capable of global power projection knocked down two of the largest structures in the world in the middle of one of our largest cities and punched a hole in the Pentagon, something that no state actor had ever been able to do, no matter how much they had wished they could. Conventional power projection in the form of 63 cruise missiles had done nothing more than anger al Qaeda and inspire them to show us what a cruise missile could really do. Our civilian government, overwhelmingly supported by the American people, decided that regime change was the order of the day. Everything past that has been a series of poor executions, not on the part of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, but of leaders who have not mastered the art that is their profession, because this particular application doesn't suit them.

Treating conflict avoidance as a declared strategic goal should give pause to those in Washington who think counterinsurgency is something American military forces should seek to conduct. For outside powers intervening in other peoples’ countries as we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan, so-called counterinsurgency has not been the success story presented to the American people. Making cash payments to buy cooperation from insurgent groups to conceal a failed policy of occupation is a temporary expedient to reduce U.S. casualties, not a permanent solution for stability.

American military forces do not seek to conduct counterinsurgency. As a matter of fact, we've got tons of military officers who absolutely want nothing to do with it. We still don't train properly for it, certainly not down to the Soldier-level, and we are still rank amateurs at its performance. On top of that, we've got senior officers writing about why we should never have done it in the first place. That's what I call a recipe for success. As Andrew Exum of Abu Muquwama has pointed out, no one who really understands COIN is an advocate of seeking opportunities to use it. The problem is that we are currently in a position where we need to do it, because the alternative sucks, and we are too busy making excuses for ourselves to do the job that has been handed us by our civilian government.

The choices the new president makes among various military missions will ultimately decide what national military strategy America’s military executes. Of the many missions he must consider, open-ended missions to install democracy at gunpoint inside failed or backward societies along with unrealistic security guarantees to states and peoples of marginal strategic interest to the U.S. are missions America’s military establishment cannot and should not be asked to perform.

Cannot. Well, it appears that question's been decided. This would be when it needs to be pointed out that the military establishment has not been asked to perform anything; it has been ordered to.

This essay is a shortsighted pseudo-intellectual protest against the responsibility of our leadership to figure it out and accomplish the foreign policy objectives of our nation. That includes training for the doctrine that is the only doctrine that makes sense when you are embroiled in a fight against an insurgency, which would be counterinsurgency, and getting the damned job done. The Colonel laments that his big three conditions on the use of military power, purpose, method and end-state, have been missing from the current conflicts. It is submitted that the military was in fact given these conditions, and has continuously failed to achieve them, causing the end-state to constantly have to be reevaluated, making it seem as if there were in fact no strategic goal expressed from the start. Even in Iraq, the goal of establishing a new government and leaving it in control of the country was pretty clear. The same goes for Afghanistan. Purpose and end state were there; method is up to the military leadership, and of all the big three, that has been the one most lacking. Like a child faced with a daunting task, we keep hearing, "Why? Why? Why?

What senior officers of the United States Military need to be encouraging our civilian leadership to do is to do their part in the counterinsurgency, to pony up the civilian development and governmental mentoring to assist in ridding the Afghan Government of corruption and get an actual economy started there. Instead, the premier journal of the American Flag Officer, Armed Forces Journal, publishes this attempted explanation of what the military is really for, giving excuses and setting forth the caveats of the "new military deal."

An Angel Calls, And I Obey

2009-04-21T04:20:00.002+04:30

An Angel whispered in my ear; I hear and I obey.

Okay, she twittered and I read it. So shoot me. Thank you LovLesmile.

Go here, take a look, and support Team ChuckZ.

Open Plea To Milbloggers

2009-04-21T03:14:00.002+04:30

There is a disturbing trend among milbloggers; they fade away. So many who have written during their deployments come home and eventually shut down their blogs. This groundswell of on-the-spot literature detailing the experiences of so many and giving unique insights into the minds of America's fighting few is as temporary as a Facebook profile or a Yahoo Personals ad. That's a loss, because we few, we happy few, we band of bloggers are writing history and then deleting it.

More after the jump.

Last year I was contacted by a graduate student in history who sought permission to archive my blog. I'm sure I was not the only one. A friend of mine, Susan, a PhD Professor of Journalism who is fascinated by the phenomenon of milblogging, lamented two things in a recent conversation. First, she lamented the fact that so many female milbloggers just go away, as they provide a unique insight into a war that females have shared the burden in like no other. Second was the fact that so many milbloggers cannot find what we decided to call a "post-deployment voice." I know I struggled with this, and a quick check of my archives after my return from the lumpy sandbox will show that struggle. Eventually, I found that voice. Many don't.

Susan also pointed out that there are dozens of Iraqi blogs that are maintained even if the principle author is killed. These are insurgent blogs, and at this rate their history will overshadow our own. Win the war, lose the history. Hey, it's happened before. It's not like there aren't, or won't be, any revisionists out there. Ask a holocaust survivor... if you can find one.

Troy, the author of Bouhammer, and I discussed this as well. He had the same trouble. We talked about the number of blogs out there, some quite popular while the author was in a theater of combat, who just faded away, eventually to remove their blog from the rolls of the blogosphere. Some had their own domains and I suppose that they just got tired of paying for them. Some just quit writing, but instead of leaving the blog up they deactivated it or deleted it.

Here is my plea: Don't delete your blog. Please don't delete your blog. Whether you realize it or not, whether you can find a post-deployment voice or not, whether or not you feel that you can share the experiences of being a veteran warrior returning to a country that seems to have forgotten or chooses to ignore, please don't delete your blog. You have written history, and someday there will be those who wish to know what you saw, how you felt, how the events such as the summits, the conferences, the elections, the official high level stuff that others will care to prognosticate, spin, alter and otherwise fold, spindle or mutilate affected you as an entity who wore one pair of boots at a time. Someday your story may affect someone's perception of how the big picture looked from your angle, and how your little picture fit into the big picture.

It's bigger than you. If you are paying for a domain and you wish to stop, get a blogspot address and import your old posts. Please. It's too easy.

Historians want to be the ones who unearth the next treasure trove of long-dormant letters from the front in a trunk from an old attic. We have done more documentation of this war from the ground level than in any other war. Except this war, which has been so well documented on electrons, is likely to be the least well-documented in posterity because electrons fade away or are deleted.

So, from one blogger to another (or thousands of others,) please keep your blog up on the net, even if you never write in it again.

Readers, if you have a favorite milblog that has disappeared, send in the name and old link to the blog. We're going to start a list of now-defunct blogs and perhaps we can prevail upon the authors to restore their blogs, if not their voices, to the blogosphere.

Sautalu Sar: A CT Success Story In Korengal

2009-04-19T23:46:00.004+04:30

Here's a story which rings bells straight out of Vietnam. Last week an ambush patrol executed by a platoon from 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry had great results. They absolutely kicked ass on a group of Taliban diddy-bopping along a trail on a mountain called Sautalu Sar in the Korengal Valley. Classic Infantry stuff. I felt a visceral Infantry reaction and a heartfelt, "Good job!" in my Infantry heart.

It was a night ambush, which we should probably be doing more of. This is a rare story of how Americans actually took back part of the night on the ground in Afghanistan, where we largely cede the night to the predations of the Taliban. That's how night letters get delivered as we sleep peacefully in our FOBs.

More, plus comments, after the jump

Now, the Korengal is not like the rest of Afghanistan. The Korengal is an anomaly, and a poor example of Afghanistan. It is a cauldron of botched engagement, fueled by years-old mistakes that alienated the locals more than any Taliban or Wahhabist influence even could. That's a longer story, one that has been told elsewhere. The Korengal is a guerrilla war in a hostile valley that the Afghan government has no sway over and may never. It is a superhighway of infiltration and the only home of Wahhabism in Afghanistan. It is the most dangerous place in Afghanistan to be an American, and our Soldiers there have taken it on the chin day after day for years in what is a holding action against the spread of the disease. It is also a magnet for bloodthirsty journalists who want the juicy combat story, the story of peril and loss and dark victories on a mountainside where small groups of men contend for momentary control of a mountain trail with their all.

The story of the Korengal is not the story of Afghanistan, just like the story of Over the Rhine is not the story of Cincinnati. The real story of Afghanistan is less and less likely to be told. CNN, who only just reestablished an office in Kabul, has apparently informed NATO that they have no interest in reporting on the soft power influence in Afghanistan, only on "direct-action" kinetic operations, telling NATO that it's what their "viewers demand."

Demand? Excuse me?

CNN, whose dedicated viewers are the least likely to be supportive of military "success" in any realm, much less Afghanistan, wants to portray only one small slice of the war in Afghanistan, and they caveat their coverage? Hey, I've got an idea; get the %&(# out of the country!

The real story of any success in Afghanistan isn't going to be an ambush on a mountainside in the Korengal, or a firefight along the highway in Logar or Wardak. The real story of any success in Afghanistan is going to be with the embedded trainers working in an ill-furnished office on an Afghan military camp, gently influencing their charge to abandon corruption. The real story is going to be civilian mentors helping to influence a economic development in a district with villages made of straw and mud. The real story is going to be Afghan National Police who start patrolling their villages at night, their presence keeping a night letter from being delivered and weakening the hold of terror on a few families.

The ambush on Sautalu Sar was great. It was excellent counter-terrorist work, and a brilliant small unit Infantry action. It is excellent work done by young men in the high-altitude night halfway around the world from home. It was well-planned, well-executed, highly professional work; and it was incredibly brave. This is wonderful news, and I hope that it will inspire line units around the country to begin to lie quietly in the dark and ambush the Taliban who roam around at night. I fear that it will also distract them from being the shield that the people need from the Taliban 24 hours a day. It is the Infantry love of our (perceived) greatest influence; firepower and sudden, unrelenting violence that often calls us away from the quiet work of counterinsurgency to actively hunt when we should be passively protecting.

The story of Sautalu Sar is a double-edged sword in that way. It is something that we should do, but it is not all that we should do. As I have commented over at Abu Muquwama, a huge part of our problem, the basis of our failures in my opinion, has been our failure to actually perform the gritty, unglamorous work of counterinsurgency, preferring to be the hunter instead of the hunted as is so often required of the counterinsurgent who is doing what he must. This is, in my opinion, the root of the mistake we make with our firepower. Our priority is all too often to kill instead of to protect.

When the chips are down, your priorities come through. When the priority is to kill the bad guy instead of merely separating him from the people, then the application of massive force, the sledgehammer to kill the fly, becomes a natural extension of that priority. If the priority had been to protect the populace and everything possible had been done to prevent the loss of innocent lives, that would be evident. Make no mistake; this is a war, and in war people die. No doubt. There will be civilian casualties as the result of coalition actions, but they must be as rare as possible and then must be admitted to instantly and without any purpose of evasion. When our true priority becomes protecting the populace, separating the insurgent from his ability to influence the villager, then the insurgent will be forced to exert more and more force to demonstrate that the coalition cannot protect that civilian. Then nearly all, not just most, civilian deaths will be the result of Taliban actions, and that's when public opinion will begin to swing strongly in the direction of the Afghan Government, NATO, and the United States.

That being said, a JDAM on a confirmed Taliban patrol on a mountainside, with weapons confirmed by American eyes on the ground, is a wonderful thing. Bombing a wedding party on the word of an "informant" without any eyes-on observation is not an example of this. The Taliban will lie and try to portray their losses as innocent civilians, but it will be a lot harder to prove when they cannot come up with fragments of civilians to present as evidence.

Sautalu Sar is a great kinetic story, all too rare in Afghanistan. I just hope that we don't take from it the wrong message.

Tribute Video

2009-04-16T01:48:00.001+04:30

The publicist for this asked nicely, and it's a very nice tribute with a great story behind it, so here it is:

An Angel With A Devious Plot

2009-04-15T06:23:00.002+04:30

... to do something really nice. Take a look, click a link, help an Angel with an original idea do something nice for "her" troop.

From Lizette Alvarez To Homeland Security

2009-04-14T23:21:00.006+04:30

H/T to Troy at Bouhammer, who has a bit on this and LT Nixon, who has one himself.

I wrote a post in January of 2007 with the title, "I Knew It Was Coming." What I knew was coming was the Vietnam backlash against veterans. While the country "learned its lessons" from Vietnam, one of which being, "Even if you don't support the war, support the troops," there has always been an element that doesn't support the troops. That faction is increasing in boldness. That's why I have objected to the objectification of veterans, sometimes subtly, sometimes not so subtly as in the case of Alvarez. It is a slippery slope that once trod can easily slide into the very same problems that Vietnam veterans have been subjected to.

It's well underway.

More, plus some good comments, after the jump.

It's funny that in the United States, particular problems that are most often manifested among a particular demographic cannot be directly referred to as such. It's just not politically correct. We have a lot of sensitivity to issues that occur mainly among minorities, or among lifestyle groups. We don't wish to offend, and we go to great lengths to avoid stating obvious relationships between cause and effect for the sake of the feelings or sensibilities of a particular group, be it racial or lifestyle oriented. In the beginning of this war, it was not cool to go after veterans or military members, but that has been inexorably changing.

Phase I starts with stories told by reporters like Alvarez, objectifying veterans of this country's wars as either victims or as potentially dangerous near-criminals. The ultimate expression of such objectification has been demonstrated in the publication of an "Intelligence and Analysis Assessment" by the Department of Homeland Security or "Geheimstaats Polizei" dated April 7th, 2009, which labels veterans as potentially dangerous to homeland security. This is Phase II.

(U//FOUO) The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.

Holy freakin' cow. Now there is a government agency, nay; a department, that publishes the words, "the return of military veterans... could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks." Lizette Alvarez must be jumping up and down with self-righteous justification.

This Soldier gasps in disbelief, shakes his head and sadly looks towards Washington in utter dismay. I saw it coming, and I've spoken against it. I've called the warning and pointed... and there is no stopping the slide towards a great evil which has now taken hold to the point of poisoning the relationship of my government and my brothers in arms. We are now, "them." We are now that minority. We are the Jews of 1930's Germany. We are McCarthy's Communists. We are the ones who are being moved to the back of the bus and who are losing our seats at the national lunch counter. Our honor is slipping away as we become the new insidious threat.

Our own government has declared us suspect.

(U//FOUO) Returning veterans possess combat skills and experience that are attractive to rightwing extremists. DHS/I&A is concerned that rightwing extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to boost their violent capabilities.

Uh-huh. We also possess combat skills and experience that should be attractive to both DHS and law enforcement of all levels. I don't see that noted anywhere. I don't see a recommendation for harnessing the abilities of veterans to somehow be of use, or a recommendation to reach out to veterans to brief them on the existence of such recruiting efforts, if they exist. There does not seem to be any substantial evidence of such recruiting, merely the conjecture that our dangerous abilities and tendencies would be attractive to such groups.

There is the unspoken; veterans may have a tendency to be politically opposed to the current administration. Veterans may have had a tendency to have voted for the other guy. So, without any evidence of a groundswell in returning veterans joining such "rightwing" organizations or practicing or preparing to practice any "rightwing extremism," we are identified as being potential threats. We, who answered the call to defend our country, are now to be carefully watched. We, who have fought in the "War on Terror" are, without any evidence whatsoever, potentially violent terrorists ourselves?

The faction who in the early days of this war found themselves having to mute their cries against the warriors themselves is finding its voice, and with the lack of social backlash began to raise its voice from a low murmur to a conversational tone. That faction does tend to reside on the left end of the spectrum, and the left has taken power in the last election, bringing all causes on the left a new feeling of empowerment. In the first 60 days of the new administration the President of the United States, who insisted that he was stronger on veterans' issues than his opponent, himself brought forth a policy to cause veterans with service-related wounds and injuries to have to pay for medical care for such injuries from their private insurance.

It does not matter that he had to back away from this policy. It does not matter that it became less than politically expedient to continue through to implementation and, for now, the policy had to be abandoned. It matters that it was raised in the first place. It does not matter that a candidate speaks of "sacred trust." It matters what he tries to do once in power. Deeds, not words, are what show the real spirit and the real intent.

Now, under a new Secretary of Homeland Security, there is an "Intelligence and Analysis Assessment" that paints veterans, not as a casual aside but prominently among their main points, as a potential threat to domestic tranquility.

This is not a political blog. This is a military blog. This is an Afghanistan military blog. I try to stay in my lane, but when my brothers and sisters and I are being assaulted, I will not stay silent. This is not just a blog about Afghanistan and the military. It is written by a combat veteran of Afghanistan and a believer that we can make a positive difference in the world with what we do. I believe that we can make ourselves more secure by doing the right things on the opposite side of the world, and that sometimes that means going in harm's way. I believe that when you go in harm's way, sometimes you are harmed, and sometimes you have to harm in return. I believe that is regrettable, but that when it is necessary it should be done with focus, restraint, and with surgical violence at the personal level. I believe that there is a time and a place for such violence and that on our shores is not that time or place. I am finding myself being abandoned by my country in small but growing ways and I don't like it, because I have borne true allegiance to this country and do not deserve, nor do my compatriots, to be treated as a dog who has bitten a child would be.

The President of the United States, during his campaign, spoke of a "sacred trust." He has since made an action that I consider to be in direct contravention of that trust, and now a department of his administration has declared us, veterans, as a group, to be a potential danger. Now is the time for the President to renew his commitment to the sacred trust that he spoke of, because he sets the tone. He sets the tone for his administration and he sets the tone for all of those who feel that growing sense of empowerment to speak against this nation's veterans in derisive or objectifying language.

Being the first president to duck the Medal of Honor recipients on the day of his inauguration is not the way to set the tone. Being the first president to call for wounded veterans to pay for battle-related wounds from their private insurance is not the way to do it, either. Being the president who allows a department of his administration to label veterans as one of the likely suspects, without any evidence, in future domestic terrorism, is not the way to set this tone.

As a candidate, Barack Obama spoke of leadership and its importance. Now is the time for this President to be the President and set the tone for his administration relating to veterans issues. I'm a little worried at this point that this is not the president that the President cares to be.

I hope he proves my concerns to be unfounded. One way to do that would be to ruthlessly go after the unprofessional staff who published a report declaring, without evidence and based on nothing more than conjecture, that veterans are some kind of threat to this nation that we have but our lives on the line for.

I'll wrap this up with a quote from the cover of the report:

Federal efforts to influence domestic public opinion must be conducted in an overt and transparent manner, clearly identifying United States Government sponsorship.

Propaganda needs to be done clearly and in the government's name... isn't that what that means? I notice that the word "responsibly" is not to be found there.

It Is Time To Call Or Write Your Congressman

2009-04-07T06:10:00.002+04:30

Something ugly is going on in Afghanistan. I don't know who the perpetrator is, but that's up to your Congressman to find out. Here's what I can tell you; at FOB Gardez and Camp Phoenix (and I'm checking to see if this has happened elsewhere as well) there used to be MWR internet facilities, complete with computers for the Soldiers to use. "Permanent" residents of the FOB could buy monthly internet access for a fee from a private provider, usually a bunch of Indians with a satellite dish. The fee varied, and while it was high, it just got higher.

It just got insane.

Now our Soldiers and Marines can buy internet by the hour, costing as much as $200 per month for pathetic speed. That is patently ridiculous! As I wrote when I was in country, my priorities for being a happy camper included internet in the top three. Most Soldiers don't send snail mail because you haven't seen a snail in your life as slow as mail to and from Afghanistan. We are the digital generation and we stay connected via electrons.

Will I pay $200/month to stay connected? Yes, I will. Will the private who makes a lot less pay it? Yes, he probably will.

This is a particular problem at Camp Phoenix, which each and every ETT/PMT has to process through on their way in and out of the country. Phoenix used to have an entire building full of phones and one that had internet computers and laptop drops in it. Now that building is full of phones. These "transients" who are trying to stay in touch with their families while they are coming into a new country, or whose families are trying to track their progress towards home, are now officially screwed.

What the hell, people?

First, the guy who made that decision was undoubtedly a Lieutenant Colonel or higher. Why he made that call is beyond me, but I can guarantee that he had no realistic idea, nor apparently did he care, how that type of expense impacted a young man with a family back home which he tried to stay in touch with via email and video chat. LTC's have jobs that provide internet-enabled computers, anyway, so what does he care? Doesn't affect him.

I cannot explain to you how much higher morale is when you can log on and get your email. I cannot explain to you how much more sustainable life is when you can log on the internet and see your child on the screen. Everyone wants to talk about the stress of deployment, but here is a morale killer and someone needs to look into it.

Someone is making a shitload of money from our deployed Soldiers, and those whose responsibility it is to safeguard those Soldiers and Marines are not only leaving them to the predations of crappy, overpriced service, but they actually had to change the existing system to do it! Now that the MWR rooms are gone, if those young men and women don't have a laptop, their access to this morale-saving technology is gone; or they can spend money that they weren't otherwise obligated to spend in order to buy a laptop and pay out the boowah for horrid service.

You want to take care of Soldiers? Provide free internet.

No, this the way that we take care of our deployed troops. We rape them for every dime we can so that they don't lose their freaking minds in a foreign country. Someone is making a lot of money on this, and it's on Joe's back.

Please get your Congressman interested in this. It's things like this that don't get solved when people are living by the "what happens in Afghanistan, stays in Afghanistan" moral code unless a Congressman starts asking what the hell they are thinking of.

A Comment On Bouhammer

2009-04-06T22:23:00.005+04:30

Just to be clear; this is only nominally about Bill Maher. Really, Maher is just a symptom. His "joke" about military rapists was ill-advised, but sometimes a guy hits a clunker. I still call foul, but whatever; it's not the end of the world. Like I said, it's a symptom of a series of issues that are all tied together, a few of which are brought together in this comment left on Bouhammer.com, which Troy Steward, the blogauthor over at Bouhammer, has kindly allowed me to use for the purpose of response.

Get some popcorn, there's more after the jump.

Here is the original comment:

Richard, on April 3rd, 2009 at 11:27 am
What is up with the attitude? Mayer is funny. There have been rapes in Okinawa. You didn’t do it. I didn’t do it. So, why all the hostility? Oh, yeah, I ams one non-Republican who has: Lobbied to get you better armor, rations and housing, better bebefits from the VA. I’ve spent time and money escorting OUR fallen to their graves, willing to spend a night in jail if it meant OUR guys would get buried without looney fruitcase demonstrators harrassing the survivors.

After having been through one circle jerking rattfuck on behalf of our nation, I’m not at all suprised you have to wear these goofy belts while on patrol. But, just for morale purposes, let me share a scripture with you; Hebrews 13:8

Jesus Christ, the same yesteday, today, and forever.

They say insanity is doing the same thing over and over, and expecting a different result. Take that with a grain of salt. We learned something, about politics and fighting, in our generation. It means, to me, if you’re gonna go, go hard. This fucking around politically, occupying and policing, is not an Armed Forces job. So it’s an automatic cluster fuck when they make you try. Vampire’s got it right, but he’s farting upwind, you wait and see.

We need about 40,000 green berets looking for one criminal, Ozzie B., and the rest can sort itself out. The food and firewood options should be NGOs jobs. Military should be ‘high cover’. There, available, and mostly invisible.

Sorry to grind on ya, but it sure seemed we would have learned COIN by now. I’m not a liberal, but I sure ain’t a Repugnut. I’d rather you (as in, ALL of you) were home. It tears my guts to bury kids again, and I don’t want one life uselessly spent. Having said all that, YOU are the guy in-country, so you get the edge.

Thanks for listening

Richard

Richard, thank you for your service and for escorting the remains of America's fallen, I assume as a Patriot Guard Rider. I deeply appreciate the Patriot Guard Riders. Thanks for your lobbying efforts as well. Thanks also for this comment on Bouhammer's blog, because it got me going.

Let's take this a step at a time; first, Maher is officially no longer funny. Maher is at best generally funny. Funny in the sense you used it is a state of being, and with this Maher is not existing in a state of being funny. He is at best generally funny, but he is not funny. Depending on your taste, he is usually, sometimes, or rarely funny, but he is not funny.

Why the hostility? Because someone has to say it, and tens of thousands of deployed servicemembers lack either the time, the bandwidth, the words or the platform to speak up against being called a bunch of rapists. Indeed, there have been rapes on Okinawa. Again, I would point out that while such events are exceedingly bad for international relations, a foreign national is less likely to be raped by a young Soldier or Marine than an American woman is to be raped by a non-military male in any American city with a comparable population of males in the same demographic groups.

You will never find a more professional group of young men than the 18-26 year olds in the military. You may find individual civilians who you may hold up with a spotlight on them, but I defy you to find a group of civilians of similar ages who routinely take the lives of others in their hands the way these people do and deliver the results that they do.

There is not an American company who can claim anyplace near the success rate in training and dedication that the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines routinely deliver. There is not a similar group of young men in this country who have a lower overall crime rate. The best young men and women that this nation has to offer are in the Armed Forces of the United States; they are a credit not only to the organizations that they serve but to themselves and their families as well. Just to stay focused; I am not speaking of older professionals, nor am I speaking of senior NCO's or officers. I am speaking strictly about our young Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors. I by no means claim personal superiority to any civilian professional. This is not about me nor meant to degrade anyone. It is in response to a degrading comment, and to those who find it "funny." I have never in my life seen, as a group, a more professional bunch of young people.

If Chevrolet and their union could consistently produce the level of professionalism that our young servicemembers display, there would be no need for a bailout. If the banks displayed the same level of selfless service as these young men and women, there would be no need for a bailout. If Wall Street displayed the same knowledge of right and wrong as these young Americans, there would be no need for a bailout. An Army PFC could figure out that being given money by the government to do a job doesn't mean, "give yourself a bonus."

Trust me, Bill and Richard, if America could produce more like the young men who have volunteered to stand on that line between you and bad things and people and who represent these United States in an overwhelmingly exemplary fashion in foreign lands both friendly and hostile, this country would be a better place. Calling them, as a group, "rapists" is not funny, and neither is Bill Maher.

That being said, let's look at the rest of the comment. As an aside, we do not have to wear the belts on patrol. They are worn on the FOBs, and as such are a symbol of the disconnect between the inside and outside of "the wire." No one who spends a fair amount of time outside the wire can put one on without feeling silly, nor can they believe that there are "reflective belt nazis" on the FOBs, but there are. We don't wear them outside the wire, as that is just plain silly.

They say insanity is doing the same thing over and over, and expecting a different result.

Insanity is the inability or refusal to perceive, accept and abide in reality (the truth.) Doing the same thing over and over again is merely a symptom, displaying the inability to understand or accept reality. In order to deal with the insanity, you have to recognize where it came from.

We learned something, about politics and fighting, in our generation. It means, to me, if you’re gonna go, go hard. This fucking around politically, occupying and policing, is not an Armed Forces job. So it’s an automatic cluster fuck when they make you try. Vampire’s got it right, but he’s farting upwind, you wait and see.

We need about 40,000 green berets looking for one criminal, Ozzie B., and the rest can sort itself out. The food and firewood options should be NGOs jobs. Military should be ‘high cover’. There, available, and mostly invisible.

I'm a half-step behind you generationally. My brother served in Vietnam, and I witnessed it. For most of my career, I bought the meme that the military didn't lose that war, that the American people lost their will and the political machinery lost it. Here is what I have learned; the military did lose the Vietnam War. We never did learn the lessons of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Now, let's stay focused; the American Soldier did not lose that war, but his leadership to the highest levels did. Soldiers were not trained in counterinsurgency, but they did the best that they could and fought very hard. They paid the price and they handed it back many fold. There was no lack of bravery, of sacrifice or of personal purpose. There was a huge failure in leadership. We teeter on that brink right now, but we are tipping in the right direction.

Your recipe for counter-terrorism would fail just as surely as the American Military failed in Vietnam, Richard. It is anger and firepower-driven and while it sounds at first take like it's just common sense, it as far from a successful strategy as one can get. Unfortunately, it still has adherents in the military.

Getting rid of "Ozzie B" is just getting rid of a poster child. It's like saying that getting rid of Gordon Brown will make all of the Brits just go away.

Invisible military forces would be really handy in making the Afghan people feel secure enough to make decisions that aren't driven by the need to avoid being a victim of the Taliban need to make an example of them for daring to make a decision of their own; like, say, the decision to let their little girls go to school that day. No, Richard, having 40,000 Special Forces running around would involve, first, training a bunch of new Special Forces. Secondly, it would just tie up 40,000 Green Berets doing things that wouldn't help solve the long term problem. Do you know how many Afghan National Army units we could train with 40,000 SF?

Here's an automatic Charlie Fox, Richard; do a job that you aren't trained for. Just as you weren't trained for COIN, even if they told you that you were doing it, neither are our young Soldiers. The Marines do a little better than the Army. Our young Sergeants are not trained in it, either. The only ones who have any understanding of it are generally officers, with varying levels of understanding, and Senior NCO's who take it upon themselves to read and study it on their own and see the applicability of it on the ground. Vampire 6 does have it right... but it's not because he was put through a stellar course on COIN. He has it right because he has read the books and because when he looks at his situation on the ground what he has read comes to life. He truly is farting upwind, but if enough of us fart upwind, perhaps the wind will change. Nobody's ever really tried that.

Ideally, Richard, NGO's and AGO's (Afghan Government Organizations) are the ones who should be doing the food and firewood deal. It's men like Vampire 6 who are doing the best that they can do with what they have, and they do what needs to be done when nobody else can or will. That's COIN on a shoestring, and men like Vampire 6 are why we haven't failed abjectly. If we had more of them, we'd be more successful. Vampire 6 hasn't won any fans in his Chain of Command, Richard. His criticisms are undoubtedly on-target. Guys like me get excited to read them because we have seen the same things. He has had the ability to apply his personal readings of COIN to his experience on the ground and he has had the moral courage to point out where we are our own worst enemies.

Richard, we do not need "high cover." What we need is "ground cover." If the Taliban can't openly walk around in the villages, and at night they can't skulk around dropping off their intimidating notes and threats called "night letters," then the people of Afghanistan will begin to take breaths of air that smell vaguely of freedom from intimidation. Men like Vampire 6 understand this, and when men like you see it and lobby not just for body armor but for accountability and basing the "success" and career progression of military leaders on the results that matter on the ground, then you will be even more helpful.

If this you feel like I've torn into you, Richard, please don't. You have raised some of the issues that I directly wanted to discuss, and for that I thank you. I understand that some of what you said was meant quite a bit less seriously than I seemed to take it, but these are things that I take very seriously.

Not Just A Popularity Contest

2009-04-03T09:58:00.004+04:30

Go on over to Blackfive and add a comment for your favorite "unknown" blog. This isn't like the milbloggies... they are trying to recognize the little guys.

Vampire 6 is doing really well in the nominations. Great blog, great counterinsurgent, great American. I can go with that.

What Would You Expect?

2009-04-02T22:11:00.001+04:30

The latest news is that the Taliban have referred to as, "Lunatic" the latest overture to reconcile with "moderate" Taliban. Our old buddy Zabiullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman-ever-at-an-undisclosed-location released the latest critical evaluation of the plan to offer reconciliation to "moderate" Taliban.

What would you expect the "official" Taliban position on this to be? Would anyone expect them to hold referendums at their union meetings on who wanted to reconcile? More like the first one who brings it up will get a knife to the throat for his visit from the good idea fairy.

More after the jump...

Now, the reasonable question to ask is, "Just what the hell is a moderate Taliban?" Remember, not all insurgents are deeply committed Taliban. One thing we noted was that a lot of criminal elements with business interests to protect sided with the Taliban and used the brand name to strike terror and cloak themselves in religious legitimacy while still pursuing their criminal enterprises. Others are simply unemployed or underemployed men who hope to someday pay a dowry. In a society with not much dating action, coming up with a bride price weighs heavily on a young man's mind.

Also, as has been pointed out elsewhere, the Taliban are not going to feel any need to reconcile while they perceive themselves to be "winning." While they are "winning," those less than idealistically pure are not only "employed," they are also securing their future with the next regime. If, and only if, the Coalition and the Afghan Government start to make significant progress, then the veneer will begin to crack.

It is good counterinsurgent strategy to leave the door open to reconciliation. My M-9 pistol carried a 14-1 magazine. Fourteen rounds were for them and one was for me. Surrender was not an option. In the circumstances in which teams like mine operated, getting overwhelmed by a superior force was not hard to imagine. What if my Afghans broke and ran? What if I was wounded and overtaken? One round. As long as I had that one round, I would not be a propaganda tool, beheaded on video for the world to watch on the internet, for I knew that death was the only end result. My ANP may have fared better, but it was hard to tell. They weren't inclined to give up, either, but for them there was some hope of survival.

I discuss this only to demonstrate that the promise of decent treatment can be an inducement, to someone who is under terrifying pressure, to consider another way out of the pickle in which they find themselves.

If security begins to spread, some of the roughly 80 percent of the populace who don't want the Taliban in charge will start talking and Taliban and criminals will start to get arrested. That is when the continued calls for reconciliation will start to make some start to think.

Galula pointed out that offering a path to reconciliation is important. It only works when the insurgent is struggling, however. When the government is losing, it just looks desperate. This is the correct policy, but it's not going to have any effect until the government begins taking back some areas. Galula pointed out, also, that committed insurgents only only negotiate when it is their best interests, one of those times being when they feel they are on the verge of victory, only to lull and distract their enemies with a false sense of hope or to convince the government to fatally weaken itself. I think that this is what the Taliban were doing at the meetings last year, trying to get the Coalition to leave so that the government could be more easily overwhelmed.

But Zabiullah Mujahid is not going to change his song. Taliban "rejection" of reconciliation is not news. It's just exactly what you would expect them to do. If that song does change, we are most likely in trouble.

Vampire T-shirt Update

2009-04-02T18:40:00.001+04:30

For those of you who ordered Vampire t-shirts and are wondering if you are ever going to get them, there is news. First of all, rest assured that you did a good thing in three ways... you are supporting Soldiers' Angels, whom I dearly love, you are helping a group of hard-working and entrepreneurial former Marines get their little business off the ground and you are showing support for the great Vampire 6 and his merry band of Vampirelings. Good stuff.

Very good stuff, in fact... so good that Vision Strikewear, the little bunch of Marines-turned-t-shirt-printers, is literally overwhelmed and running behind significantly on filling the orders. This is a good thing.

So, thanks to everyone who bought a shrt or two, and please be patient.

At Some Point, Bill Maher Is Going To Have To Learn To **** Himself

2009-03-31T09:39:00.002+04:30

The latest exercise in jackassery focused against the US Armed Forces, Bill Maher submits this for your approval:

Bill can be entertaining to watch, because he's made an art form out of the same sardonic wit he developed on the playground as a child. Being neither particularly athletic nor obviously popular for bringing anything to the party that the popular kids usually bring, he found another route. Being fairly bright, he found that witty sarcasm could win points in many contests. He probably earned himself a few ass-whoopings, but more than likely not too many. His tongue was his weapon. If your kid ever came home near tears because of some kid with a propensity for verbal bullying, your kid ran into a budding Bill Maher.

Picture him as a kid on the playground running his mouth... not too hard, is it? Little roundish kid with a mop of hair, a prominent nose and a smart mouth. He's made quite a living out that; because as adults we're entertained, just as kids are, by seeing someone else sardonically abused. Bill making a living as an ass doesn't bother me until he points his shitty little mouth at people who serve this country in a time of war.

You know what, Bill? Let's compare rape rates with American cities with similar populations of males, why don't we? Would you like to do that? No, because that won't be funny. Because small cities in every state will come up with higher rape rates than a similar population of Marines on Okinawa or Soldiers in Germany. Then your joke won't make any sense.

Bill, I think that now would be a good time to learn to **** yourself. Somehow, I don't think you're going to need lessons.

The New Plan

2009-03-27T20:36:00.004+04:30

Just a little while ago, President Obama revealed his new plan, in broad strokes, for Afghanistan. All in all, the plan makes sense. I do not see an abandonment of Afghanistan's development in favor of counter-terrorist activities, rather a realization that without a lasting framework, the region will have no other result but to slide back into chaos and a home for international terrorism.

This recognition that the future of stability in Central Asia is tied to our own national security interests is welcome. Many have argued, including an Air Force Major General, that a "loss" in Afghanistan would not seriously damage U.S. interests or security. Obama's statement has refuted that in at least the sitting administration's opinion. That's a good thing.

Michael Yon has already expressed disappointment. He feels that the increased troop levels aren't enough, and that the administration will have to make announcements of further increases in the future. That may be so; however, it's a good start, and it's not the best news.

The best news is twofold; first there is finally an acknowledgment, officially, of the role of good governance and corruption in the stability of Afghanistan. Secondly, there is the commitment, finally, to fully man the advisor effort in Afghanistan. These two critical pieces are so key in any potential strategy for success in Afghanistan that it cannot be stressed enough.

Pakistan is dealt with as sensibly as possible, and the engagement of the other Central Asian states is a new strategy that cannot do harm and may help in many ways.

Overall, this is a step in the right direction. Personally, I hope to play a part in it.

A deeper and ongoing look will undoubtedly follow, but that's my first take on it.

~Blue

Some Gravy For Your Bishkeks?

2009-03-26T23:55:00.004+04:30

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexei Borodavkin, stated in an interview with Interfax that Russia will not be sending troops to Afghanistan. I didn't even know that this concept was in play, and I'm certainly relieved (as are 30 million Afghans who still haven't quite gotten over the last Russian intervention in Afghanistan) at the Russian announcement.

I do wonder if anyone had asked them for their help.

Borodavkin went on to speak about how ISAF was helping to provide regional stability surrounding Russia's southern border, which I found odd in light of their incursion into Georgia to send a message to any breakaway republics who may consider applying for NATO membership.

More after the jump

Talking about the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Borodavkin said that, "in the current conditions, these troops in fact remain a force curbing the terrorist threat."

"Their presence at this moment meets both interests of Afghanistan itself, as well as regional and in a wider context international security. Proceeding from this understanding, Russia intends to continue to provide political support to the international forces stationed in Afghanistan under a UN Security Council resolution," he said.

Peace and stability in Afghanistan meet long-term interests of both Russia and the NATO member-states, which make up a majority at the ISAF, he said.

"And vice versa, a failure of the ISAF's operation in Afghanistan and a buildup of the conflict potential near our southern borders would pose a threat to the interests of Russia's national security. This is exactly why we welcome interaction on Afghan affairs within the Russia-NATO Council format," he said.

While acknowledging some benefit to Russia from NATO's presence in Afghanistan, Mr. Borodavkin found it necessary to scold ISAF for civilian casualties.

Moscow views as unacceptable "indiscriminate actions by foreign military contingents inflicting damage on the civilian population," Borodavkin said also.

"Such excesses should be avoided in the future," he said.

Wow, those are strong words coming from a country known for flattening villages suspected of harboring Mujaheddin. Someone should sit this guy down for a viewing of The Beast, the most socially responsible movie ever made by a Baldwin. After that we can have a round table discussion about the responsible use of chemical weapons in a counterinsurgency, followed by a request for another announcement of what Moscow views as unacceptable.

It's not like we shouldn't be more careful in the future, but to hear it from a Russian is like being called a racist by a Klansman.

"As for our possible assistance in the formation of the Afghan Armed Forces, we might consider such requests from the Afghan government," Borodavkin said.. "

And Russian military anything being asked into the country by Afghans will be immediately preceded by the White House proclaiming it "National Hug a Klansman Day." Much of what we found wrong with the ANSF had to do with their Russian training and habits. The Afghans need more Russian "assistance" like they need a bigger opium crop. Speaking of which...

As for international cooperation on Afghanistan, there is a need to coordinate efforts in fighting against drug trafficking, he said.

"It would be useful for NATO to coordinate its efforts in Afghanistan with the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] in combating drug trafficking along the perimeter of its northern borders," the Russian diplomat said.

"[Drug trafficking] is one of the major Afghan problems, which spills out far beyond its borders, and ignoring it would be short-sighted, to say the least," he said.

"In our view, international military forces must be more active in fighting against drug criminals," Borodavkin said.

Well, if anyone were sure that the Russians wouldn't feed that information directly to the drug cartels, I'm sure that we could work something out. The power of Russian organized crime is not to be underestimated. What Mr. Borodavkin doesn't understand is that we have been allowing Afghan heroin to flood across their borders so that it would be easier for them to catch the fattened rats on their side of the border. So far, so good. Their "drug criminals" are doing fine, addiction rates in Russia are soaring, and the Russians get to call us short-sighted. Great stuff!

He said also that Russia was not against Kabul's contacts with the moderate wing of the Taliban if Kabul sees fit to seek such contacts.

"If the Afghan leadership sees fit to establish contacts with the moderate wing of the Taliban, Russia will not object to this on condition that they lay down their arms, recognize the Afghan constitution and government, and denounce any ties with Al Qaeda," Borodavkin told Interfax.

At the same time, Moscow believes it is important to stick to a clear and principled position with regard to the leaders of terrorist and extremist organizations acting in Afghanistan, Borodavkin said. "We are categorically against any agreements with them," he said.

This is pleasing. I wonder what part of, "No one asked for your approval or conditions!" is hard to understand.

Russian diplomat also told Interfax that so far no applications had been received from NATO member states for the transit of military cargo to Afghanistan via Russia.

I wonder if they ever gave back our humvees they stole off the dock in Georgia. Hmmm. Perhaps we never filed that application. Somebody get a bureaucrat on this issue immediately!

"We have signed a number of bilateral inter-governmental agreements setting out easier terms for military gear and personnel transit to Afghanistan through Russia. Such agreements were signed with Germany, France and Spain. So far we have not received any application for this type of transportation from these countries," he said.

In April 2008, Russia and NATO also signed an agreement for the transit of non-military cargo to Afghanistan for the alliance forces and its member states, as well as all the countries which sent their troops to the country as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Borodavkin recalled.

"According to the Russian regulations, ISAF's non-military cargo will be transited by Russia as commercial cargo in accordance with international and Russian customs regulations," he said.

"This is a half-hearted attempt on our part to make up for inducing the Kyrgyzstanis to evict the U.S. from Manos Air Base in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan," Mr. Borodavkin went on to say... just kidding, he didn't say that. I wish he would have, but he didn't.

Borodavkin said also that the authorities in Moscow hoped that an upcoming international conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will help bring stability to the country.

"The agenda of the conference will focus on searching for more effective ways to jointly counter the terrorist and drug threats. Naturally, its results, which its organizers and participants hope to receive, will objectively contribute to efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan," Borodavkin said.

This is the second half of the July 5, 2005 pronouncement by the SCO that the United States should set a time line to leave Afghanistan.

An action plan outlining a wide variety of specific measures will be announced as well, Borodavkin said. "They include plans to step up the activities of the consultative mechanism of the SCO member-countries' anti-drug agency chiefs and to give it a bigger say, plans to reinforce the legal foundation for cooperation in the combat against the illegal turnover of drugs, and the idea of conducting joint anti-drug operations," the high-ranking diplomat said.

"The results of the conference will be summarized in a declaration, which will reflect the views of all participants in this forum regarding the development and improvement of multilateral cooperation to counter the threats of terrorism, drug trafficking and cross-border crime," he added.

Declaration; good. Cooperation; good. Russians in Afghanistan; just look at the bones, man! So I'd say that this is a win for the Afghans at this point. Russians are apparently like vampires... if someone doesn't invite them in, they won't kill your whole family.

On a serious note, hopefully the conference will provide some framework for cooperation and there is word that the US will be making contact with Iran behind the scenes. That should be an interesting story in itself. Oh, to be a fly on that wall!

However, with the recent encouragement (buyoff) of Kyrgyzstan's decision to remove Manos Air Base from our logistical bag of tricks, it's hard to take Russian pronouncements of goodwill seriously. It's especially hard to accept any scolding from them (the worst, most brutal counterinsurgents in the world) regarding brutality against civilians.

Tampering

2009-03-25T22:26:00.001+04:30

The latest news about an "initiative" to "install" a Prime Minister in Afghanistan to "counter" Afghan President Hamid Karzai does not bode well, and is not what was expected from this administration. For an administration whose campaign rhetoric seemed to flow against foreign interventionism, it is an astounding thought that it would consider interfering in the internal workings of Afghanistan to this extent.

Now, Hamid Karzai has often spoken about ISAF and civilian casualties (of which there were two more yesterday,) even threatening at one point to commit national suicide by asking NATO to leave the country. Between that and completely failing to stem corruption in the Afghan government, there have been many calls to forcibly remove Karzai from power.

This would be a tremendous mistake.

More after the jump

No matter how difficult Hamid Karzai may be, we have not done our part to help this former Mujaheddin to become a chief executive of a country the size of Texas and with 30 some-odd million citizens. Just as we have conducted counter-terrorism operations in lieu of counterinsurgency for the past seven years, we have failed to properly mentor the Afghan government in administering itself. Then we point to these former warlords and fighters and express dismay that they can't effectively run a government. A good administrator would have great difficulties in properly administering anything in a country whose infrastructure, never substantial to begin with, has been mauled by over thirty years of warfare. Now an administration who objected to American interference is considering tampering with the internal structure of a government which we are supposed to be legitimizing through our efforts and expenditures of blood and treasure. This is not the way to legitimize the sitting Afghan government.

We could encourage the Loya Jirga to change the Afghan Constitution and add the office which the President of the United States is considering creating. We could actively back another candidate, like the one that the Obama administration would like to see installed as "Prime Minister." We could use our considerable financial clout to change the way that aid is administered, controlling it down to the local level and thereby pressuring Karzai to accept more help and mentoring. We can use many methods to influence the Afghan government to attack corruption.

We can also take more responsibility for preventing civilian casualties, including training COIN to the Soldier level and being the first to admit when we have made a mistake. We could make sure that compensation for civilian deaths is excessive compared to local norms, which it is not. (Just so you know, monetary compensation for a death caused by another is normal in Afghan society. It is often the decision of local courts or shuras/jirgas to award such compensation in cases that we would prosecute as manslaughter or negligent homicide, sometimes even as murder.) These are things that could be done by our civilian and military leadership to influence the Afghan government in acceptable ways.

Willful tampering in the structure of what we insist is a sovereign nation is not an acceptable way. It has been described as colonialist behavior, which is exactly the type of behavior that President Obama seemed to object to in his campaign. This is the type of shift once in power that is totally unwelcome. It would also torpedo our national objectives in Afghanistan in ways that cannot be totally foreseen. First of all, think of the boon to Taliban information operations (propadanda.) This would, along with some of our other behaviors, feed directly into Taliban assertions that the Kabul government is a puppet government. This is a central argument of the Taliban, and such an action would add great credibility to that argument.

We are, and must rightly be, held to a higher standard, even when that makes our job more difficult. We must at all times endeavor to take the high road, even when that road makes us vulnerable or our job more difficult. We are the powerful, we are the well-educated, we are the "advanced." Every bit of tampering, every bit of subversion against the sitting government, every bit of underhanded or untruthful action on our part damages us much more deeply than the daily lying of the Taliban does to them. They are insurgents; they are expected to lie, cheat, steal and murder. We are not. Not even by our own press or the press of other countries.

Witness the article about the two farmers killed near Khost yesterday. There is a multi-paragraph article about NATO and civilian casualties, even noting Karzai's statements about ISAF-related civilian deaths. The article only notes in passing that three quarters of the civilian conflict-related fatalities were not caused by coalition forces. In an article several paragraphs long, here is the note given to another incident which killed four times as many civilians, this one caused by a roadside bomb (IED) which is by definition not coalition.

Separately in Khost, a roadside bomb killed eight civilians aboard a minibus and wounded eight others, NATO-led forces said.

One sentence. One lousy sentence. We are held to a higher standard, and this standard is not limited to civilian casualties. It is also related to not tampering in the established government of our ally, the country and the government that it is our job to legitimize and who we are helping to defend (in our own best interests.) The job is tough. It is hard, and it is increasingly dangerous... due in part to our own failings as counterinsurgents both militarily and civilly. That is no excuse to stoop to manipulation on the scale of externally creating an office for which there is no provision under existing Afghan law.

Why don't we try helping to teach Hamid Karzai what a president is really supposed to do? Why don't we try to teach and support those who are teachable in each government ministry and apply strong pressure to remove those who aren't? We have not done that, and seeking the easy road is to find the road to Hell.

2009 is a pivotal year in Afghanistan. It's time to take a hard look at ourselves and objectively seek where we can do better. It's time to do our jobs, not look for the easier, softer way. There is none. Meddling to this extent will only bring more difficulty.

"Sustainable Security in Afghanistan," New Report From The Center For American Progress

2009-03-25T09:06:00.003+04:30

The Center for American Progress has published a new position paper called, "Sustainable Security in Afghanistan." While there is nothing earth shattering, the report touches on some keys that have been notably absent from much of the higher-level national discussion in any meaningful way.

First, the call for a "civilian surge," while nothing new, is more detailed than just two words. Also, for the first time in a policy paper, (I may have missed something somewhere) there was an acknowledgment that the military strategy to this point has been "counter-terrorism," or what I have referred to as "counter-guerrilla." This is an acknowledgment that, despite the terminology used by military maneuver units on the ground, there has been little pop-centric COIN actually implemented.

More after the jump

Also there is a suggestion that NATO partners with "caveats" be called upon not for more military contributions, but civilian contributions; particularly in the area of governance. I have called for this in lieu of further pleas for military contributions, and I'm glad to see this in a policy paper.

Another edifying point is the call for a focused effort on the judicial system, and perhaps a bonding of tribal/local mechanisms with government writ as a way to facilitate this. Using the ANP as the Arbakai to enforce shura/jirga decisions has not been raised often in policy papers, and this one does so. I also strongly agree with the point that any "Sons of Afghanistan" effort is ill-advised and dangerous. As noted, it is the type of thing that gave rise to the Taliban initially. This call should be heeded.

The weakness of the effort to reform/rebuild the Afghan National Police was noted, and a recommendation to fully pursue manning of the mentoring program is made. Also good stuff.

Overall, this paper calls the spade a spade and puts forth some good recommendations that should be listened to. While some spades are called without a strong solution recommended, there were a few sacred cows that, if not slaughtered, were bled a bit.

Potentially the strongest point is that the "limited objectives" strategy is presented as a reasonable short-term strategy, while making the strong argument that if the long term goal of a self-sustained and stable Afghanistan is abandoned, there will be dire consequences in the future, including a waste being made of all the blood and treasure invested to this point. These consequences will affect both national safety and regional stability, particularly in Pakistan.

I did note the complete absence of any recommendation to undermine the Afghan government, an "initiative" which, if pursued, will also backfire. In fact, the call was strongly made to increase the legitimacy of the sitting Afghan government; part of which would entail strong efforts to attack corruption within that government. I strongly agree with the call to fully back the national elections.

Overall, I find myself in agreement with both the assessments of the current weaknesses and with the proposals to improve the situation in Afghanistan and the region in both the near and long terms.

Okay, so it wasn't "earth shattering," but there were some key points made that have not been strongly made in the national discussion of the way forward in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A number of things that I have felt strongly need to be said out loud have been said, and that is the first step to undertaking a solution.

Knock It Off!

2009-03-24T23:25:00.002+04:30

In the early days of this blog I once made fun of the French. Okay, it was twice. In Afghanistan I learned that I had been mistaken. I never held a low opinion of the Canadians, who Scott Kesterson spent some time with and videos of whom fighting hard were posted on YouTube. They look, act, and fight like Americans. They use the same types of weapons, wear similar uniforms, are aggressive, and sound like Guardsmen from Minnesota. I did something wrong back in November of '06; I engaged in making fun of an ally of which I had no real knowledge. I have learned my lesson, and I know of what I speak. Now it's time to use that knowledge to speak up against the same type of immature behavior that I engaged in myself once upon an ignorant time.

More after the jump

The Canadians did not have any buildings knocked down on 9/11. They did not lose thousands of lives that day; and yet they have stood by our side from the very start. The Canadians took the difficult and dangerous mission in Kandahar Province, one of the deadliest in Afghanistan, and with a contingent much smaller than the American contingent (their Army is much smaller) they have borne the brunt of some of the most vicious fighting in Afghanistan. They have sustained casualties and given lives for a threat that is much more nebulous to them than it is to even we short attention span theater Americans.

While some here in the States, very often for the purpose of political maneuvering, go on about our strained military (with a basis in reality, but not in any genuine sense of caring, to my perception,) the Canadians have literally worn themselves out in a cause that has never affected them to the extent that it has affected us. While we complain that our conventional capabilities are stressed and weakened by the exertions of the GWOT, the Canadians have worn out their equipment and Soldiers, have repatriated many dead, and have given a full measure of themselves on the battlefields of Afghanistan. The Canadians have acquitted themselves honorably in this effort. Their relatively tiny military has gone the extra mile and now heaves itself forward on sheer willpower, never giving up.

Now the Canadians have to take a breather. Like a marathoner who literally crawls across the finish line, they need to recuperate. A Canadian Lieutenant General states that it will take a year to refit the Canadian Army. Folks, a year is not a long time when it comes to all of the maintenance, retraining, and refitting that is required when a small army expends itself to the extent that the Canadians have.

What is their reward for their expenditures of blood and treasure in a fight that it could be argued they could sit out reasonably? This. Fox News, usually the more patriotic of the bunch, slams our brothers-in-arms to the north with what amounts to a juvenile comedy routine that is based not on facts but on asinine jokes about our very capable and scrappy allies.

I am not an advocate of basing our foreign policy on what the rest of the world thinks. Their agendas are their agendas, and they are welcome to them, but remember always that the rest of the world never has our best interests at heart; they have their own interests at heart. Like a friend who runs when you knock a ball through the neighbor's window, most of them will leave when it is in their own best interests. That doesn't mean that we can't be friends; it means that we have to take care of our own business. My disagreements with our foreign policy are not based on "My God, the Europeans just hate us!" It is based on whether or not I believe that we are going about our objectives properly. Character is not just what you do when no one is looking. Character is also doing what you believe is right when everyone is looking and opinion runs against you.

That is a weak spot in our national character. A huge segment of our population is far too concerned with what others think of us. If that makes me an exceptionalist, then so be it. Every other country in the world is exceptionalist to one extent or another. Look at the Germans, for instance. Do they care what we think of their rules of engagement in Afghanistan? No. They care what their national conscience tells them.

That being said, the last thing in the world that we should be doing is making fun of our allies for breaking themselves against the Sisyphean task of fighting an international insurgency in general and a national insurgency with external support halfway around the globe. We should be patting them on the butt and saying, "Good game, you played it well." We should be writing love letters to the Canadians for the heartbreak and sorrow they have incurred bringing home Canadian dead at their own version of Dover. They have done this plenty. On the day that Fox News let their weasels off the chain to run their comic mouths, four more Canadians had their all taken from them in a fight that is unarguably more ours than theirs. Their reward? A sharp poke in the eye from a major U.S. media outlet.

There is a difference between exceptionalism and arrogance, and that video clip shows what that difference is in childish crayon colors. That was a playground-style taunting of a good friend. It's stuff like that which spoils friendships, while an honest difference of opinion may strain it but not destroy it.

Fox, you should be ashamed of yourselves. You owe the Canadians an apology from each and every one of those jackholes who opened their yaps to spew forth giggling venom at our allies. You are usually one of the less jackassic of the outlets, but this time you're not. As a Soldier and a veteran, I demand an apology be made to the Canadians. Man up, Fox. You did something wrong and I will respect you more if you apologize.

Then there is the matter of this site, a British blog that posted an asinine video downgrading the French. I found this awhile ago, and I tried to post a comment, not too strongly worded, pointing out that they don't know what they are talking about and pointing them to a hilarious YouTube video done by a (large) group of British Soldiers in Iraq. The site author didn't have the balls to print my comment. Nothing like maintaining that you're right by not acknowledging dissent based on personal knowledge.

So, while we are not alone in our practice of jackassery, that doesn't make it right. None of the above referenced commentators have earned the right to poke fun at their targets. If you served with them in this war, then you may poke good-natured fun at them. If you haven't, either ruck up and see how much respect they actually deserve by suffering with them on the ground or have the sense that God gave a rabbit and knock it off.

UPDATE

While Fox has not commented, Greg Gutfield, host of Red Eye on Fox, has apologized... sort of. He claims that the "comedy" was misunderstood.

Riiiight.

Listening To Voices Who Know

2009-03-23T22:30:00.003+04:30

There are many voices out there who speak a lot of hypothesis, who get visits from the Good Idea Fairy and, while well-intentioned (for the most part,) there is a lot of wandering around in circles. Some, driven by a deeply rooted defeatism or some sense of purpose leading to withdrawal, literally preach the "impossibility" of the task of succeeding in building a free Afghanistan. Many even espouse the idea that Muslims are incapable of developing and living under a representative form of government.

There is little understanding of what it's like on the ground in Afghanistan.

More after the jump

There are a million voices out there, some influential, some inconsequential, all asking to be heard. I read many who just don't get it. Some are deeply affected, educated men like Andrew Bacevich, who while an honorable man who can argue his points very well, in my opinion have lost any real concern for the outcome and have come to believe that the security of the United States is not affected by what happens in the little valleys in a distant land nearly halfway around the world. I disagree with his assessment. It's a shame, because he is a very smart man who could be adding a lot to the conversation instead of wanting to call it off.

At the other end of the spectrum are men like Robert Young Pelton, who used his embed as a platform to assassinate a team of people who are working in a young program under difficult circumstances and to try to forward his own business interests by doing so. We have so few good journalists downrange who can paint a real picture of what it's like to be on the ground. We have so few smart guys who are willing to, in good faith, throw the flag at things going on downrange that are less than fully productive, and present realistic alternatives that would be so much more effective than what we are doing. We are seriously in need of both.

Let's go to the journalist side first. Before August, 2006, I had sought deployment to Iraq; rarely, like the rest of America, thinking of Afghanistan. When I learned of the ETT mission and began researching it, I found a number of sources of information. Scott Kesterson was an embedded journalist from Oregon who had gone to Afghanistan with the 41st BCT. I read his reports with relish, and his video clips gave me rare glimpses into what I was getting myself into. Now, as a veteran of Afghanistan, his work is even more impressive.

Scott, in partnership with some really good people, has made a documentary film called "At War." I have not had an opportunity to review this movie, but I hope to soon. In the meantime, there is a little support that people can lend to the movie to help it get more attention and reviews. Check this out over at Bouhammer (who went downrange with Scott and knows Scott well) as far as what you may be able to do to help this important documentary gain some more attention.

Now to those who offer solutions to some of the most overriding concerns standing in the way of success in Afghanistan. Today's post by Tim "Babatim" Lynch over at Free Range International speaks volumes about the need for a civilian surge; what works and what doesn't. There are several links to others there as well as a podcast. Tim spends a lot of time outside the wire and outside the influences that may tint the opinions of others. Tim knows what works and what doesn't from experience, and he really needs to be listened to. He also puts his butt out there, so he can speak clearly as to what he sees.

What can the average citizen do? Here's a recommendation; start sending blog links to your congressman and/or senator. Educating yourself by reading milblogs is great stuff. If you are reading this, you are likely seeking and finding information on everything from the experience of warriors in the GWOT to what it all means. I applaud you. Now, let's use that knowledge to steer our politicians to some of this information that doesn't make it to the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post. If you didn't find what you were looking for there, why would you leave your elected representatives in the dark. They are busy people; give them a hand.

~Blue

Knowing Jon Stiles

2009-03-16T04:46:00.004+04:30

The shock of learning of Jon's death has worn off a bit. I called a mutual friend, a retired Master Sergeant who now works as a representative for a company that sells systems to the Army, the one who introduced me to Jon Stiles. They had been next door neighbors in Dayton before Jon had moved with his wife, Launa, back to Colorado. I asked if he had heard about Jon. He hadn't, and I became the bearer of bad tidings. Jeff was shocked. We spoke only briefly before he had to go, but he promised to call me back this weekend.

We spoke together about how Jeff's kids cried to find out about Jon's death. We talked about Jon and how much effort he put into getting downrange. We talked about how hard Jon had to work to get back into the service. Jon sought out his service, he struggled to get back in. He jumped through many hoops, he ran into walls, he ran into lazy people who didn't want to do their jobs, he ran into bureaucracy and botched paperwork. Jeff and I talked about how Jon kept his purpose in mind and never quit.

I walk among people here in the United States, which I've seen a lot of in the past few days as I've traveled hundreds of miles by road, and I wonder about the people I see. I see people who are too busy living their lives, too interested in their careers, having too good a time to give serious thought to putting themselves into harm's way for our country. I have seen tens of thousands of people in the past three days. I have seen easily several thousand able-bodied men having their weekend and as I've driven around Florida during Spring Break time, the contrast is so clear to me.

Jon's story needs to be told. Jon Stiles is such a strong example of the type of man this country produces in small numbers. Even among the members of the military, Jon stands out. Jon was not ordered to go. Jon marched towards the sound of the guns. He sought to do as much as he could. He worked so hard to lay his life on the line.

When I met Jon, he was not a member of the military. Jon had been a Marine and had served on active duty in the Army, but he had been out of the service for years. He had been injured and he had had surgery on his back. Jon wanted to serve, but he had spoken to recruiters like Mr. Jones, an MPRI contracted recruiter in the Dayton area, who couldn't be bothered with a tough accession. Jon had been blown off. He believed that he couldn't get back in, though he desperately wanted to serve, to do what he saw as his part.

As we worked together, helping National Guardsmen from Tennessee and Pennsylvania get ready to go to Iraq during their predeployment at Camp Shelby, MS, Jon and I became fast friends. We shared an apartment in Hattiesburg and in our off time we often played golf together. Jon had brought a PS2 game system, and when the weather was poor he taught me to play "Tiger Woods Golf." It took me nearly a month to become a worthy adversary, but Jon demonstrated the patience of a saint.

Jon saw me taking phone calls related to deployments that I was seeking, and he asked me for advice on how to handle getting back in uniform. I did my best to be helpful, but Jon did the work. He began a quest that would span over a year and three separate states to get back into the service.

Jon became frustrated with the family business, and he and his wife sold their home in Dayton and moved back to Colorado. Launa's family was there, and while she had sacrificed being close to her family so that Jon could be part of the business, when he decided to leave the business, they decided that Colorado was the place for them to be.

While I only met Launa once or twice, Jon's relationship with his wife was remarkable. Jon never said anything negative about his wife. He was the type of husband that every father wants for his daughter. He was thoughtful, respectful, loving, kind and he would tell anyone that Launa was his best friend. He treated her like it, too. Jon was a man's man... because that's the way that real men are supposed to be.

After their move back to Colorado, Jon and I spoke pretty regularly. Jon continued his pursuit of service, and finally found a recruiter who was willing to listen to him, hear his commitment to service, and put forth the effort to do the paperwork. This process took months. I've still got the emails that Jon and I exchanged over this time, and they span months until he finally sent me an email the day that I arrived in Afghanistan that he was raising his hand two days later.

Jon had gathered all of his medical records together and presented his case to a recruiter who was willing to go through what promised to be a lengthy process. Jon had a physical and his case was referred to a medical review board. There were so many hoops for Jon to jump through that I lost track. Most men would have quit trying. There was dismal news at every turn. Jon was repeatedly given discouraging words, but he never gave up. He never quit.

Finally, the case had to go to a General for approval. The paperwork sent for Jon initially had the wrong name on it, setting him back months. Jon's email was ecstatic when he informed me of his impending enlistement. The email was sent the day that I arrived in Afghanistan, and showed that his efforts were not complete.

Hey Brother,

I am there man!!!!! They finally are going to let me in. I am raising my right hand this Friday morning!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Thank you for all of your support and prayer's it did help. I hope all is well in the ZONE drop me a line when you get a chance, and know that I am praying for you!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Keep your ass down and your eyes open brother!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I will write soon and let you know if and when I can catch a deployment.

Love you BRO

Stiles

Every one of those exclamation points are his, and he was not one to use them lightly. Jon's commitment wasn't just to wearing that uniform, either. As you can plainly see, he fully intended to deploy.

While Jon looked into what it would take to get downrange, he worked for the Colorado Honor Guard, doing funerals for service members who had passed away. He took pride in rendering honors to those who had served their country. Here is a picture of Jon dressed for Honor Guard duty.

The unit that Jon had enlisted into had been slated to deploy to Iraq, but when that deployment was pushed back, Jon went looking for an ETT mission. Jon would have made a great ETT. His patience and maturity would have stood him in good stead, but it was not to be.

Hey Hey Hey, Brother... I wish we could have talked more when you where home,
but such as life, it was just good to hear your voice and know that you are
hanging in there. As far as ETT deployment goes that is a big fat negative,
they wont take an E-4 know matter how hard the DET COMMANDER fights for me.
He even went so far as to duke it out with Fort Riley and the powers that may
be, but to no avails. On the other hand I am still going to the STAN I am
getting deployed with the 927th Eng Co SAPPERS from Baton Rouge, L.A. I go on
three week SRP/AT in February, and then we MOB in march for a 70 day train up
at Fort McCoy Wisconsin. Then it is boots on the ground for 9 to 9 1/2 months
(probably longer), the total order package is supposed to be for 400 day's.
The mission is a good mission! We will be on the Pakistani border doing the
route clearing mission (IED Hunting) using the Buffalo Vehicles, as well as
being the QRF for that area of OPS. Not sure exactly where on the border we
will be yet but I am sure it will all become very clear soon enough.

Jon and I never crossed paths in Afghanistan. He arrived over a month after I had left the country. We exchanged a few emails... very few. Jon was busy, his access to the internet limited, and he spent most of it on his best friend; his wife.

Jon emailed me in October, telling me that he had a broken thumb from a bad ride on bad roads behind a .50 caliber machine gun. He also had a hairline fracture to an ankle. He reveled in the fact that neither injury would keep him out of the fight. I've seen men beg off of missions for less. Not Jon. Shortly thereafter, I would learn recently, Jon sustained lung damage and vocal chord injuries while helping rescue two men from a burning truck after it had been struck with a VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device.)

Jon was awarded a Bronze Star for his actions that day.

He was offered medical leave, but he wanted to stay with his team. Even after that, Jon was still unwilling to take the easy road. If he had taken the leave, he likely would have been stateside when the IED that took his life detonated near his vehicle on November 13th, 2008. Jon died of his wounds that day.

Andy Rooney stated recently that we have no heroes today. I'm here to tell Andy Rooney that when a man can no longer find the relevant, he himself is irrelevant. Andy Rooney has lost all relevance, because when men like Jon Stiles walk the earth, and now lie in its embrace because of what no man can deny is valor of the highest caliber, men like Andy Rooney should take notice.

Jon Stiles was not remarkable in many respects. He looked like a normal Joe. He wasn't flamboyant, he didn't cry out for attention, and he wasn't a seeker of anything except service. He returned to the Army at a reduced rank without complaint. You cannot spot a hero by his looks or hear it in his words. You see it only in his actions. Jon clung to his ideals and values tenaciously, and while he laid his life on freedom's altar willingly, you can believe that his life was not willingly forfeit. It had to be taken from him. Jon had a lot to live for.

Jon loved life. He loved his wife, his family, his friends and his country. He believed that what a man did when the chips were down was what defined him more accurately than at any other moment of his life, and he defined himself well. I am honored to have known him as I did.

There are many others who knew him for far longer. Launa Stiles, his wife, gave her husband for this country; a husband that most women only dream of. You see, Jon was one of the finest men that I have ever known. He was absolutely dedicated to his wife, and I'm sure that she knew it. She knew what she risked losing, that Jon was a one-in-a-million man. Yet, she supported him in his service. She risked all but her own life when Jon went off to war in Afghanistan. She was taken up on her wager on freedom to the fullest measure. Jon and Launa Stiles were a heroic couple. Now she must wait to see Jon again, for it will not be in this life.

On Monday, March 17th, 2009, Highlands Ranch, the town where Jon and Launa Stiles settled when they returned to Colorado, will name a street after Jon.

If anyone needs a hero, I offer them Jon Stiles.

Finding Jon Stiles

2009-03-11T21:09:00.007+04:30

I started this blog to capture, and share, my experiences related to this war. Somewhere, this thing took on a life of its own, and it has become many things. Some have followed this since fairly early on, and back when I first started writing it, it was all about experiences, feelings, perceptions... the stuff that one man feels as he goes through playing his small part.

This blog has changed. After returning home, I didn't know what to do with it or even if I should keep writing. Describing this process to a university professor who uses it in her classroom for some of her assignments to journalism students, I had to find my "post-deployment voice." She thought that a very apt phrase, and expressed her disappointment that some never do. I have turned to a very different type of writing. I have been sharing what I see with my changed eyes; the way that I view the war, what is said and written about it, and what I see concerning our successes and, all too often, our challenges to being successful. It has become something different.

Today is about a singularly wartime experience. No high-minded bullshit about COIN or Afghanistan in broad, sweeping terms. This is about an experience.

How all this came about is a long story. Perhaps I can tell that more clearly tomorrow. It needs to be told. It is a small story, just a wee part of a much bigger story, but a little long. Today I will do my version of brief.

God brings people in and out of our lives. Some stay and have meaning, and some just pass through. As we pass through the web of life, we weave our own web and we touch each other's lives. Sometimes our webs only touch briefly, and sometimes they bind together and are knotted forming lasting bonds. Soldiers understand this, and they also understand that some of those lasting bonds have long periods of lapsed communications, especially when one or the other is deployed. It's not unusual. But we always touch base again. Those are the people that you can not talk to for a year, but when you do, it's like it's only been a couple of weeks. You know the type.

Sometimes you have to look for your friends... the ones who are worth looking for. They are the ones who will look you up, too.

It's funny that, when you meet someone, you never know if the webs are just brushing or if you are going to develop the kind of friendship that lasts a lifetime.

Jon Stiles is one of those whose web is bound to my own. He was one of the people I took the time to call when I was home on leave, even though he moved to Colorado a couple of years ago. He was excited to tell me that he had found a deployment to Afghanistan. He arrived in Afghanistan shortly after I left, and we exchanged a few emails... a very few emails. He spent most of his internet time, when he had any, chatting with his wife as their time frames overlapped from across the world; he on the end of his day, she on the front end of hers. I've never met a better husband than Jon. That guy could be an example of "this is how you do this right" in any pre-marriage seminar. It was no big deal not to hear from him for long periods. I last heard from him on October 7th. Before that it had been July. He was busy living his deployment.

Jon went active in March of 2007, so he should be coming off of active duty soon. I had started to wonder, and then I tried his cell phone. Still disconnected. Lots of guys shut off their phones while deployed. No big deal.

Then I tried Google and my heart broke instantly when I saw this at the top of the list.

I still can't keep it together. Thank God I'm by myself right now.

Today, all I can do is feel. All I can do is hurt. My heart is broken.

Jon was killed on November 13th, 2008 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. I'm not connected to his family, and so I just went to check on my friend from Colorado who should be coming home soon only to find that he has been home for almost four months now. Now I know why he has not had time to email me about how his tour is going. His tour ended in November.

I will tell more about this, hopefully, tomorrow. Jon Stiles jumped through a million hoops to get back into the service and he couldn't wait to do his part and make a contribution. His story puts to shame all those who have never raised a finger to put themselves in harm's way for this nation, and I will tell it the best way that I can.

When I can.

I'm having problems seeing my keyboard. All I could think to do is write about it, to get it down and express it. It's one of the few tools I have to deal with such things. But I don't think it's helping.

Here are some pictures of his funeral. It looks like they did a good job for Jon. Jon served on that Honor Guard before he deployed. He gave the same honors to many before receiving them himself.

Jon was an exemplary man. I mean that in every sense of the word. He was just simply exemplary.

I want to thank the Patriot Guard Riders for keeping the vultures away from Jon. If anyone who reads this is a Patriot Guard Rider, please know that what you do is important, and I thank you for it.

Guest Post: The Good Question Man

2009-03-11T08:49:00.002+04:30

Dale Kuehl, who posted the "good" question which inspired the last post, has presented a different viewpoint in a comment responding to the response. It deserves to be its own post. Mr. Kuehl (rank unknown) works at the NTC (National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California,) and he feels that the Combat Maneuver Training Centers are doing a good job of preparing units for COIN in-theater. His viewpoint deserves not to be lost in comments.

I have been aware of the progress of the CMTC's in working to provide more realistic COIN training and evaluation. I can also tell you that right this minute, there are PRT's in Afghanistan that are not functioning in conjunction with their maneuver forces. I don't mean coordinating; I mean in conjunction with. I can tell you that there is a unit in Afghanistan right this minute that had a competition going for who could break the most windshields with water bottles during convoys. No shit. I can tell you that after searching for NCOES (Non Commissioned Officer Education System... the people who train Sergeants) curricula that included COIN doctrinal training, I couldn't find any. I think that it's great that the CMTC's are trying hard to make a difference. Hopefully, that will work.

Right this minute, on the other side of the world, there is a man who told the story of being prevented from getting illumination by a battlespace owner a hundred miles away. Right this minute, on the other side of the world, there is a man who witnesses occupation-type disruptive behavior from United States Army troops nearly every time he passes a convoy. My personal experience from the fairly recent past was that American maneuver unit Infantrymen from an "elite" unit couldn't work well with indigenous forces and left a bad taste in many Afghan mouths.

There are very few stories out there of night patrols to secure a village that has been having a problem with night letters, of our forces taking back the night. There are very few stories of COPs set up near a threatened village to provide that 24-7 security and the developing relationship when the Soldiers started to connect with that community. As a matter of fact, Wanat is being used as a cautionary tale against it, and the investigation of the battle at Wanat completely missed the fact that the ANP who were complicit in the attack were not properly engaged prior to the attack. That investigation happened in the past six months.

I'm glad that there are those out there trying to make a difference. I'm glad that Dale Kuehl says that they're doing good things at the CMTC's. That means that we should start seeing effects very soon.

Here's Dale's comment:

I have a bit of a different perspective having spent the past eight months at the National Training Center training units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Having had the opportunity to work closely with seven different battalions I would say that leadership at all echelons have a pretty good understanding of COIN and not just from reading, but from actually trying to implement our doctrine. I have only seen one unit who had what I would call a counter-guerrilla focus and they had many aspects of COIN within their operational design.

More after the jump... it's worth it

We try to build a scenario for the training unit that requires them to balance both lethal and non-lethal operations. While our scenario includes demonstrations (which I believe relevant since I had to deal with several during my time in Baghdad in 2007) it also includes sectarian tensions, mortar and rocket fire, complex attacks, and of course the various types of IEDs. Units also have to deal with local and provincial government, PRTs, ISF/ANSF, and local police. They have to develop projects along with the local civil leaders and their PRT. We are also placing greater emphasis on partnering with host nation security forces.

We have over two thousand role players to include hundreds of Iraqis or Afghanis depending upon the focus of the rotation to add texture to the environment.

Every battalion commander I have worked with has developed a pretty solid campaign plan which encompasses several lines of effort to include governance, economic development and information operations in addition to security.

We take a hard look at how units are doing on what we have labeled Individual Skills in a COIN Environment which includes negotion skills, language skills, counter IED, counter sniper, and every Soldier a sensor and ambassador.

We also try very hard to stay abreast of latest developments in TTP in theater from both Iraq and Afghanistan and try to incorporate best practices into our training and leader teaches. We try to pull lessons learned from OCs who have just returned from deployment and also try to maintain contact with units in theater. We also send OCs in theater to gather information and best practices. We have included State Department personnel, Law Enforcement Professionals, and the Assymetric Warfare Group to name just a few of the organizations we try to bring into our training.

We have also worked hard along with JIEDO to try to get units to focus not just on force protection to defeat the IED, but to use intelligence and developing relationships with the people to more effectively identify and target the insurgent network.

This training is much more complex and advanced than it was when I came through here with my battalion in 2006 and we seek to improve how we replicate the environment in theater for both Iraq and Afghanistan. Bottom line is I think we have come a long way in understanding the COIN fight and it has become institutionalized in the way we train and prepare units for deployment. While we can't duplicate the environment any unit may face, I believe all the maneuver training centers do a pretty damn good job of replicating many of the conditions units will face and force them to think through complex problems in an ambiguous environment.

If You Haven't Seen This...

2009-03-10T09:16:00.002+04:30

You should. Do not have anything in your mouth that you don't mind having in your sinuses while viewing this. Then come back here and read the post below.

(h/t to Abu Muqawama who steered to Checks with Chart)

Good Question; Silly Question

2009-03-10T00:55:00.008+04:30

The good news is that apparently the COINdinistas (would COINtras be better? Hmmmm...) are gaining a greater toe-hold on the DoD and in the Army specifically.

One note of interest in all of this is that the Marine Corps is "getting" COIN better than the Army. I've discussed this with a Marine Major at a joint center that takes a great interest in COIN regarding the assistance of foreign governments in the stabilization of their own countries. These guys, who operate in one of a few bubbles in a world filled with "green-suiters," "blue-suiters" and so on, are referred to as "purple-suiters." This is because none of the other sobriquets are apt. "Purple suiters" are "joint" types. Those who play well with others... from other services. This Major ascribed the ability of the Marine Corps to institutionally accept the new doctrine more quickly has to do with the Marine culture of agility, adaptability and the Marine tendency to devolve authority to the lowest practicable level.

And now you know what the military meaning of "purple" is. Made it worthwhile to get out of bed today, didn't it? Anyway, purple is catching on and COINtras are gaining a toehold.

How could you not want to read what's after the jump?

We'll see how this works out, but the signs are somewhat encouraging. Meanwhile, there are some questions out there; one being a current sub-topic in the "national conversation" regarding policy vs strategy, tactics and doctrine. The other is a question posted by Dale Kuehl on the last post. One is silly, one is a pretty good question that begs a coherent response. Both are related like second cousins.

We'll start with the silly, and it's not Mr. Kuehl's question. It's the micro-debate that is largely over, but leaves a gap in the veneer showing an underlying "concern" with becoming good at COIN. The gist of it seems to be an objection, the narrative of which (Reader's Digest condensed version) is that if we get really good at counterinsurgency, our civilian masters may deem it simple and more desirable to run about willy-nilly unseating governments that we deem offensive on a regular basis. The simple answer to that question was put forth that those who truly understand COIN see it as an entirely unpalatable exercise that should be avoided at all costs.

This, of course, begged the question from the opposition of why those selfsame individuals were such proponents of the doctrine. The natural assumption seemed to be that the COINdinista in question was a proponent for some reasons relating to personal enjoyment of the doctrine rather than any expediency related to the situation in which we find ourselves.

The deeper question was whether our civilian masters (whatever administration holds the keys at any given moment, presumably in the future) can be trusted with such capability... the temptation to use such incredible cosmic power being obviously nearly irresistible.

The real answer to this question is a sibling to the answer to Mr. Kuehl's question, which is not silly at all.

Just curious. Why do you think the Army is confusing counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla? From what I have seen the Army as a whole has embraced counter-insurgency while conducting counter-guerrilla operations. The big difference now from the 1986 Counterguerilla manual is the focus on the people vice an enemy centric approach. ~ Dale Kuehl, posted on "Not Now, Cato!"

There are a number of indicators that the Army has not fully grasped, nor fully committed itself to practicing COIN as if its life depended on it. As noted before on this blog, there is an active counterpoint being made against further promulgation of the doctrine within the Army, the assumption being that we are already masters of this domain. This is not because this assumption is in fact correct. A simple response to this assumption is that the "proof is in the pudding." The pudding that we have produced to this point in Afghanistan is not pudding at all, but instead a weak slurry with lumps of pudding-like material that is being stirred madly by a group of people with a few straws and one plastic spork.

This may seem a bit disjointed, but the answer to the second question is intimately related to the answer to the first. Part of the reason that we are not "getting" COIN, the reason why our pudding is not thickening evenly, is that we are not performing COIN in anything resembling a coherent manner. We've left out significant ingredients. For those who are reading such writers as Tim Lynch at Free Range International and Vampire 6 of Afghanistan Shrugged can easily see some of the serious errors being made in the actual theater of operations. Vampire 6 addresses the mistakes being made in the application of military efforts to secure the population, while Mr. Lynch is a strong advocate of not only military but also civilian COIN-related behaviors.

Lynch, who operates outside of the traditional parameters (meaning he doesn't stay within the Hesco-rimmed sanctuaries which harbor Green Beans Coffee shops and trailer park Burger Kings,) observes that we are making epic mistakes. Not only the Army but also USAID, the State Department and other governmental agencies who are responsible for and capable of making great differences in the security and development of one of the poorest nations on earth, whose security is linked directly to our own, are so busy protecting themselves that our efforts are being watered down to the point of ineffectiveness. Weak slurry... not pudding.

Dale, don't listen to the words and exhortations; look at the results. Here's another clue; we don't know how to measure success. The Army rates its own performance constantly. It does this on an individual basis as well. Every leader gets evaluated on his or her performance. The Army has a couple of forms that are used for this; the OER (Officer Evaluation Report) and the NCOER (Non Commissioned Officer Evaluation Report.) The NCOER is a rigid format. The OER includes something called an OER Support Form. Officers basically tell their supervisors what they are going to do and thereby set the objectives by which they are measured. The support form is done in conjunction with input from the supervisor, but the rated officer himself has a considerable amount of input into what the parameters of his evaluation are to be.

The Army is big on measurables. Most businesses are, too. Here's the beginning of the rub; how do you measure success in a counterinsurgency? In Vietnam we learned that enemy body counts are not a good measure. In fact, counting how many enemy you have killed is so counterproductive as to pretty much ensure that you are not going to be successful. What is most important to the military in a counterinsurgency? Securing the populace. How do you measure that? Do you go by the number of instances where civilians are harmed? Do you go by how many successful incidents of insurgents targeting civilians there are over a period of time? If so, does the loss of civilians to the actions of coalition forces count against a commander... or the whole series of commanders from the most local to the highest in that chain?

Leaders will put their efforts towards the measurables upon which their OER/NCOER is based. They will work for the reward; the good evaluation that sets them above their peers for promotion purposes. Witness these recommendations from the recently released Rand report:

•Introduce the creation, use, and employment of effect-based metrics into all echelons of leader and staff training. Training must include understanding the link between causality or correlation and outcomes, the importance of incorporating local conditions in metric development and assessment, and the use of qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics for aggregation and interpretation at higher levels of command.
•Conduct systematic reassessment and refinement of metrics at periodic intervals. Review metric baselines to ensure that they remain relevant.
•Establish a doctrinal metric framework that promotes objective definition from the top and identification of input measures from the bottom, with effects as the common link.
•Use a red-team approach to assist in metric development and evolution.
•Portray metrics by using simple, easy-to-understand tools that facilitate commander decisions.

~ Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rand National Defense Research Institute, November, 2008

While these recommendations had to do with measuring effects (and therefore success) in counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, if OERs were based on such metrics, officers would be exceedingly interested in them, including how they are developed and how they are affected. They are not, currently. Here is one of the effects of the current setup:

That so many leaders at every level were less familiar with counterinsurgency than they should have been means that they failed to educate themselves. ~ ibid.

The Rand authors are not saying these things because they felt like spouting off; they are making recommendations based on the same things that I have seen.

This could go on and on, but there is one more thing upon which I will rest at this point; we are not training our subordinates in COIN. I have been saying this for awhile, and the good people at Rand have seen the same thing. As long as we are not training our junior leadership in COIN, we are not taking it seriously. This despite the fact that most of our junior leaders will not be members of the Army by the time the next major conventional conflict arises. Here is a telling statement as to the importance of well-trained junior leadership and decentralization:

Decentralization, and therefore good junior leadership, is essential to urban-operation mission accomplishment. ~ ibid.

We're not the Lone Ranger in this. The Dutch have apparently realized this and not they are training specifically.

Dutch leaders were concerned when some of their combat-unit soldiers demonstrated intolerance for Afghans in their AO. Recognizing the importance of maintaining positive relations with those able to provide critical intel, they introduced predeployment training that instills in their men and women the vital lesson of taking more than merely their own perspective. (he Royal Netherlands Army is now also considering in-theater reinforcement training in this regard.) ~ ibid.

Not being the only one in the boat doesn't make it any more right to be in it, by the way. Now the Dutch are kicking our butts in mission preparation, by the sound of it, because we don't do any of that. We train for stuff that doesn't happen, like protests outside the FOB. My young SECFOR from New York were better prepared to time warp back to the 1968 Democratic National Convention than they were for Nuristan.

Okay, so how does this tie in to the silly question of why success in our current COIN ventures won't bring us to the verge of empire? Because first, we're not getting it right... yet. The Army does very difficult things, and it's actually full of smart people, including a pretty large number of well-educated smart people. Not only are these people smart and fairly well-educated, but they are also well-trained. Any corporation would give their portion of the bailout to have people who were this well-trained and dedicated. When have you seen Chevrolet send tens of thousands of people overseas and pretty much every single one of them actually went? No, they can't pull that off... because try as they might, they can't get that kind of training and discipline instilled in their employees.

So they just send the jobs instead.

The point is that real, effective COIN is hard. It's complicated and it's hard. If it were less than really really difficult, we would have gotten it right probably sometimes after the first few years to attempting it. COIN? Nope. Never did get it right in Vietnam, and now we're over seven years into it in Afghanistan and we're losing ground. Now, some may say that's because it can't be done.

Slackers. They are like when my son insisted that his shoes were impossible to tie because he was struggling with learning how to tie them. He tried to sell me on the idea that, due to Velcro, shoelace tying was an archaic and dying art. It turned out with the proper training and education, he could indeed master the ancient art of shoelace tying.

There was one more thing that he needed: motivation. If the motivation to develop his new skill had been less than the motivation to assist the good people at 3M in the furtherance of their business growth objectives and their endless pursuit of the Italian shoe market, my son would still be wondering what in the hell rabbits running around trees had to do with footwear.

Those who insist that Afghanistan is too hard or not worth the effort required to actually do the job right are pretty much right along in that vein... except most of them are nearly four feet taller than my son was at that point in his life. The effect is the same. Now, if someone can just figure out how to motivate them to buckle down and learn how to tie this shoe... well, you get the idea.

Oops... there's part of the equation that's been left out.

Sometimes it seems we are the only people dealing with the beladiya [community government]. I have a MiTT [military transition team] with the battalion. There is a [MiTT] with the brigade. There is no equivalent on the civilian side.”

Huh? Civilian side? Yes, civilian side. You see, the biggest reason that we aren't going to take this COIN thing global once (if) we get it right is because it's going to require civilian governmental work, too. You see, one of the really cool things about these Rand guys is that they can see that it takes civilians to teach civilians how to run a government and how to start and run businesses.

Whoa... what a concept. You know what that means, right? Yep... hard work. Hard, tough work that isn't the easiest thing in the world but will bring a deep sense of satisfaction from helping some folks pull themselves up by their bootstraps and grow into the 21st Century. You guessed it... totally against the principles of government employees.

That in itself will prevent future governmental types from getting any screwy ideas about conquering the world in the furtherance of apple pie, baseball and democracy.

There you go... once again Old Blue has saved the world from the Cato-strophic consequences of well-executed COIN to whirled peas.

Actually, Membrain answered the question much more succinctly, but I still had a good time. Thanks for reading.

Not Now, Cato!

2009-03-06T06:12:00.004+04:30

In the Pink Panther series of movies, Inspector Clousaeau had a trusty companion whose job it was to keep Clouseau sharp by attacking him at the most inopportune times, like when he was just coming in the door. The cry of inspector Clouseau at these inappropriately-timed attacks rang through my memory this evening.

Earlier I indulged myself in ruminating all over Abu Muqawama's post this afternoon. I missed the point. Completely. COL Gian Gentile made an appearance and raised one of his calls, which is like Pavlov performing a cowbell concerto to me. Gentile was not the point. In part it was a response to Justin Logan at the Cato Institute, who criticized Exum's statement that real counterinsurgents want less counterinsurgency, not more of it.

More after the jump...

Exum's response sparked a discussion of the differences between policy, strategy, operations and doctrine. The discussion widened to include "grand strategy" and so on and the discussion in comments seemed to take a turn. Somewhere around my delight at seeing Gentile present a question that I thought, "Oooh! Oooh! I got it!" I lost the point. I completely forgot to read Logan's petulant post which had inspired the need to discuss policy vs doctrine. I posted two lengthy comments and, satisfied, went about finding things worth reading.

Having opened Logan's post in a separate tab, I eventually came back around to it. "D'oh!" I said to myself. Not only had I missed the point, but there had in the meantime been a response to Exum's post by Benjamin Friedman.

Sheesh, fellas, he's barely warmed the seat he's occupying. As with Clouseau, Cato attacks before one is settled in the house.

Logan quotes a Bush NSC member in what appears to be a slam by agreement, then settles on his point:

Orienting planning and resources more toward COIN is likely to lead to more counterinsurgency wars. I’m pretty confident in this prediction. If somebody disagrees, I’d like to hear a better fleshed out argument behind the idea that telling policymakers “we now know how to do COIN pretty well” will lead to those policymakers to decide we ought to do it less.

Mr. Logan's main peeve is that people like Exum, if successful, will provide politicians with a capability that they just shouldn't be trusted with, and so the best alternative is to not develop the capability.

Friedman strikes with a slightly different approach with a similar theme, first exhorting Exum to exercise his stark power as the FNG at CNAS, and then stating the meat of his argument:

Second, the stark divide between strategy and operations is an ideal. The theory that the military services are only professional technicians serving the ends of politicians is too simple. The Army has political interests, which change with its structure and leadership. Those interests affect our defense and foreign policy.

I will not argue that, given the opportunity, the military will influence policy. Leaders of any significant organization in this country will, given the opportunity, say their piece and will attempt to influence policy. In fact, isn't that what think tanks do?

The question is, how is becoming capable of succeeding in what is now a shooting war in Afghanistan threatening? How does the Army's addition of "secure" to the bag of tricks alongside "attack" and "defend" threaten these two men? Their response is that of threatened men, and it appears that they are irritated with Exum for having joined CNAS, who they wish would quit advocating counterinsurgency as a remedy for terrorism. I will have to look into Cato's recommendations for dealing with terrorism. I don't know anything about their corporate stand on that topic. The only thing I do know is that they object to the CNAS take on it.

More clear to me is that the realist view of small wars wars could use support.

Friedman wraps it up,

They say that the best solution is don’t do it and next best is to severely curtail your objectives and stop confusing counterinsurgency with counterterrorism.

Personally, I'd like to see my Army quit confusing counter-guerrilla with counterinsurgency. Perhaps then this discussion wouldn't seem somewhat silly. What this argument seems to settle into is that good counterinsurgency will not only not help stop terrorism, but will also lead policymakers into trying to change the governments of even more countries. You know, if the government ever "got" counterinsurgency, and that removing one government in favor of revamping the governmental landscape of a nation will include counterinsurgency; understanding that really effective counterinsurgency is not a purely military exercise, then the enormity of the task would be plenty discouraging to its wanton application.

A quick glance at the current state of Afghanistan will answer the question of whether the United States Government in its many forms has truly learned this lesson.

It seems to me that their real fear is has to do with the policymakers, not the military's attempt at development and deployment of doctrine to satisfy the requirements put on its plate by those policymakers.

Happy Dance

2009-03-05T05:46:00.003+04:30

I won! I won! I won!

No, it's not the lottery, it was a contest at Abu Muqawama. While I can't claim to have perfectly deciphered the cryptic etchings of two Pentagon-bound think-tankers, I have been declared the winner by Abu Muqawama himself. That makes it official. (He makes the rules.)

This is very exciting.

If you haven't already, please go and wish Andrew Exum (Abu Muqawama's human incarnation) good things in his new position as a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, where he joined Dr. John Nagl and an all-star cast this week.

~Blue

We Found A Duck; Now Let's Cook One For A Good Cause

2009-03-04T10:14:00.004+04:30

The votes are in, tabulated, certified by the auditor, protested, recertified by the auditor, and de-chadded.

It's a duck. 91% of the 87 votes cast say it's a duck. Only Robert Young Pelton, Max ~~Factor~~ Forte, ~~Vladimir~~ John Stanton, and a couple of their cronies voted for "eagle."

Question: If the duck votes for "eagle," does it count?

Well, we'll be egalitarian and count it. The good news is that over 90% of people can spot a duck. Thanks for voting.

Now that we've found a duck, it's time to cook it. Honor Their Service, Inc. is a non-profit group (still waiting for their official 501c(3) letter) who perform good works such as Operation Santa in hospitals and Operation Fresh Air.

Carrie Constantini, President of Honor Their Service Inc. says, "Our events have always been modest proposals. They do not require lots of money to execute. We are budgeting about $500 to put on one Operation Fresh Air... that's a day of fishing, food and fellowship at Leesylvania State Park for wounded/injured servicemembers and their families at Walter Reed and Bethesda."

Because they are not officially a tax-exempt charity until they have that letter, there are legal complications to them taking donations over the 'net; so they are going to provide something of value... a cook book of recipes from milbloggers and their readers.

First things first; they need recipes. Please go and read a better post about this and then see if you can add something to the duck stew. Or... you can click on my newest widget to the upper left below the oh-so-scary 2-2 Vampires Logo. (It will take you to the same post... it's just more fun.)

Let's give some great wounded warriors a fun day out with their families. To quote Wilford Brimley, "It's a good thing to do and a tasty way to do it."

~Blue

Welcome Back To The Suck, My Friend

2009-03-03T10:10:00.006+04:30

Months ago, I read my first post by Vampire 6. I commented, and he emailed me back to tell me that he had read my posts while preparing to deploy. As Bouhammer pointed out, we are links in a chain. Vampire 6 is the current baton-carrier for the embedded trainer types in Afghanistan. He's done some fantastic posts, sharing the experience and the frustrations wonderfully. His "Illum, Illum, Where Art Thou?" should be required reading for battalion commanders deploying to Afghanistan.

I've had the privilege to get to know Vampire 6 over the past months not only through his posts but also through emails and a brief phone conversation that he squeezed into his leave. Vampire 6 is now back in The Suck and posting again. I told him that when he got back it would feel different, and he told me via email from FOB Bermel that he feels it, but can't put his finger on it. It took me back to my own return, fresh from the normalcy of home, family and the mall.

The change... Afghanistan feels different; but I'm convinced that it's inside us. Coming home hits the reset button. Riley had us on trajectory. First there is the shock of entry... like jumping into a pool. The mind is busy with accepting, reorganizing reality. The job takes over, a comfort level is established. There is the relief of competence... the deepest fear of any Soldier is to fail his comrades, to be that guy. We hit a comfortable stride in the marathon of our deployment. We begin to feel nearly at home in the stark poverty.

Leave, and home, are a distant dream.

More after the jump...

Then, in a blur of misery and warped time, we are home. The reality of home hits us and we are comfortably numbed. It's so real, so comfortable, so normal. We get our first taste of being the ghost; walking among our fellows who have no clue that less than a hundred hours earlier we were walking in a country that we can describe but never convey. Harm's way was just where we went to work. No one can look at us and just know. It's like having a secret. We discover that most do not care. Seeing our friends, it's like it always is with old friends; like we had seen them last week. Except we have seen something that has changed the way that we see everything. It's not PTSD. It's having our vision changed by knowing something that we will struggle to put into words completely. Those of us who write about it have a blessed outlet. Those who can't or won't try to express it will suffer for it.

We feel what we knew we had been missing, but like the taste of certain foods, it's better than we had even remembered it; being around those who love us unconditionally and for whom the dust and rocks and varying looks from bearded men are still alien. We realize our personal isolation while in country; part of a team that we will remember forever and for whom we will always have a special bond that only happens under such circumstances... but we are isolated from the presence of our family. Our solitary journey home in the company of so many others had only driven home that isolation. Our team soldiers on while we make our pilgrimage.

When we return, the spell is broken. The rhythm that we had found; the stride is changed. It's like pausing for lunch in the middle of a marathon. The rhythm will never quite be the same. It just feels different. This is the phase that no one told us about. The reset button has been hit. Home has now changed the way Afghanistan looks and feels.

But Afghanistan has changed the way that the world looks and feels. Home will never be quite the same, either.

Godspeed, Vampire 6.

Go click on the nifty 2/2 ETT skull icon at the top left of my page and buy a t-shirt. The money supports a Marine Veteran-owned business with $5.00 from each shirt going to Soldiers' Angels. No serving Soldiers receive any money, but you get a really cool shirt.

Shout Out To Tampa-St Pete

2009-02-28T03:28:00.002+04:30

I know there's a couple of readers down there, I can see you on the SiteMeter!

... Aunt Muriel? Cousin Larry? Anyone?

Please look at this and see if you can do a little to show some support. Perhaps a little cheering or something?

We each do what we each can do. It all adds up.

Thanks,

Blue

Here Is Bacevich's Counterpoint; John McCain

2009-02-27T23:37:00.002+04:30

A day after posting that there was no point/counterpoint between Nagl and Bacevich, SWJ puts up the content of Senator John McCain's remarks to the American Enterprise Institute.

Bacevich offered no counterpoint to Nagl. Nagl moves past the question of "why?" and gets to the "how," which Bacevich never does. McCain's remarks serve as an excellent rebuttal to Bacevich's stance. Nagl's piece stands without challenge in substance.

Anyone? COL Gentile?

Two Very Smart Men; Missing The Point-Counterpoint

2009-02-26T23:27:00.007+04:30

Dr. John Nagl is always ready for a point/counterpoint type of exchange with an opposing point of view. In his latest joust, Dr. Nagl takes on Professor Andrew Bacevich in U.S. News and World Report. Dr. Nagl offers a course of action that is predicated upon the belief that Afghanistan - and Central Asia - is vitally important to the security of the United States. Prof. Bacevich dismisses even addressing this issue in what appears to be a de facto assertion of the irrelevance of Central Asia to national security, and counsels that departing Afghanistan is the only way for President Obama to truly cast his legacy. This misses the Point/Counterpoint that was advertised.

More after the jump...

Dr. Nagl, the new President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS,) a Washington-based think tank which was co-founded by Michelle Flournoy, a very smart woman in her own right and recently sworn in asAmerican goals in Afghanistan have suffered from the most fundamental of all strategic errors: insufficient resources to accomplish maximalist goals. Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, presents the opinion that success in the Afghan Campaign of the GWOT is achievable. He also presents a pretty horrendous picture of what that success will cost in terms of troops deployed, at least initially. This is tempered by a call for transition to a sustainable Afghan force, backed by advisers and force multipliers such as air power, in order to maintain security gains. In the midst of this, Dr. Nagl notes that this needs to be more than a purely military solution.

While an expanded international commitment of security and development forces can assist in the achievement of these goals in the short term, ultimately Afghans must ensure stability and security in their own country. Building a state, even if it is a flawed one, that is able to provide a modicum of security and governance to its people is the American exit strategy from Afghanistan...

...Success in counterinsurgency requires the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic assistance to a country afflicted by insurgents; Gen. David McKiernan, the American commander responsible for the International Security Assistance Forces, briefed just such a strategy to a group of scholars visiting Afghanistan in November. Unfortunately, he has not been given the resources required to accomplish his mission.

These are things that have been said before here on this page, and are proof that I do not have an original thought in my head. The point here, and stated clearly in Prof. Bacevich's response, is that there is no purely military solution to any insurgency. It requires a holistic approach that we have not been pursuing.

I tend to agree strongly with most of Dr. Nagl's points, and the one that gives me pause is the troop requirement, which I believe to be excessive. On this point I may well be wrong, but my central point remains that if we were in fact performing full-spectrum counterinsurgency we would not be suffering so in Afghanistan. A quick review of the many ideas being bandied about, and the widely divergent opinions of such smart men as Nagl and Bacevich, display our absolute national confusion as to how to resolve this situation favorably. Our own Armed Forces, particularly the Army, struggle with the embrace of such strategies and tactics to the point that the institution itself has become practically schizophrenic.

Any Soldier who has deployed will tell you that there are two Armies; the one that is deployed and fighting and the one that resides in non-combat areas. This is not a statement of standards of living, but an observation of the training and preparation for war done at home station as opposed to the actual Soldiering that is done in the Theater of War. Some active duty units do a better job than others, but Guard units are still training for WW-III or at least some more conventional war. Even at pre-deployment training there are things that are taught as gospel that bear little to no resemblance to what is actually done in-theater, especially in Afghanistan.

A case in point was that of SSG Smokey Jackalacker. SSG Jackalacker was the subject of the subject of some humor on this site, but those humorous points had a purpose; to demonstrate the failure that we have had in preparing our Soldiers for this war. SSG Jackalacker and all of his compatriots underwent their pre-deployment train-up at Fort Bragg. You would think that, on a post which hosts elite units that have spent many months in the suck of Afghanistan, the pre-deployment training would be the very best theater-focused immersion training that the Army could possibly provide.

SSG Jackalacker and his men were "immersed" in a "FOB" complete with role players who frequently demonstrated outside the gates of the "FOB." Not once in a year in Afghanistan did I see, on any of the many FOBs I visited or worked out of, a single demonstration. Not once. Yet hours and hours of training and mental bandwidth were spent preparing for the most unlikely of potentialities while critical aspects of training were completely absent.

SSG Jackalacker had heard the word, "counterinsurgency," but really was utterly and completely clueless as to what it meant. Heavy on the "utterly" and the "clueless." SSG Jackalacker's mind was stuck on thirteen years of training for narrow-spectrum Infantry operations and all of the inapplicable training that he had been subjected to in a three month train-up at Ft Bragg. After a quick review of what his training, I had to sing to SSG Jackalacker the same song so many have heard upon arrival in the theater; "Forget everything they taught you except your weapons, your combat lifesaver, and your communications. We will show you how it is done for real."

Many of the active duty units that do a good job, due to repeated rotations, of training theater-specifically in counter-guerrilla tasks. Note that counter-guerrilla tasks are not the full spectrum of counterinsurgency tasks. While the survival and small unit combat skills are necessary, junior leaders, particularly NCO's, are woefully untrained in COIN. Commanders are not judged by how secure the populations are relative to the arrival and departure of their units. Success as a commander is measured by how many missions were executed, how much humanitarian aid was delivered, and their casualties relative to any apparent damage done to the enemy, among other things. Nowhere in the appraisal process is an attempt made to measure the opinion of the local populace, the center of influence in any counterinsurgency campaign.

Dr. Nagl points to a lack of resources made available to the highest military authority in Afghanistan to do what he knows to be the right thing. GEN Petraeus, who pushed down counterinsurgency behavior to the small unit level in Iraq, knows these things, too. The Armed Forces can only do so much in the counterinsurgency. Iraq has had more of the non-military resources devoted to it, and has a lot more of the basic material (such as the basis of an economy) than Afghanistan has. Iraq has an institutional memory of how to govern itself and provide basic services to its constituents. Dr. Nagl points out that Afghanistan lacks this.

Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires.

Dr. Nagl then presents a solution; but it is a solution predicated upon our Armed Forces conducting proper counterinsurgency and our civilian government making just as big a commitment to supporting the non-military organs of the Afghan government. This writer does not see these as foregone conclusions.

Additional troops will be successful only if they are employed correctly. Relearning the classic "clear, hold, and build" counterinsurgency model took several years in Iraq, but to date there are insufficient international or Afghan forces to hold areas that American troops have cleared of insurgents. As a result, the troops have had to clear the same areas repeatedly—paying a price for each operation in both American lives and in Afghan public support, which suffers from Taliban reprisals whenever we "clear and leave."

The alternative requires not just more troops but a different strategy. After an area is cleared of insurgents, it must be held by Afghan troops supported by American advisers and combat multipliers, including artillery and air support. Inside this bubble of security, the Afghan government can re-establish control and build a better and more prosperous community with the help of a surge of American civilian advisers.

Andrew Bacevich, also a very smart while very pessimistic man, weighs in from his angle and, perhaps unwittingly, points to the very deficiency in our current strategy that makes Afghanistan appear, to those who will not clearly see the solution, as an imponderably sodden mass of confusion.

Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight.

Bacevich then launches into a flawed and overly simplistic three-phase analysis of the war. His analysis is hamstrung by a traditional military analytical approach, and a total dismissal of any effects at all from the application of rudimentary counterinsurgency doctrine down to the unit level.

What Bacevich's analysis appeared to do, surprisingly, is bring to light the very inability of traditional military thought to accurately decipher the events that have occurred as the conflict changed from conventional warfare into irregular warfare. His analysis of the early phases of the war hint at a foreboding that simply defeating the armed defenses of Iraq and the Taliban regime would not be sufficient to bring relief from the threat, but as the analysis goes on Bacevich is only able to discern the failures without seeming to understand why they occurred. His attributions of the military and civilian failures on the local level are to the overarching political decision-making rather than on the inability of the United States to effectively shift gears with the changing needs of the situation. Bacevich appears to be stumped.

Yet efforts to achieve a military solution yielded not decision but escalating levels of violence. Confident chatter of ending tyranny and liberalizing the Islamic world ceased. The strategic focus narrowed further: In common parlance, "the war" no longer meant the larger struggle against terrorism; it meant Iraq. There, U.S. commanders had willy-nilly adopted a strategy of attrition, which produced frustration on the battlefield and backlash on the home front.

In frustration Bacevich dismisses any American change of doctrinal behavior by utterly ignoring it and instead launches upon a political analysis of the presidential campaign and the war's effect upon it. While this appears to be diversionary, it is not.

Petraeus launched what was in effect a salvage operation. The emphasis shifted from chasing insurgents to protecting the Iraqi people. Under what was styled as the Sunni Awakening, the United States offered money and arms to militants who promised to cease attacking coalition forces. Thanks to this "surge," the level of violence in Iraq diminished appreciably. Although Petraeus by no means solved the Iraqi conundrum, he pulled that country back from the precipice of disintegration.

This limited success did not suffice to redeem the presidential hopes of Sen. John McCain, who made his support for the surge the centerpiece of his campaign. Barack Obama, a consistent critic of the war, beat McCain handily.

Bacevich then lends more credence to what has become a common meme; that the conflict in Afghanistan suddenly and nearly inexplicably degenerated in 2008 and that the safe zones in Pakistan were somehow a new problem.

In 2008, the Taliban returned to the offensive. Allied casualties increased. Fighting spilled across the border into Pakistan, which became the Long War's de facto third front.

Any veteran of Afghanistan who spent much time "outside the wire" in the past several years could tell you that the Taliban had been getting bolder and bolder with each passing year. Until 2008, 2007 had been by far the most violent year in Afghanistan, and there was plenty of cross-border activity that year including air strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in the FATA. While Musharraf's government was much more amenable to such cross-border activity, they are by no means new. Bacevich's depiction of the apparently sudden resurgence of the Taliban demonstrates that his awareness of Afghanistan, like that of the American public's, is lost in a fog prior to this year. Until this year Afghanistan was "the forgotten war," and everyone who slogged around in the dust of the Hindu Kush knew it. Even the Army forgot that it existed. In our preparations for deployment as embedded advisers, it became a running joke that our briefings would start off on the wrong foot.

"When you arrive in Iraq..."

"Uh, Sir?"

"Yes?"

"We're going to Afghanistan."

"Oh."

While Bacevich is not alone in his misunderstanding of Afghanistan, the entire tone of his piece is a political viewpoint. This is not a point/counterpoint, as the two men are discussing two completely different topics. Nagl's advice for how to bring about success is an appeal to both military leadership and political leadership to take a well-rounded counterinsurgent approach, while Bacevich's ultimate appeal is not to military decision-makers but to one man; President Obama.

The time to address these questions is now. Obama's freedom of action will never be greater than it is today. Should he dodge these issues and plunge more deeply into Afghanistan, the Long War will very soon become Obama's War. And he will richly deserve the obloquy to be heaped on his head as a consequence.

The real difference between these two men begin with their respective appraisals of the national security implications of Central Asia and Afghanistan's role in it. If you feel that Afghanistan is in any way significant as a key to national security in the future, listen to Dr. Nagl very carefully. If you are convinced that retreat from that theater will not bring adverse consequences for our security, then cite Professor Bacevich liberally.

Yep, It Quacks Just Like A Duck

2009-02-25T10:56:00.003+04:30

With the kind permission of Neptunus Lex, I bring two comments out of his vault, both made today. I'll let you be the judge.

I say it quacks just like a duck.

RYP // Feb 24, 2009 at 2:27 pm

Sadly, yet another series of untruths from Old Blue in addition to the ones he has already corrected. I have never met Ted Turner or Wes Clark and I have no business relationship with them.

You can see the site I own at http://www.iraqslogger.com. Not that exciting or even close to being a Human Terrain program killer. I gave Steve and his crew free subscriptions after I first met him and offered to hook him up with a number of research sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I like Steve and wish him well.

There are quite a few errors, inventions and misstatements in his latest iteration. Its clear that he steadfastly keeps the focus off the actual problems in the HTT program by desperately tries keep pulling rabbits out his hat.

And yes, I would think that most people on this forum would agree that the truth is always worth a ferocious defense but invented offense is probably worth ignoring.

Emphasis mine.

Old Blue // Feb 24, 2009 at 6:01 pm

Please allow me to deposit the BS flag as gently as possible.

So after he left CNN, Mr. Jordan called up his former boss and longtime mentor, Ted Turner.

“I didn’t ask for money, but for his advice and guidance,” Mr. Jordan said. Mr. Turner sits on Praedict’s advisory board, as do former Presidential hopeful Gen. Wesley Clark, Iraqi Red Crescent president Dr. Said Hakki, Gen. James Marks and Lord Richard Bethell Westbury.

“The company has been largely funded out of my pocket, with some help from a couple of angel investors,” Mr. Jordan said. Mr. Jordan declined to specify who the angels were, beyond saying that they were not members of the advisory board.

Praedict’s U.S. staff consists of co-founder Robert Pelton, author of a book on the inner workings of military contractors; journalist Nir Rosen, who chronicled the Sunni and Shiite resistance starting in 2003; Zeyad, an Iraqi CUNY student who uses only his first name; Amer Mohsen, who critiques the Iraqi press; and Ms. Shen.

http://www.observer.com/node/36590

Just sayin’…

I do not understand how one can not have a business relationship with someone on the advisory board of a company in which you are a co-founder. Can anyone help me to sharpen my business acumen? I'm obviously missing something here. Can this possibly make any sense at all?